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Abstract 
In decisions from experience tasks objective information regarding payoffs and 
probabilities must be inferred from samples of possible outcomes. A series of 
recent experiments has revealed that people show deviating choice behaviour in 
such tasks, indicating underweighting of small probabilities instead of 
overweighting of small probabilities as in decisions from description. In a range of 
experiments, the research presented in this thesis provides a new direction by 
showing that such reversals from overweighting to underweighting in decisions 
from experience are very robust and can be replicated even if all the existing 
explanations - sampling error, recency weighting and judgement error - are 
experimentally controlled for. Furthermore, reversals were replicated within 
common decision making biases like the common ratio effect. An important, but 
unexpected, new finding has been the observation of a reversed reflection effect 
under decisions from experience. This suggests that the difference between choice 
behaviour may not be restricted to underlying transformations of probabilities, as 
suggested in the literature. Drawing from an extensive range of model tests and 
parameter estimations, it is also demonstrated that the differences are reflected in 
the best fitting parameter values for prospect theory under decisions from 
experience. However, it is also shown that simple reinforcement models, which 
provide a more intuitive rationale for experiential choice behaviour, can account for 
the data just as well, without any assumptions regarding the weighting of 
probabilities. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
CHAPTER 1 
DECISIONS FROM EXPERIENCE LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates the choice phenomena observed in decisions from 
experience, a new strand of research that has received a lot of attention in the recent 
decision making literature. This first chapter provides a brief introduction to 
research on experience-based decision making and the concepts relevant to it. It 
will begin with an overview of the theoretical concepts established in decision 
making under risk in general and the experimental paradigm of decisions from 
description which has so far dominated this field. It will also present the empirical 
choice phenomena observed in risky choice together with the most prominent 
choice models that have been developed to account for these findings. Thereafter, 
Section 1.4 will introduce another family of decision making tasks that have been 
revisited in a number of recent publications, namely, experiential choice tasks that 
fall within the domains of decision making under risk and uncertainty. The 
paradigm of decisions from experience will be introduced and the literature on 
experience-based decision making will be summarised. The decisions from 
experience paradigm is the basis for the experimental work presented in this thesis. 
Research from related disciplines that have also investigated the impact of learning, 
feedback, and experience in decision making tasks will be drawn upon in the 
subsequent sections. Further, a review of the research on probability and frequency 
judgements will be offered as this will be important in order to understand the 
different processes that may be involved in experiential choice tasks. Finally, this 
1 
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chapter will conclude with an outline of the motivation for the research of this 
thesis and a brief look forward to the following chapters. 
1.2 Decision Making Under Risk 
Before we can understand the significance of choice phenomena observed in 
experiential choice tasks we first need to look at the brief interdisciplinary history 
of decision making under risk in general and the choice paradigm that has been 
dominating this area of research. Since its beginning, the theoretical investigation 
of risky decision making has been preoccupied with the examination of various 
games and gambles. This is probably not a coincidence, as one of the pillars of the 
discipline, mathematical probability theory, is also said to originate from 
correspondence over a gambling problem' (see Gigerenzer, 1989). This tradition 
can be traced into the present where the problems in decision making under risk are 
still presented in the form of simple gambles, comprising a choice between pairs of 
prospects. In this context a prospect (x1, pl;...; x , p) 
is defined as a gamble 
yielding the outcome x; with the probability p;, where E p; = 1. In the case of only 
two outcomes, of which one is zero, the notation can be simplified to the form (x, 
p) with (x, p; 0,1 p). The summary description of such a pair of prospects is 
usually presented to experimental participants in the form of a list. 
1 Blaise Pascal and Pierre Fermat are said to have founded modem probability theory over the 
discussion of the so-called Problem of points which was first mentioned in a 15 `h century textbook 
by the Italian mathematician Luca Pacioli. 
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For example, 
A: Get $x with probability p, $0 otherwise. 
or 
B: Get $y for sure. 
Another milestone in the progression of decision theory, the shift from 
expected value to expected utility (EU) theory, was also instigated by a game, the 
St. Petersburg lottery. Expected utility theory, originally proposed by Daniel 
Bernoulli (173 8/1954), assumed that prospects like the above are evaluated by 
comparing the sums of the products of the subjective utility of the option's 
outcomes u(xl), which is a positive monotonic but decelerating function of the 
desirability of a monetary amount xi, and the probability of obtaining these 
outcomes p1, 
EU=I pu(xi) (1.1) 
and that people choose the prospect with the higher expected utility over the option 
with a lower expected utility. With its formal axiomatic derivation by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), EU was established as both a normative model 
providing a benchmark for how people should make decisions and a descriptive 
model of how people actually make choices between options. 
The descriptive nature of the model was soon to be questioned though, as 
there was accumulating evidence showing that for some pairs of prospects the 
observed choice behaviour did actually violate EU axioms. The two most important 
violations were the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) and the Ellsberg paradox 
(Ellsberg, 1961). 1 will not attempt to provide a comprehensive review of all the 
inconsistencies found at that time (for more details see Camerer, 1992; Kahneman 
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& Tversky, 1979; Starmer, 2000) but I will devote some space to the Allais 
paradox as it illustrates a set of choice phenomena that will also be relevant for 
later sections of this thesis. The first choice problem designed by Allais (1953) was 
of the following form: 
or 
A1) $1 million 
B1) $5 million, . 10; $1 million, . 89; $0, 
. 
01. 
In a second game the prospects to choose between were: 
A2) $1 million, . 11; $0,. 89; 
or 
B2) $5 million, . 10; $0, 
. 90. 
Each pair shares a common consequence (. 89, $1 million within the first pair and 
. 89, 
$0 within the second pair) and the second set can be derived from the first by 
subtracting the common consequence of . 89, 
$1 million. According to the 
independence axiom of EU theory the preferences within the two pairs should be 
independent of such common consequences and people should consistently choose 
either `A1' + 'A2' or `B1' + `B2'. Instead, Allais (1953) discovered the predominant 
choices to be `A' for the first and `B' for the second pair which is called the 
common consequences effect. 
In another example the following gambles were used: 
Cl) $3000 
or 
D 1) $4000,. 80; 
$0,. 20. 
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By dividing both options by four we get a second set 
C2) $3000,. 25; 
$0,. 75; 
or 
D2) $4000,20; 
$0,. 80. 
Here, one usually finds the majority of subjects to prefer the sure option `C 1' with 
the lower expected value within the first set and the more risky high expected value 
option 'D2' in the second set. This is again a violation of the independence axiom 
of EU theory according to which people choosing `C' or `D' in the first gamble 
should choose the same option in the second problem. As the ratio of p and x for 
`C' and `D' is identical in both sets this phenomenon is referred to as the common 
ratio effect. Both of the paradoxes illustrate the certainty effect which describes the 
fact that changing the probability of an outcome by a constant factor has more 
impact when either the initial or the resulting probability involved certainty (p = 
{0,1 }) than when it was and remained merely probable. This is commonly 
illustrated by Zeckhauser's paradox: When playing Russian roulette people would 
be willing to pay more for the removal of a single bullet from a gun with only one 
bullet in the six chambers than for the removal of one bullet from a gun with four 
bullets in the six chambers. 
Another violation of EU, which will be of interest later is the reflection 
effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) which can be observed when subjects are 
presented with the options C1 and D1 shown above and the same gambles 
consisting of losses of identical size instead of gains: 
CO -$3000 
or 
D3) -$4000,. 80; 
$0,20. 
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The inversion of the sign of the outcomes results in a preference reversal indicating 
a change in risk preference. People seem to be risk averse in the context of gains 
and risk seeking in the context of losses. 
When we put these results together we can see a pattern emerges which has 
become known as the four fold pattern of risk attitudes (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992), consisting of risk-averse behaviour for gains with medium to high 
probabilities or losses of small probability and risk-seeking for losses with medium 
to high probabilities or small probabilities in the domain of gains. Both the Allais 
paradox and the reflection effect will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
In their seminal paper Kahneman and Tversky (1979) presented the 
powerful and formally appealing Prospect Theory (PT) that could explain the 
descriptive deficiencies mentioned above and which would dominate decision 
theory thereafter. One of the most substantial contributions of PT was the 
distinction between a value function and a probability weighting function. The 
value function v(") is defined over changes in wealth (gains or losses) instead of 
absolute levels of wealth. In order to account for the changes in risk preference 
mentioned above the value function is assumed to be S-shaped with concavity 
within the domain of gains (v "(x) <0 for x >0) and convexity in the domain of 
losses (v "(x) >0 for x< 0), reflecting diminishing sensitivity for both domains 
with increasing distance from the reference point. Furthermore the function is 
steeper for losses than for gains, resulting in losses looming larger than equivalent 
gains (-v(-x) > v(x) for x>0), see Figure 1.1 
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Value 
Gains 
Losses 
Figure 1.1. Example of a typical PT value function. 
The more important and novel part of the model though, was the addition of 
the probability weighting function w(") which captures the impact ofp on the value 
of a prospect, see Figure 1.2. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) small 
probabilities are overweighted and large probabilities are underweighted. As a 
consequence w(p) + w(1 p) do not necessarily add up to unity. In the context of the 
Allais paradox described above, this means that, if decision weights do not scale 
linearly, scaling down the probabilities by a common factor can change preferences 
and thus Cl might be chosen over D1 more than C2 is chosen over D2. In particular, 
if small probabilities are overweighted, the ratio between the weights of .2 and . 25 
may be higher than between .8 and 1, 
because the smallest probability (. 2) gains an 
additional boost. 
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The original form of the weighting function was discontinuous2 at both ends 
and later gave way to an inverse S-shaped version which has been consistently 
replicated after being subject to direct empirical tests involving descriptions of 
simple gambles (e. g. Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt, 2001; Camerer & Ho, 1994; 
Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Wu & 
Gonzalez, 1996). 
to 
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ß--. S6 
Figure 1.2. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) weighting function for various y values 
(redrawn from Wu & Gonzalez, 1996) 
The PT weighting function w("), according to Tversky and Kahneman (1992), has 
the following functional form: 
2 The original prospect theory paper (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 283) explicitly mentions 
ambiguities regarding the behaviour of the weighting function at the extreme ends and predicts that 
"highly unlikely events are either ignored or overweighted, and the difference between high 
probability and certainty is either neglected or exaggerated". 
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w(pj)= 
Pi 
, 
if xj >05 
_ (Pi +(l pi 
s Pi 
s 
ps + ý1 p1 
(1.2) 
There are two parameters (y, S) which determine the shape of the weighting 
function separately for gains (y) and losses (b). To determine the value of a gamble 
(p, x; q, y), both functions are combined multiplicatively in the form 
V(p, x; q, y) = w(p)v(x)+ w(4)v(Y). (1.3) 
This functional form and the interplay of the properties of v(") and w(") can explain 
the four-fold pattern of risk attitudes and the common consequence and common 
ratio effects. 
It did not take long though before additional empirical phenomena were 
found that neither PT nor its refinement cumulative prospect theory (CPT) by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) could account for (see Camerer, 1992,1995). A 
comprehensive review of all the latest paradoxes is provided by Birnbaum (2007). 
Alternative models have been proposed since then, including regret theory 
(Loomes & Sugden, 1982), rank-dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 1982,1993), 
aspiration-level theory (Lopes, 1987), decision by sampling (Stewart, Chater, & 
Brown, 2006; Stewart & Simpson, in press) and the TAX model (Birnbaum, 2007), 
to name but a few. However, CPT still dominates the literature and is considered as 
the most influential theory (Bleichrodt, 2001; Starmer, 2000; Wu, Zhang, & 
Gonzalez, 2004). 
5ifxj <0. 
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We can see from this section why simple static lotteries have been so 
appealing. They provide clearly separable properties which can be controlled easily 
to identify specific properties of behaviour in risky choice or to test different model 
predictions. Whenever paradoxes are observed within these gambles they become 
important benchmarks for which subsequent models must account. This has led to a 
number of significant contributions that have enhanced our understanding of 
decision making under risk and it is therefore not surprising that the field has been 
dominated by this paradigm for more than half a century. 
1.3 Choice under uncertainty 
Although the simple gamble paradigm has been "as indispensable to research on 
risk as is the fruitfly to genetics" (Lopes, 1983, p. 137) it also has its limitations. 
Until now we have only been dealing with gambles that involved prospects for 
which all probabilities attached to the consequences have been known to the 
decision maker. These situations involve risk and risk should be distinguished from 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921). Uncertainty defines situations in which some of the 
probabilities are unknown (i. e., the decision maker must estimate or infer the 
probabilities, and may be able to do so very imprecisely). Most sports bets, for 
example a bet on a football team winning, are examples of uncertain outcomes. No 
objective probability exists for this event, only subjective assessments regarding its 
likelihood. In the context of real-life situations one can assume that most decisions 
are made under at least partial uncertainty (Busemeyer, 1985) which is not 
represented in textbook gambles (Wu & Gonzalez, 1999). The first theory put 
forward to deal with this alternative strand of decisions under uncertainty was 
Subjective Expected Utility (Savage, 1954), which introduced a subjective 
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probability measure in addition to a personal value function. Later, with CPT the 
basic PT was generalised to accommodate uncertain outcomes as well. The two- 
stage model (Fox & Tversky, 1998; Tversky & Fox, 1995) provided another 
extension of PT into the domain of uncertainty, assuming that the probability p of 
an uncertain event (E, x) is judged by the decision maker in a first stage, before the 
subjective probabilityp(E) is then transformed using the probability weighting 
function w(. ), 
W(E)v(x) = w(p(E))v(x). (1.4) 
Empirical tests conducted by Wu and Gonzalez (1999) lend support to this model 
and demonstrate that the same inverse S-shaped pattern of risk preferences which 
Wu and Gonzalez (1996) found for risky choice can also be applied to uncertainty. 
As I will show in the following section, the theories of both domains, decisions 
under risk and uncertainty provide useful concepts that can be applied to a new 
category of decision problems, decisions from experience. 
1.4 Descriptions vs. Experience 
From the previous sections we have seen that a lot experimental evidence has been 
accumulated in experiments using simple descriptions of gambles, supporting the 
notion of an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function across the domains of 
both risk and uncertainty. Consequently, it came as a surprise when a series of 
recent studies reported choice behaviour that differs sharply from that observed in 
decision making tasks using classical lottery descriptions: crucially, choices 
appeared to indicate an underweighting of small probabilities rather than an 
overweighting (e. g., Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004, 
11 
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
2006; March, 1996; Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004). What all these studies have in 
common is the use of a different type of choice tasks. As pointed out by Busemeyer 
(1985) decisions under uncertainty can either be based on past experience with 
similar situations or on information about the outcomes actively collected prior to 
making a decision. Whereas Tversky and Fox (1995) examine the former, the 
experience-based decision tasks discussed here investigate choices that are based 
on novel, actively sampled information. To understand the potential causes of the 
reversal from over- to underweighting it is important to examine these tasks more 
systematically. 
1.4.1 Small feedback-based decisions 
The early experiential paradigms reporting a pattern of underweighting of 
small probabilities are repeated choice problems consisting of several hundred 
trials of consequential decisions whose accumulated outcomes constitute the final 
score (e. g., Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev & Barron, 2005; March, 1996). This strand 
of work goes back to the animal learning tradition initiated by the work of 
Thorndike (1898) and the law of effect, after which options that have led to good 
outcomes in the past are more likely to be chosen again. Models incorporating this 
principle in different ways had later a renaissance in the probability learning 
literature, which I will also discuss in one of the following sections. Furthermore, 
these learning models have been shown to provide a useful framework to 
investigate repeated binary choices (Erev & Haruvy, in preparation). 
One specific type of repeated decision making problems referred to as small 
feedback-based decisions (Barron & Erev, 2003), provided the first evidence for 
apparent underweighting of small probabilities in experiential choice. In small 
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feedback-based decisions participants have to choose between the same two 
options repeatedly over hundred of trials. Although they start off with no 
information about the outcomes of the two options they receive feedback in the 
form of payoffs from the chosen distribution after every single trial. The decisions 
in this context are referred to as `small' because the expected consequence of each 
individual choice comprises very small payoffs of only a few cents. Significant 
amount are only accumulated over time. The learning curves obtained from this 
data also allow the examination of the changes in choice behaviour across trials 
with the accumulation of feedback. 
The method is similar to the one used by Busemeyer (1985) with the 
difference that participants sample from binary events instead of normally 
distributed outcomes. However, this kind of task has to be distinguished from the 
repeated play of gambles (see Keren & Wagenaar, 1987; Lopes, 1981; Wedell & 
Bockenholt, 1990) where participants are typically asked to select which of two 
gambles they would prefer to play repeatedly (e. g. 10 times) after a one-shot 
decision, whereas small feedback-based decisions actually involve repeated play 
with a new decision in each trial. 
In addition to differences in the maximising choice proportions compared to 
decisions from description, Barron and Erev (2003) also found mirrored common 
ratio and reflection effects, which are all reversals of phenomena usually reported 
in descriptive choice tasks. The authors see the explanation for the observed 
deviation as relating to the possibility that people rely excessively on recent 
outcomes. This only emerges in the context of feedback-based decisions where 
information has to be accumulated over time. With the participants' final payment 
being contingent on the accumulated total score this procedure poses potential 
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problems that exacerbate the interpretation of the results. Firstly, there is an overlap 
of two different, potentially opposing, strategies within each trial. The 
accumulation of information regarding the potential payoffs (exploration) coincides 
with the selection of the option that appears to offer the highest expected value in 
order to maximise the total score (exploitation). Or, as Lee (1971, p. 248) describes 
it, a participants "learns while he earns" (see also Berry & Fristedt, 1985; Erev & 
Barron, 2005; March, 1996). An alternative with a rare but high payoff, for 
example, comes with the cost of receiving inferior payoffs in most of the trials 
resulting in a restrained information search for this option (see also Denrell, 2007). 
This adds additional dynamics to the problem and makes the task structurally 
different from a descriptive one shot decision making problem. Secondly, it 
remains unclear whether the behaviour shown is due to the impact of experience 
itself or whether the preference reversals are driven by repeatedly playing the 
gambles. 
1.4.2 Decisions from Experience 
The necessary disentanglement of these confounding variables was achieved by 
Weber, Shafir and Blais (2004) and Hertwig et al. (2004,2006) who introduced an 
improved experimental design. In an initial sampling phase participants could 
freely explore a pair of lotteries without cost (or reward) by drawing samples (with 
replacement) from the options' underlying outcome distributions (e. g., a participant 
might sample the sequence {4,4,0,4,0,4} from a distribution with a .8 chance of 
winning 4 points and 0 points otherwise). Only after this sampling phase can 
participants decide which lottery to play once for real. Hertwig et al. (2004) refer to 
this paradigm as decisions from experience (hereafter called DfXP) and distinguish 
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it from decisions from description (DfD), the paradigm described above. By 
separating the sampling phase from the actual one-shot decision this design gets rid 
of the exploration-exploitation trade-off and distinguishes itself from small 
feedback-based decisions. 
Hertwig et al. (2004) found reversed choice proportions in six different 
gambles (see Table 1.1) between DID (showing apparent probability 
overweighting), and DfXP (showing apparent underweighting). 
TABLE 1.1 
Summary of the choice proportions reported by Hertwig et al. (2004) 
Percentage choosing H 
Decision 
Problem H L Rare event DfD DfXP 
1 4,. 8 3,1.0 0,. 2 36 88 
2 4,. 2 3, 
. 
25 4,. 2 64 44 
3 -3,1.0 -32, .1 -32, .1 
64 28 
4 -3,1.0 -4,. 8 0,. 2 28 52 
5 32, 
.1 
3,1.0 32, 
.1 
48 20 
6 32, 
. 
025 3, 
. 
25 32, 
. 
025 64 12 
In choice problem 1, for example, only 36% of the participants in the DfD 
Condition chose the more risky option (H option) with the higher expected value, 
whereas the same option was chosen by 88% in the DfXP Condition. Similar 
results were reported by Weber, Shafir and Blais (2004). Another reversal towards 
more H choices under DfXP is observed for choice problem 4. However, it is 
important to note though, that there are also reversals in the other direction, for 
example for problems 2,3,5, and 6, with lower proportions of H choices under 
DfXP. According to Hertwig et al. (2006) the difference between the two formats 
can be attributed to a differences with regard to the psychological impact of the rare 
events. As the impact of rare events under DfD is usually described by 
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overweighting of small probabilities the reversed pattern would indicate apparent 
underweighting of small probabilities under DfXP. Such a dependence on the 
impact of the rare event is illustrated in the Table above. If a rare event makes an H 
option unattractive, like the 20% chance of winning nothing in choice problem 1, 
the underweighting of this rare event will make this H option more attractive and 
increase the proportion of participants choosing it. On the other hand, if the rare 
event is the part of an H option that makes it attractive then underweighting of its 
probability will have the opposite effect by penalising this option, for example in 
problems 5 and 6 in Table 1.1. 
Although the participants were free to sample as often as they wanted 
Hertwig et al. (2004) report that the participants' information search prior to choice 
was based on a rather small number of samples. Crucially, in such a sampling task, 
when there is a low probability event and the sample is small, the number of times 
the event occurs in a given sample is positively skewed. Using the previous 
example (. 8 chance of winning 4 points and 0 points otherwise), if we have 100 
people who only draw 10 samples each from this distribution, on average 38 will 
experience 0 points fewer than twice, and will thus underestimate the true 
probability of receiving 0 points, including 11 who will not even experience the 
zero outcome once; 30 will experience 0 points exactly twice and will correctly 
estimate the probability; and 32 will experience the zero outcome more than twice 
and will overestimate the probability. This positive skew pattern occurs for all rare 
binomially distributed events and is also confirmed by Hertwig et al. 's data which 
shows that in some cases participants did not encounter the rare event at all and 
stayed completely ignorant of its existence. Although the asymmetry between 
underestimation and overestimation is small, Hertwig et al. (2004) argued that it is 
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one of the sources of the underweighting of low probability events. While the 
implementation of the DfXP paradigm helped excluding repeated choice as a 
potential cause it came at the cost of introducing sampling error as a new confound. 
Hertwig et al. (2004) also tested whether an overemphasis of outcomes 
from more recent samples may explain the apparent underweighting of rare events 
in DfXP (as shown by Barron & Erev, 2003). They split the sequence of draws 
from each option into two halves and found that the expected values of samples 
from the second half of the sequences predicted participants' performances much 
better than the expected values of samples from the first half. 
In summary, Hertwig et al. (2004) suggested that reliance on small samples 
of information (perception of a lack of variability) and overweighting of recently 
sampled information (recency effect) are the possible explanations for the 
underweighting of rare events under DfXP. However, there is also a potential 
interaction between the two as having less exposure to a rare event also reduces the 
probability of encountering it in one of the recent trials. 
Generally, prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) does not seem to 
predict choice satisfactorily within decisions from experience as it assumes 
overweighting, not underweighting of small probabilities. Hertwig et al. (2006) 
consequently tried to develop a model that can account for the data by 
incorporating recency weighting in a Bush and Mosteller (1955) type stochastic 
learning model, which is an example of that old learning theory tradition, in 
combination with PT's value function and a recency parameter. This value- 
updating model provides choice proportions that approximate the observed 
proportions quite well and will be explored more fully in Chapter 6 where it will be 
compared with other potential modelling solutions. 
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Similar to the reliance on small samples explanation, Fox and Hadar (2006) 
argue that sampling error in DfXP reconciles an apparent overweighting of small 
probabilities in decision from description (as embodied in prospect theory, 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), with an apparent underweighting of small 
probabilities in decisions from experience. That is, underweighting occurs because, 
in small samples, rare events are simply not sampled very frequently. Hence, the 
phenomenon is not psychological, but results from the statistical properties of small 
samples. Hertwig et al. (2004) had not fully considered this as they evaluated the 
choice behaviour using the experimenter defined probabilities. 
Furthermore, Fox and Hadar (2006) also raise the possibility of a distortion 
through judgement error, which might arise in the mapping from experienced 
frequencies to probabilities (i. e. at the first stage of the two-stage model of 
decisions under uncertainty (Fox & Tversky, 1998; Tversky & Fox, 1995), 
described above). However, they provide evidence against this possibility. By 
adding an explicit probability judgement task to the design, they show that 
probability judgements in their experiment were well calibrated. Moreover, they 
successfully applied prospect theory value- and weighting-function parameters 
reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), originally fitted to descriptive 
problems, to individual probability judgements, and found a good fit with the 
observed choices. Fox and Hadar (2006) therefore argue that apparent evidence for 
underweighting of probability in decisions from experience is, in reality, entirely 
consistent with overweighting of probabilities, as found in descriptive choice 
problems. 
The existence of a sampling error, however, highlights the actual difference 
between the two paradigms. Whereas, a summary description in DfD is 
18 
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
standardised, providing the same information for every participant, in DfXP 
participants' experienced probabilities are likely to differ from the objective 
probability depending on the sequence of outcomes actually observed. The initial 
DfXP design is thus not an adequate method to investigate the question whether 
people exhibit a different choice pattern when faced with experiential choice 
problems that are structurally identical to gamble descriptions. 
One of the goals of this thesis is to provide an answer to this question. The 
thesis will take up these points after the introduction has further explored the links 
between decision making and learning, feedback and experience as they have been 
investigated in other areas of psychology or related research fields like economics, 
animal learning and foraging behaviour. 
1.5 Other related decision making tasks 
Although feedback, experience and learning have not been investigated intensively 
in the decision making literature other domains have investigated these issues more 
closely. This section will provide a brief summary of the type of problems studied 
elsewhere and will highlight important findings that could provide insights for the 
decision problems discussed here. 
1.5.1 The 1950's: Probability Learning 
A task very similar to the type of experiential problems introduced above, 
especially with small feedback-based decisions, is the probability learning 
paradigm, which, as I already pointed out earlier, has its roots in the animal 
learning tradition that dates back to Thorndike (1898), investigating formalisations 
of principles inherent to human learning phenomena. Probability learning has been 
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studied extensively within experimental psychology in the context of mathematical 
learning theories (Estes, 1950) during the 50's and 60's right into the late 70's. 
Reviews of this literature can be found in Estes (1976), Fiorina (1971) and Myers 
(1976). More recent surveys are provided by Shanks, Tunney, and McCarthy 
(2002) as well as Vulkan (2000). 
In a typical experiment involving probability learning subjects have to 
predict repeatedly which one of two binary outcomes is going to appear in a long 
series of trials. The event to predict could be the appearance of a light on the left or 
right side of a screen, or the colour of the next card drawn from a deck with blue 
and yellow cards. The probabilities attached to the different events are fixed and 
usually independent of previous responses and outcomes. After each prediction the 
participants receive feedback by revealing the actual outcome. 
The striking observation in these probability learning tasks was that the 
asymptotic probabilities of predicting the different outcomes were equal to the 
outcomes' relative frequencies of occurrence. This indicates that subjects are able 
to learn the probabilities with which events appear quite accurately. Furthermore, it 
implies that people use a sub-optimal strategy and fail to maximise expected value. 
To illustrate this point, imagine a pair of stimuli of which one (A) appears 70% of 
the time the other one (B) 30% of the time. By probability matching and predicting 
`A' in 70% of the cases and `B' in 30% of the cases the rate of correct predictions 
will be only 58% (. 72 + . 32). Instead, the optimal strategy would be to consistently 
predict the event that has been identified as the more likely one, resulting in a 
correction prediction rate of 70% (1.0 *. 7). Sub-optimal behaviour in the form of 
asymptotic probability matching has been replicated in numerous experiments with 
humans, rats, pigeons and monkeys. It has also been found in multiple-cue choice 
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tasks (e. g. Estes, Campbell, Hatsopoulos, & Hurwitz, 1989; Friedman & Massaro, 
1998; Myers, 1976; Shanks, 1990). Birnbaum and Wakcher (2002) have been able 
replicate the classical results with data collected over the Web by implementing a 
button design that is comparable with the one used in experiential choice tasks. 
However, there have also been results that complicate the picture further. A 
famous deviation from probability matching is the gamblers fallacy or negative 
recency (Anderson, 1960; Anderson & Whalen, 1960) which describes the 
tendency of consistently predicting the non-reinforced option based on the belief 
that a run without successes will be balanced out by consecutive future successes, 
thereby misinterpreting the law of large numbers and neglecting the independency 
of the events. Other departures from probability matching in the direction of more 
rational behaviour, so called overmatching or overshooting, have been observed 
under conditions with larger incentives, meaningful feedback and extensive 
training (e. g. Edwards, 1956,1961; Shanks et al., 2002; Siegel, 1959; Siegel & 
Goldstein, 1959). Although all these different manipulations indicate that the effect 
is less robust than initially thought (Friedman & Massaro, 1998), they do not seem 
to eliminate it completely (Myers, 1976). 
The most successful models predicting similar asymptotic learning curves 
have been stochastic learning models (e. g., Bush & Mosteller, 1955; Estes, 1950) 
which incorporate different updating mechanisms upon the received reinforcement. 
A review of the predictions and progression of Estes' model can be found in Bower 
(1994). Alternative models have been built on assumptions regarding the usage of 
runs and patterns that people might have identified within sampled outcome 
sequences (Edwards, 1956; Goodnow, 1955; Nicks, 1959; Restle, 1961). These 
approaches are much more difficult to formalise (Vulkan, 2000), as there is a vast 
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number of potential hypothesis that can be formulated. Yet another strand of 
explanation for the gap between matching and optimisation was the assignment of 
utilities to switching between options in late trials. This includes utility gained 
through the reduction of boredom or an increased utility for successful prediction 
of the less frequent outcome (Brackbill & Bravos, 1962; Siegel, 1959). 
Probability matching tendencies have also been found in the context of the 
experiential decision problems. Erev and Barron (2005), for example, reported 
deviations from maximisation in small feedback-based decisions that can be 
approximated by probability matching. Underweighting of small probabilities in 
small feedback-based decisions on the other hand cannot be explained by 
probability matching (see Barron & Erev, 2003). However, DfXP describes a 
slightly different paradigm that has to be distinguished from probability learning 
tasks in a number of ways. One of the differences lies in the reinforcement. In 
probability matching and small feedback-based decisions people are facing the 
trade-off between exploration and exploitation mentioned earlier. Related to that, 
DfXP is a single shot decision task with a sampling or learning phase prior to 
choice whereas probability learning tasks are repeated choice tasks. Thus, in DfXP 
it is not possible to test for probability matching as it does not provide sampling 
trials long enough to reveal stable asymptotic performance. There is also a 
difference in terms of the degree of practice to which participants are exposed. In 
the case of probability learning this comprises hundreds of trials or even a thousand 
(Edwards, 1961). Subjects therefore base their choice on much more data than 
under DfXP, which is characterised by an extremely short information search of 
less than 20 samples per choice problem. 
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Although both tasks are quite distinct, the findings from the probability 
matching literature could still prove to be relevant for the identification of the 
properties causing the apparent underweighting of small events. The processes or 
choice strategies behind the two phenomena could overlap and the models 
introduced in this literature could provide alternative approaches to understand the 
DfXP phenomenon. Of special interest in this context are the Bush and Mosteller 
type stochastic learning models that have already been tested in the domain of 
DfXP in the form of the value-updating model (Hertwig et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
the probability learning literature has put forth some additional approaches to 
explore such trial by trial data which has not yet been utilized or tested in DfXP. 
This includes models that try to capture the impact of sequence effects, runs and 
patterns (Restle, 1961), which will be discussed in more detail later in Chapter 6. 
1.5.2 The 1970's and 1980's: Experience in the Judgement literature 
A similarly pessimistic view regarding the possibility of learning from experience 
and feedback has been discussed within the Judgement literature during the 70's 
and 80's. The research at that time was strongly influenced by the emergence of the 
heuristics and biases programme in decision-making which led to the discussion of 
conditions under which learning rules and heuristics can be acquired through 
experience (Einhorn, 1980). It was found that actual outcome feedback provided in 
real world environments is not adequate to learn heuristics and complex rules as it 
does not necessarily provide the relevant information (Brehmer, 1980). This might 
be due to the lack of the necessary schemata to make use of the information 
provided (Brehmer, 1980) or due to scarcity of feedback (Klayman, 1988). In an 
evaluation of a job selection procedure, for example, one might not have 
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information about incorrectly rejected candidates (false negatives) which would be 
important to judge the validity of the chosen strategy (Einhorn, 1980; Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1978). 
Instead it was shown that learning from experience in the form of feedback 
can actually reinforce normatively poor decision rules and result in a range of 
biases (Brehmer, 1980; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Hammond, Summers, & Deane, 
1973) in both deterministic and probabilistic tasks, without the agent being aware 
of it (Einhorn, 1980). The biases discussed included the tendency to focus on 
confirmatory evidence (Wason, 1960) and the inability to incorporate negative or 
disconfirming information (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Klayman, 1988). 
The predominant tasks used to investigate outcome feedback were single- 
and multiple-cue probability learning paradigms (Hogarth, McKenzie, Gibbs, & 
Marquis, 1991; Klayman, 1988). In these tasks complex probabilistic linear or 
nonlinear relationships between cue variables and a criterion have to be learnt 
through repeated outcome feedback. People show difficulties in learning these 
functions, especially when they are nonlinear and negative (a more detailed review 
is provided by Klayman, 1988). By looking at the acquisition of appropriate 
strategies in rather complex tasks like single- and multiple-cue probability learning 
experiments it is not surprising that performance was behind the predictions of 
normative approaches, such as Bayesian learning. The outcome-irrelevant learning 
structures referred to in this literature seem to be more complex real-life problems 
and do not necessarily overlap with more controlled laboratory tasks like DfXP, 
which provides immediate unambiguous feedback embedded in a repeated and 
identical context. It is therefore difficult to apply these results in the context of 
DfXP. As I will show in the following sections, there are alternative approaches 
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from other disciplines that are better suited to account for the type of experiential 
choice problems investigated here. 
1.5.3 Repeated gambles in the economics literature 
I have so far focussed on the psychological literature, but there is closely related 
work conducted in a different tradition: experimental economics. Due to their 
interest in learning processes experimental economists have a long tradition of 
investigating behaviour in decision making tasks with repeated trials rather than 
one-shot decision making tasks. First of all repetition helps the participants to 
familiarise themselves with the environment and the task (Binmore, 1999). In the 
context of complex games with multiple players it can also facilitate the 
understanding of one's own strategic options, the strategies used by the opponent, 
and the interaction of the two (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). Another motivation for 
economists to use repeated trials is their focus on equilibrium solutions. In the 
prisoner's dilemma or the ultimatum game, for example, people's one-shot 
decision behaviour does not necessarily fit with equilibrium predictions. However, 
when assuming an equilibrium to be established in the long-run, as asymptotic 
behaviour (Camerer, 1997; Fudenberg & Levine, 1998) and through an interactive 
process of trial-and-error learning (Binmore, 1999), people's behaviour changes, 
conforming to the Nash equilibrium. Some economists therefore share the view 
that within simply framed problems, providing adequate incentives and allowing 
for sufficient learning participants will get to equilibriums (Binmore, 1999) and 
expected utility maximisation will work as an appropriate descriptive 
approximation of individuals' true preferences (Plott, 1996). Chu and Chu (1990), 
for example, showed that the occurrence of preference reversals decreased when 
25 
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
participants repeated the experiment many times. Even the mere prospect of 
playing a gamble repeatedly seems to be sufficient to increase expected value 
maximisation in individual choice behaviour (Keren & Wagenaar, 1987). However, 
repetition does not always increase the tendency to use maximising strategies, as 
shown in probability learning tasks. 
A maximisation problem in economics that is similar to the experiential 
choice problems mentioned above are stationary replications of one-shot decisions 
called multi-armed bandit problems. Bandit problems, first mentioned by Robbins 
(1952) got their name from the analogy with a slot machine. In an n-armed bandit 
problem one can choose from n different options (similar to an arm or lever of a 
slot machine) which provide a reward drawn from its underlying distribution. The 
player iteratively chooses one of the arms each round and observes the associated 
reward with the objective to maximise the sum of rewards collected. Small 
feedback-based decision problems can be formalised as two-armed bandit 
problems with the two arms A and B, each associated with a probability of 
receiving a reward (p(A) and p(B)) where p(A) ý1 -p(B). As in the probability 
learning paradigm an optimal strategy would be to consistently choose the arm that 
maximises expected utility, after both p(A) and p(B) have been established in a 
series if trials. Instead of such rational behaviour probability matching is observed 
quite frequently which led to the application of stochastic learning models (e. g. 
Bush & Mosteller, 1955; Erev & Roth, 1999). This illustrates once more the 
obvious overlap between the different literatures on probability learning, bandit 
problems, reinforcement learning, and small feedback based decisions (Barron & 
Erev, 2003; Roth & Erev, 1995; Vulkan, 2000). 
26 
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
1.5.4 Risk sensitivity in the literature on animal decision making 
Another research area that has been looking into learning processes involved in 
decision making is the field of foraging behaviour and animal decision making. As 
in human decision making, risk-sensitive foraging behaviour in animals is 
compared with a benchmark in the form of a rational model, for example, 
maximisation of expected utility. The literature seems to document a great number 
of similarities between risky decision making in animals and humans including the 
fact that animals show analogous deviations from expected utility maximisation, 
for example intransitivity of preferences (Shafir, 1994) and violations of the 
independence axiom in standard Allais-type common ratio manipulations (Battalio, 
Kagel, & MacDonald, 1985; MacDonald, Kagel, & Battalio, 1991; Real, 1996). 
Yet there has also been experimental evidence for non-linear 
transformations in subjective probabilities that differ from the common finding in 
human risky choice. Instead of distortions of subjective probabilities in the 
direction of underweighting of high probabilities and overweighting of small 
probabilities, Real (1991) found over-representation of common events and under- 
representation of rare events similar to the finding in DfXP. The link between the 
two phenomena could be the learning mechanism shared by the experimental 
paradigms. With animals it is obviously not possible to directly communicate 
information regarding the risk attached to the available outcomes in the form of 
symbolic representations (Real, 1996). Instead the variability of the outcomes (e. g. 
magnitudes of food) can only be experienced by allowing the animal to explore the 
options in learning trials preceding choice. 
One of the models that has been proposed to explain ri sk- sensitivity data in 
animal choice is scalar utility theory (SUT) by Marsh and Kacelnik (2002) which 
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postulates a cognitive representation of outcomes based on an internal scale which 
is governed by Weber's Law. An alternative explanation using associative learning 
mechanisms has been found to predict risk-sensitivity under situations where risk is 
operationalised in the form of delay of reward (Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996), instead 
of variability of reward size. According to Weber, Shafir and Blais (2004), both 
approaches are using measures of risk sensitivity that are proportional to the 
coefficient of variation (CV), the ratio of the standard deviation of outcomes and 
their expected value. Unlike the variance or SD, the CV is dimensionless and 
allows comparisons across domains. More importantly, the CV proved to be a 
better predictor of risk sensitivity than variance or SD in both human and non- 
human choice data when information about the risky option is obtained through 
repeated sampling and personal experience (Weber et al., 2004). They also show 
that associative learning models similar to the fractional adjustment model (Bush & 
Mosteller, 1955) correlates strongly with the CV, which could explain the 
successful application of Hertwig et al. 's (2006) value-updating model in the 
context of DfXP. 
We can see from these sections on research from other fields that there are 
similarities with the problems under investigation here. Most of them resemble 
small feedback-based decision type tasks. The approaches that have been put 
forward to model the choices in experiential contexts on the other hand are quite 
different. The only overlap can be seen in the application of reinforcement learning 
models which seem to provide an appropriate description of the updating process 
on the basis of newly accumulated experience in experiential problems that 
incorporate an exploration-exploitation trade-off. How useful these insights are 
going to be in the context of the DfXP-type problems investigated here remains 
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unclear though, as the properties of these choice paradigms do not fully overlap. I 
will come back to this question when I discuss specific applications later. Although 
not explicitly mentioned a pre-condition for all the different tasks mentioned here 
is the ability to keep track of the actual outcome frequencies observed. Research 
investigating whether people are actually able to utilise this type of information 
will be presented in the next section. 
1.6 Proportion and Probability Judgements 
Although working with gambles presented in descriptive rather than experiential 
terms, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) already emphasised the distinction between 
probability weighting, which reflects the impact of an event, and the probability 
estimation, which is the perceived likelihood of an event, and noted that both 
processes may shape the perceived impact of rare events in real-life situations 
independently. This distinction is indeed very important in the context of 
experience-based decisions where the risk attached to an outcome has to be inferred 
from the frequency of occurrences, bearing the danger of an increasing incidence of 
deviations between objective and estimated probabilities. An alternative 
explanation for the apparent underweighting in DfXP could be a systematic 
underestimation of small probabilities. Overestimation, on the other hand, would 
have the opposite effect, increasing the impact of rare events and resulting in 
overweighting (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). But how does underestimation fit in 
with what we already know about the processing of frequency information? This 
section will review research that has been investigating people's ability to judge 
frequencies and probabilities and explore how this could be linked with the 
observed choice behaviour in DfXP. 
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In general, the literature acknowledges that people show an innate 
sensitivity towards relative frequency information within a range of different tasks 
(Zacks & Hasher, 2002) and that people show great ability in synthesizing, storing, 
and accurately retrieving occurrences of event attributes (Howell, 1973). Zacks and 
Hasher (2002) describe frequency of occurrence as "... a fundamental aspect of the 
information that people code about their experiences in the world ... 
"(p. 21). 
Provided estimates do mirror observed relative frequencies of the presented items 
quite well and their relationship can be described by an identity function (Peterson 
& Beach, 1967). Accuracy varies though and shows typically a small distortion 
with low frequencies being overestimated and high frequencies being 
underestimated (regression towards the mean) which Lichtenstein, Slovic, 
Fischhoff, Layman and Combs (1978) referred to as the primary bias. This is 
reported for both proportions (e. g., Erlick, 1964; Stevens & Galanter, 1957) and 
frequency judgements (e. g., Hertwig, Pachur, & Kurzenhauser, 2005; Peterson & 
Beach, 1967; Zacks & Hasher, 2002) of verbal and non-verbal stimuli and across 
different domains (language, statistical reasoning, and consumer decision making). 
One variable that has been found to be related to accuracy is sample size, with 
judgements of relative frequencies and proportions becoming more accurate with 
increasing sample size (e. g., Erlick, 1964; Sedlmeier, 1999; Shanks, 1995). 
Hintzman (1976) showed that frequency judgements were also independent of 
temporal recency of presentation and duration of presentation. Furthermore, this 
ability to encode frequency information has also proven to be remarkably stable 
across different age groups (e. g., Hasher & Chromiak, 1977; Hasher & Zacks, 
1979), underlining the early acquisition and the reliability of this skill which has 
led to the hypothesis that the ability to encode frequencies is innate and automatic 
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(Hasher & Zacks, 1979,1984). Sedlmeier (1999) reports evidence for the 
equivalence of probability and frequency judgements, especially when the input 
consists of serially encountered frequencies of events (Dougherty & Franco- 
Watkins, 2002). The apparent ability to accurately assess frequencies in our 
environment is also one of the arguments for the so-called frequentist hypothesis 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1996) which is based on the idea that frequencies provide a 
basic input for a wide range of reasoning processes and that the presentation of 
uncertainty in a frequency format instead of probabilities can eliminate biases that 
have been found in judgement under uncertainty (e. g. the base rate neglect in 
Bayesian reasoning, Christensen-Szalanski & Beach, 1982; Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage, 1995). 
There are only a few studies that provide counter examples for the high 
accuracy of frequency judgements. Lichtenstein et al. (1978), for example, report 
rather poor accuracy for direct estimates of various causes of death. This difference 
to previous work might be due to the fact that subjects had to estimate the 
frequencies of events (e. g. rare diseases) they were not very familiar with 
(Shanteau, 1978). Other exceptions are reported in more naturalistic studies 
involving respondents' reports on frequencies of their own behaviour and episodic 
recall. Suboptimal performance in these tasks seems to be due to the usage of 
different heuristics (Schwarz & Wänke, 2002), like the availability heuristic 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Very rarely do studies report a pattern of 
underestimation of low proportions and overestimation of high proportions (e. g., 
Nash, 1964; Pitz, 1966; Shuford, 1961; Simpson & Voss, 1961) that would explain 
choice behaviour in the direction of underweighting of small probability events as 
found in DfXP. 
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Thus, in the light of all this evidence judgement error in the direction of 
underestimation of low frequencies seems a rather unlikely phenomenon and would 
contradict the experimental findings already established. Instead, one should expect 
accurate judgements with slight deviations from the true values in a typical inverse- 
S shaped pattern, indicating overestimation of low-frequency outcomes and 
underestimation of high-frequency outcomes. This is also what is observed in the 
context of tasks that are quite similar to DfXP. As we have seen in the section on 
probability learning tasks, the accurate assessment of frequencies is one of the 
requirements for the ability to probability match (Estes, 1976). Experiential choice 
tasks provide similar environments with sequentially experienced outcome 
frequencies and one should therefore expect similar effects. A first test of the 
judgement error hypothesis was conducted by Fox and Hadar (2006), who added a 
probability judgement task to their DfXP design. Participants' estimates were well 
adjusted though and in line with the results from the literature summarised here. I 
will come back to this question in Chapter 3 where I will provide a series of 
experiments testing the effect of judgement error in DfXP. Several of these 
experiments were implemented in a Web-based format, a methodology that I 
introduce briefly in the next section. 
1.7 Web-based experimenting 
An extensive part of my research that I am going to present in the experimental 
chapters of my thesis has been implemented in the form of Web-based 
experiments. I therefore want to provide a brief discussion of Web-based 
experimentation, its advantages, its potential problems, and research on its validity 
before I outline why I have chosen to make use of this technology. 
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With the development of the Internet to a mainstream communication 
platform that is reaching into all areas of life there has also been an increased 
interest of psychologists in conducting research on and through the Internet (e. g. 
Birnbaum, 2004; Schmidt, 2001; Skitka & Sargis, 2006). The technological 
advancements in CPU performance, modern Web browsers and the increased speed 
of the available network connections, that now allow the streaming of whole TV 
programs, have made it possible to carry out more complex and graphics-intense 
Web-based experiments that go beyond the capabilities of the usual HTML 
surveys. Today Web-based research has also found its way into the most important 
publications in the field (Skitka & Sargis, 2006). 
My main motivations for using Web experimenting were the general 
advantages including low cost, uncomplicated participant recruitment, increased 
efficiency (Birnbaum, 2001; Fraley, 2004) and access to a wider and more 
heterogeneous sample which goes beyond the typical college students population 
(Skitka & Sargis, 2005). There is also evidence suggesting that participants respond 
more naturally when they are in familiar contexts like their homes instead of a 
laboratory environment (Skitka & Sargis, 2006). Nevertheless, there are also 
potential problems including the precision with which specific stimuli can be 
delivered (Krantz, 2001), uncontrolled contextual variations that can introduce 
additional error variance (Skitka & Sargis, 2006), differences between Web users 
and nonusers that may limit the generalisability of the findings (Birnbaum, 2004), 
non-response error due to low response rates (Skitka & Sargis, 2005) and repeated 
participation or fraud (Schmidt, 1997). A more detailed discussion of these 
advantages and potential limitations of Web-based research are provided in recent 
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reviews by Birnbaum (2004), Reips (2000; 2001) and Skitka and Sargis (2005; 
2006). 
There is substantial evidence regarding the equivalence of results obtained 
through Web and lab research for a wide range of designs and psychometric 
properties (Birnbaum, 1999; Buchanan, 2000; Buchanan & Smith, 1999; Krantz & 
Dalal, 2000). More importantly, a series of successful replications using Web- 
based research have been provided in the field of decision making using tasks with 
properties similar to the ones in DfXP tasks. This includes studies on violations of 
stochastic dominance and event-splitting effects in decision making under risk 
(Birnbaum, 1999,2000; Birnbaum & Martin, 2003), probability learning 
experiments (Birnbaum & Wakcher, 2002) and medical decision making (Waters, 
Weinstein, Colditz, & Emmons, 2006). Furthermore, Birnbaum (1999) found that 
the data quality, tested in the form of direct and indirect monotonicity, was actually 
better for the Web sample. 
There are many different ways of implementing Web experiments using 
server-side and client-side processing methods (for a review of these methods see 
Birnbaum, 2000; 2004; Fraley, 2004; Schmidt, 2001). A method that has only 
recently been utilised by psychologists in order to implement Web-based 
experiments, and which I have used to implement my experimental work, is Adobe 
Flash (e. g. Reimers & Maylor, 2005; Reimers & Stewart, 2007). Flash movies are 
displayed in the Web browser using a Flash plug-in which comes preinstalled with 
most of the available browsers on all major operating systems including Windows, 
Linux, MacOS as well as for handheld devices and the latest generation mobile 
phones. According to a survey conducted by Millward Brown, published by Adobe 
Systems Incorporated (n. d. ), the flash player is "the world's most pervasive 
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software platform ... reaching 
99% of Internet-enabled desktops in mature markets 
as well as a wide range of devices". Flash facilitates the development of ergonomic 
content combined with a timely presentation format and allows greater 
methodological creativity. 
With regard to experiments involving experience-based decision making 
tasks most of the reported experiments have already been implemented in a 
computerised format (e. g. Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004) which makes 
the transition to a Web-based experiment an easy step. It also has to be emphasised 
that the implemented design has been successfully used in the laboratory 
environment prior to the data collection on the web (see Chapter 2 and 3) and that 
the necessary steps have been conducted following the available guidelines (e. g., 
Birnbaum, 2001; Fraley, 2004; Schmidt, 1997). Given the reasons outlined here, I 
therefore believe that this is an appropriate technique to collect data on the 
experimental problem under investigation. 
1.8 Motivation for thesis 
The goal of this first chapter was to introduce the research on experiential choice 
tasks by providing the necessary theoretical background and the related concepts 
that have been identified in different research domains. It also reviewed the 
available studies on DfXP and their findings, indicating underweighting of small 
probabilities instead of overweighting of small probabilities in DfD. Furthermore, I 
have laid out the various hypotheses that have been put forward by a number of 
authors and the experimental work that has been conducted to test them. Notably, 
with the work of Fox and Hadar (2006) the focus has shifted from recency 
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weighting to sampling error. At the same time the question under examination 
seems also to have changed. Whereas the original studies conducted on experiential 
decision tasks were examining the effect of the format itself, the discussion now 
centres upon the inappropriateness of a specific design which obviously does not 
capture an experiential context that is structurally identical to a gamble description. 
Thus, the title of Fox and Hadar's (2006) paper, "Decisions from experience = 
sampling error + prospect theory", is therefore premature because it suggests that 
the underlying processes are the same for both descriptions and experience formats. 
However, as I have shown, there remain several confounds which make such 
interpretations difficult and these issues have not yet been explored appropriately 
or thoroughly. 
As a consequence, my own research seeks to make a directional contribution to 
the field and its continuing development by providing a series of experiments that 
investigate the equivalence of experience-based decision making and decision from 
description under more appropriate experimental conditions. Firstly, the thesis 
offers a comprehensive review of the different strands of research that have been 
conducted and will indicate where the current discussion can be profit from 
contributions in related areas of research. By specifically testing the sampling error 
hypothesis as an explanation for the established choice phenomena I will show that 
none of the variables that has been put forward so far - neither sampling error, 
recency weighting nor judgement error - is actually sufficient to explain the effect. 
This will help bring to a close the discussion on sampling error whilst 
simultaneously reopening the debate about the actual overlap of cognitive 
processes involved in DfXP and DfD. Further, I will provide evidence suggesting 
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that established choice models fail to account for the DfXP phenomena indicating 
that they are not able to capture the relevant properties involved in DfXP. Thus, an 
additional contribution will be an effort to identify the cognitive processes 
constituting the differences between description-based decisions and decisions 
from experience by investigating the impact of different properties of the actually 
experienced sequences. The main focus of the additional experimental work will 
therefore be an examination of sampling order effects including sub-sequences 
resulting from switching between options. Other sequential properties, like runs of 
outcomes, will be explored theoretically by testing a variety of models on the 
collected data, drawing on modelling work that has been developed in the context 
of the probability learning paradigm. 
The thesis is organised into a further six chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 will 
present initial experimental work conducted on the effect of sampling error. First, 
Chapter 2 will examine the contribution of sample size which has been identified as 
one of the sources for sampling error in the form of underrepresentation of rare 
events. Chapter 3 will go one step further by introducing a novel experimental 
approach which eliminates sampling error and thereby remedies the mentioned 
confounds in the original methodology. Additional questions arising from this 
work, including the effect of sampling order, will be the focus of Chapter 4. 
Thereafter, Chapter 5 will review the collected data in the context of established 
biases. Chapter 6 then tests how far different choice models that have been 
developed to account for decision making under risk from both description-based 
and experience-based choice tasks are actually able to explain the various strands 
of experimental evidence the thesis presents. The set of models considered will 
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include adaptations of models already established and one of my own modelling 
approaches which draws upon knowledge from other relevant areas of research 
within and outside the field of decision making in psychology but which, as 
discussed above, are pertinent to the problem constituted by DfXP. The thesis 
concludes in Chapter 7 with a summary of the findings, a discussion of the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the research presented and concrete 
suggestions for the different avenues of exploration that are crucial for the 
development of future research in this field. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DECISIONS FROM EXPERIENCE UNDER COMPREHENSIVE- 
SAMPLING (EXPERIMENT 1) 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1,1 noted that there remain a number of methodological shortcomings 
in the original DfXP design. The most significant of these is the difference between 
the objective and the experienced probabilities due to sampling error. We have seen 
that, in small samples, rare events can be underrepresented. In light of these 
differences in terms of the statistical properties of experienced samples, the 
research to date has overlooked the reality that DfXP tasks are not structurally 
similar to their descriptive counterparts. One way of resolving this issue is to 
increase the number of samples that participants have to draw. According to Fox 
and Hadar (2006), the apparent underweighting of probabilities should disappear 
when sampling error is reduced or eliminated. This chapter will provide an initial 
experiment testing this hypothesis. The motivation behind the design of the 
experiment presented here is two-fold. Firstly, it provides a replication of the 
original study testing the stability of the findings. Secondly, it investigates the 
impact of sample size on the apparent underweighting of small probabilities in 
DfXP. 
Before I describe the experiment, I wish to briefly establish two 
methodological concepts that are relevant to the sampling process. In the original 
DfXP design it was left to the participants to decide how many samples to draw 
from the two distributions. I will refer to this type of design as Free Sampling. One 
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way of reducing the impact of undersampling is the introduction of a higher, fixed 
number of samples that participants have to draw before they can choose between 
the two options. Such a Comprehensive Sampling design comes with the advantage 
of standardising the information search for all the participants across all choice 
problems, another methodological problem not accounted for in previous sampling 
tasks. The differences in choice behaviour between the Free-Sampling Condition 
and the Comprehensive-Sampling Condition are examined in the following 
experiment. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
51 participants were recruited from students and members of staff of the University 
of Warwick through advertisements and a subject panel. All participants received 
£2 for their participation. 
2.2.2 Stimuli 
The six decision problems presented were taken from the same set of gambles used 
in the original Hertwig et al. (2004) experiment. The options have different 
expected values. Four of the choice problems provide gains; the remaining two 
consist of losses (see Table 2.1). 
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TABLE 2.1 
Summary of the decision problems used in the experiment 
Options Expected value 
Decision 
HLHL Rare Problem event 
1 4, 
. 
8; 0, 
.2 
3,1.0 3.2 3 0,. 2 
2 4, 
. 
2; 0, 
.8 
3,. 25; 0,. 8 0.8 0.75 4,. 2 
3 -3,1.0 -32, . 
1; 0, .9 -3 -3.2 -32, .1 
4 -3,1.0 -4, . 
8; 0, 
.2 -3 -3.2 
0,. 2 
5 32,. 1; 0,. 9 3,1.0 3.2 3 32, .1 
6 32, 
. 
025; 0, . 
975 3, 
. 
25; 0, 
. 
75 0.8 0.75 32,. 025 
2.2.3 Design and procedure 
The experiment was set up as a between-subjects design with two conditions, a 
Free-Sampling Condition, as in the original DfXP design, and a Comprehensive- 
Sampling Condition, with a fixed number of samples per option. Assignment to the 
two conditions was random, as was the presentation order of the six choice 
problems. 26 participants were assigned to the Free Sampling Condition. The 
remaining 25 ran the Comprehensive Sampling Condition. Both conditions provided 
a sampling phase in which participants explored the two options represented by two 
buttons, `A' and `B', on a computer screen, followed by a final decision phase where 
they had to choose the option they preferred. 
Each click on a button in the exploration phase revealed an outcome from 
the option's underlying payoff distribution. The outcomes in both conditions were 
determined randomly (with replacement) for each participant and displayed for one 
second on top of the button pressed. While the outcome was displayed both buttons 
were ghosted out and inactive to prevent participants from clicking through the 
samples too quickly. The prerequisites to go to the following decision phase 
differed between the two conditions. The Free-Sampling Condition followed 
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Hertwig et al. 's (2004) paradigm: participants could stop the exploration of the 
buttons as soon as they felt confident enough to make a decision for real. However, 
in the Comprehensive-Sampling Condition participants had to sample 393 
outcomes from each option, in any order, before proceeding to the decision phase. 
After the 39th sample from one option its button turned shaded and further sampling 
from it was stopped. Figure 2.1 shows a screenshot of both exploration and the 
decision phase. 
Find out what payoffs the buttons have to offer and how likely it Is 
to get them. Just click on the buttons In whatever order you like 
and however often you wish and observe the outcomes. Wait for 
the outcome to disappear before you click again. 
Please press the 'NEXT' button as soon as you feel confident 
enough to choose an option for real'! 
"o """: ox LEARNING PHASE 
Which button do you prefer? 
Choose one of the buttons you have just sampled from by 
clicking on ft. It will be played once at the end of the experiment 
and the result will be added to your total score. 
El Ei 
"w""" 0% DECISION PHASE 
Figure 2.1. Screenshots from the sampling/learning phase (left) and the decision phase (right). 
In the decision phase participants had to choose between the two options 
they had previously sampled from. Whereas the outcomes from the learning phase 
did not affect their score, participants were informed that the option chosen in the 
final decision phase would be played once at the end of the experiment and the 
result would be set against their total. Participants were instructed to maximise the 
number of points they accumulate within the six choice problems. At the end of the 
experiment, all six lotteries were played randomly for each participant before they 
were informed of their points total. 
3 The reason for the 39 samples was a programming error, the original number was 40. 
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2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Free Sampling 
2.3.1.1 Information search 
One of the important observations in the original DfXP design was the limited 
information search resulting in sampling error. Within the Free-Sampling 
Condition a similar pattern could be observed. The number of draws was rather low 
with a median of 16.5 (M = 21.12) draws per choice problem. This matches the 
data reported by Hertwig et al. (2004) and Weber et al. (2004) who report values of 
15 and 17, respectively. Sample sizes were not very stable across the different 
choice problems with a median correlation of r= . 58. An examination of the 
sampling symmetry between the two options within choice problems revealed that 
in only 28 percent of all the cases participants had obtained an equal number of 
samples from both buttons. The median absolute difference between sample sizes 
for buttons A and B across all choice problems was 1 (M = 3.25). It can be seen in 
Figure 2.2 that participants sampled similar numbers of outcomes from options 
with the high and lower expected values (t(25) = 0.76, p= . 452). 
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Figure 2.2. Number of draws from the high and low expected value option across the six 
choice problems 
An examination of the sampling sequences showed that a number of 
different strategies were used to explore the two buttons. In 28% of all sequences 
the sampling process for one button was finished before the second button was 
explored, resulting in only one alternation between the two buttons. The opposite 
approach, continuous alternation between the two buttons was observed in 19% of 
the sequences. The median number of alternations was 3 (M = 6). To test the 
stability of the transitions between buttons the ratio of the actual number of 
switches and the potential maximum number of transitions (n-1) given the actual 
sample size n was calculated. Values close to one indicate a high rate of 
alternations whereas values approaching zero are a sign for a more separated 
exploration of the two options. A median switch ratio of . 
26 (M = . 
44) shows that 
there was a considerable amount of switching between options. Across all the 
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decision problems the switching ratios were relatively stable with a median 
correlation of r= . 68. 
2.3.1.2 Experienced probabilities and sampling error 
As in the original DfXP experiment, the short information search in the Free- 
Sampling Condition came with substantial underrepresentation of the rare events. 
Across all choice problems the rare events were encountered less frequently than 
expected in more than two thirds of the sampling sequences (69%). More 
significant is the percentage of participants who did not encounter the rare event at 
all, thus remaining ignorant of its existence. This applied to 49% of all sequences, 
which is in good agreement with the 44% mentioned in Hertwig et al. (2006). Only 
5% experienced the rare event as often as expected from its objective probability, 
leaving only 26% for cases of overrepresentation. Figure 2.3 provides further 
evidence for this interpretation, illustrating the positive skew of the distribution of 
differences between experienced and objective probabilities. 
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Figure 2.3. Histogram with the distribution of differences between experienced and 
objective probabilities. The bars to the left of 0 mark underrepresentation of the objective 
probabilities and the bars to the right mark overrepresentation of the objective probabilities. 
In summary, all of the properties of the sampling behaviour and information 
search found in the Free-Sampling Condition very closely resemble the patterns 
found in the original DfXP experiment. This includes sample size, sample 
symmetry and deviations between experienced and objective probabilities. Again, 
there is a tendency to draw small samples which comes with a systematic 
underrepresentation of small probabilities. 
2.3.1.3 Choice behaviour 
To clarify whether this underrepresentation of small probability outcomes has an 
impact on choice, I calculated the number of times the option with the rare event 
was chosen depending on the number of times the rare event was actually 
observed. It is evident from the differences between the last two columns in Table 
2.2 that the decision to choose the option with the rare outcome was partly 
46 
Chapter 2: Comprehensive Sampling 
influenced by the frequency of its occurrence. This relationship is mediated though 
by the valence of the rare outcome. Encountering a rare positive outcome less 
frequently than expected reduces the attractiveness of such an option, as can be 
seen in choice problems 2,4,5 and 6. For a negative outcome that is 
underrepresented the opposite is observed; it is chosen more often in cases where it 
is experienced less frequently than expected. This is illustrated in choice problems 
1and3. 
TABLE 2.2 
Choice behaviour depending on encounters with the rare event within the Free-Sampling Condition. 
Due to the small number of cases the category of encountering the rare event according to the 
objective probability was combined with the category of overrepresentation (last column). 
Options 
Impact 
Decision 
HL 
Rare of the 
Problem event rare 
event 
Percentage choosing option with rare event 
Rare event not 
Encountered 
encountered 
less frequently 
than expected 
Encountered as 
frequently as or 
more frequently 
than expected 
1 4,0.8 3,1.0 0_2 - 88(7/8) 87 (13/15) 45 (6/11) 
2 4,0.2 3,0.25 4,. 2 + 14(1/7) 42(8/19) 86(6/7) 
3 -3,1.0 -32,0.1 -32-1 - 89 (16/18) 81 (17/21) 60(3/5) 
4 -3,1.0 -4,0.8 0,. 2 + 13 (1/8) 21 (3/14) 67(8/12) 
5 32,0.1 3,1.0 32, .1+ 0(0/14) 0(0/17) 44(4/9) 
6 32,0.025 3,0.25 32, . 025 + 19(4/21) 19 (4/21) 40(2/5) 
With regard to the proportions of participants choosing the option with the 
high expected value (H option), they were found to be nearly identical to the 
proportions in the original Free Sampling Group of Hertwig et al's (2004) 
experiment, which is also reflected in a high correlation between the proportions (r 
_ . 94, p= . 
006). In order to test whether the choice proportions within the six 
choice problems differed between the two Free-Sampling Conditions, six separate 
contingency tables were constructed from the observed raw proportions. The 
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results of the Fisher's exact tests for these tables are summarised in Table 2.3. 
None of the six proportions differed significantly. 
TABLE 2.3 
Percentage of participants in the Free Sampling Groups who selected the H option 
Percentage choosing H 
Decision Free Sampling Free Sampling p-value (2-Tail) 
Problem Hertwig et al. (2004) Experiment 1 Fisher's exact test 
1 88 73 . 291 
2 44 54 
. 
579 
3 28 23 
. 755 
4 56 58 1.00 
5 20 15 
. 726 
6 12 23 
. 
465 
However, when comparing the proportions of participants choosing "H" 
under the Free-Sampling Condition in Experiment 1 with the proportions found in 
Hertwig et al's Description Group, a negative correlation was found, r=-. 57, p= 
. 229. This 
is also reflected on the level of individual choice problems. The p-values 
of the Fisher's exact tests on the comparisons within the six contingency tables are 
summarised in Table 2.4. Only the proportions of decision problems 2 did not 
differ significantly from the proportions in the description format. Across all 6 
choice problems, the mean difference between the proportions under Free 
Sampling and descriptive choice in this experiment was 32%, which is close to the 
36% found by Hertwig et al. (2004). 
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TABLE 2.4 
Percentage of H choices under descriptive choice and under Free Sampling 
Percentage choosing H 
Decision Descriptive Choice Free Sampling p-value (2-Tail) 
Problem Hertwig et al. (2004) Experiment 1 Fisher's exact test 
1 36 73 
. 
012 
2 64 54 
. 
572 
3 64 23 
. 
005 
4 28 58 
. 
048 
5 48 15 
. 
017 
6 64 23 
. 
005 
A different summary of this choice pattern is provided in Figure 2.4. The 
chart shows the differences in choice proportions between the DfXP and DfD 
formats across the six decision problems for both the Free-Sampling Condition in 
Experiment 1 and the Hertwig et al. data. The differences have been transformed so 
that the orientation of the bars can be interpreted in terms of the underlying 
difference in probability weighting. Positive bars indicate less overweighting of 
small probabilities in DfXP whereas negative bars indicate more overweighting in 
DfXP. The juxtaposition of the differences from the Hertwig et al. (2004) data 
shows that the direction in all six choice problems is identical to previous findings, 
implying less overweighting of rare events. 
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Figure 2.4. Differences in choice proportions between the descriptive and experiential 
choice proportions. The values are transformed so that positive values represent deviations 
in the direction of less overweighting. The white bars provide the original differences 
reported by Hertwig et al. (2004). 
2.3.1.4 Recency weighting 
As pointed out in the introduction, one of the main candidate explanations for the 
choice pattern has been recency weighting which assumes that the most recently 
encountered outcomes have more impact on choice than outcomes that have been 
observed earlier in the sequence. If this is true then recency weighting should be 
observable by comparing the predictive power of different parts of the experienced 
sequence. Following the analysis conducted by Hertwig at al. (2004), 1 split the 
outcome sequences of each button into two halves and calculated their expected 
values. The option with the highest expected value was predicted to be chosen, 
separately for the first and second half. A comparison of the predicted choices with 
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the actually observed choices showed that there was no significant difference 
between the percentages of correct predictions of earlier and later samples (74% vs. 
76%, t(24) = -. 51, p= . 612). Both 
halves predicted choice equally well. 
2.3.1.5 Application of descriptive choice models 
Thus far I have shown that the choice behaviour deviates from the one usually 
observed in descriptive choice, replicating Hertwig at al. (2004). The question now 
is how well established choice models like EV or PT, which have been developed 
on the basis of descriptive choice phenomena, can account for the findings 
presented here. This section will provide an initial test of the performance of 
expected-value based models. A more detailed analysis including additional 
models used in related task and a comprehensive comparison will be presented in 
Chapter 6. Given the obvious deviations between objective and experienced 
probabilities due to the skewed distribution of the rare events, it is not appropriate 
to determine any model fits based on the objective probabilities. Instead, I tested 
the predictions of (a) a simple EV model and (b) prospect theory (PT) based on the 
probabilities that the participants have actually experienced within the sampled 
outcome sequences. When using a simple EV calculation for each sequence, 76% 
of the choices could be predicted correctly, which is in agreement with the 74% 
reported in the original data (Hertwig et al., 2006). A PT model, which requires 
additional parameters for the value and weighting function, could only account for 
65% of the choices correctly when using the median value- and weighting-function 
parameters reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Across participants this 
advantage of the EV model's performance was significant (t(25) = 2.46, p= . 021, 
two-sided). 
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2.3.2 Comprehensive Sampling 
2.3.2.1 Information search 
Due to the nature of the Comprehensive-Sampling task (39 samples for each 
option) there was no difference between participants in terms of the number of 
samples drawn from each option. The switching strategies did differ and a pattern 
analogous to the one reported earlier was observed. Again, the majority of the 
sequences (68%) were explored with a few shifts between options. Less frequently 
observed were pure strategies like consistent alternation (7%) or exhaustive 
sampling of the 39 samples from one option before exploring the remaining option 
(25%). With a median (mean) switch ratio of . 06 (M = . 19) participants showed less 
switching than in the Free-Sampling Condition. The transition stability across all 
choice problems was also slightly higher than in the Free-Sampling Condition 
(median correlation of r= . 84). 
2.3.2.2 Experienced probabilities and sampling error 
With the higher number of 39 samples the binomial distribution should overall be 
less skewed and therefore allow a more accurate assessment of the underlying 
probabilities. This is supported by the data. The mean absolute difference between 
the objective probabilities and the probabilities experienced during the 39 samples 
was much lower than under Free Sampling with only 4% (SD = 3.7). However, 
because of the odd number of samples people were also less likely to experience 
probabilities identical to the objective probabilities. As a result participants were 
shifted towards under- or overrepresentation of the rare events. This is also 
reflected in the observed frequencies of the rare events. In the majority of the cases 
(62%) participants encountered the rare event more frequently than expected. 
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Underestimation only applied to 38% of the cases. More importantly, due to the 
increased sample size there were only ten cases (7%) in which the rare event was 
not encountered a single time. All of these cases occurred in choice problem 6 
where the probability of the rare event was only 2.5%. None of the sequences 
though allowed a completely accurate assessment of the underlying probability. 
The overall distribution of the differences between experienced and objective 
probabilities was therefore much slimmer than in the Free-Sampling Condition and 
also less skewed (M= 0.5%), as illustrated in Figure 2.5. As a result of the different 
sampling mechanism in the Comprehensive-Sampling Condition 
underrepresentation is much less frequent. If sampling error in the form of 
underrepresentation is supposed to be the main reason for the apparent 
underweighting of small probabilities the effect should be less pronounced here. 
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Figure 2.5. Histogram with the distribution of differences between experienced and 
objective probabilities under Comprehensive Sampling. The bars to the left of 0 mark 
underrepresentation of the objective probabilities and the bars to the right mark 
overrepresentation of the objective probabilities. 
2.3.2.3 Choice behaviour 
Although the sampling behaviour prior to choice differed, the actual choice 
behaviour within the Comprehensive-Sampling Condition was comparable to the 
original Free-Sampling Condition of Hertwig et al. (2004), which is shown in a 
high correlation between the choice proportions of the two conditions, r= .81, p= 
049. Moreover, Table 2.5 shows that there are also no significant differences 
between the proportions of H choices of the two sampling conditions within the 
individual choice problems. 
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TABLE 2.5 
Percentage of participants under Free- and Comprehensive-Sampling selecting the option 
with higher expected value (H) 
Percentage choosing H 
Decision 
Problem 
Free-Sampling 
Hertwig et al. 
(2004) 
Comprehensive- 
Sampling 
Experiment 1 
p-value (2-Tail) 
Fisher's exact test 
1 88 64 . 095 
2 44 52 . 
778 
3 28 40 
. 
551 
4 56 64 . 773 
5 20 48 
. 
072 
6 12 16 1.000 
The direct comparison of both experiential conditions of the first experiment 
exhibits very similar results. Although based on different sampling modes 
comparable proportions of H choices were obtained for both conditions, r= . 
73, p 
=. 099. Within the individual choice problems the only significant difference was 
found in decision problem 5 (see Table 2.6). 
TABLE 2.6 
Percentage of H choices under Free- and Comprehensive-Sampling 
Percentage choosing H 
Decision Free Sampling 
Problem Experiment 1 
Comprehensive- 
Sampling 
Experiment 1 
p-value (2-tail) 
Fisher's exact test 
1 73 64 . 
555 
2 54 52 1.00 
3 23 40 . 
237 
4 58 64 . 
776 
5 15 48 . 
017 
6 23 16 . 
726 
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However, when comparing the choice proportions under Comprehensive 
Sampling with the descriptive choice proportions reported by Hertwig et al. 
considerable differences were found between the two formats, r=-. 75, p= . 084 
(see Table 2.7). The average (absolute) difference between the percentages was 
25%, which is still high, but less extreme than in the Free-Sampling Condition. 
TABLE 2.7 
Percentage of participants choosing the H option under descriptive choice and under 
Comprehensive-Sampling 
Percentage choosing H 
Decision Descriptive Choice Comprehensive- p-value (2-Tail) 
Problem Hertwig et al. Sampling Fisher's exact test (2004) Experiment 1 
1 36 64 
. 
089 
2 64 52 . 567 
3 64 40 
. 
156 
4 28 64 
. 
022 
5 48 48 1.00 
6 64 16 
. 
001 
The relative comparison in Figure 2.6 shows again the transformed 
differences between the choice proportions of the two formats. Once more, the 
direction of the differences for five out of six bars is the same as in previous DfXP 
experiments and points in the direction of less overweighing of rare events under 
DfXP. The only exception is decision problem 5 for which identical proportions of 
maximising choices have been obtained in the descriptive and experiential choice 
format. However, this anomaly appears to be random and does not follow a specific 
pattern, which will become more evident throughout the following experiments. 
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Figure 2.6. Differences in choice proportions plotted as differences between the descriptive 
and experiential choice proportions. Again, the values are transformed so that positive 
values represent deviations in the direction of underweighting. The white bars provide the 
original differences reported by Hertwig et al. (2004). 
2.3.2.4 Recency weighting 
Again recency weighting was examined by looking at the rate of correct 
predictions of the two halves of the sampled sequences on the basis of their 
expected values. There was no evidence for a higher predictive power of the more 
recently sampled outcomes. In fact, the opposite trend was observed with 65% 
correct predictions based on the outcomes from the first half and 58% correct 
predictions from the second half, but this difference was not significant (t(24) = 
1.26, p= . 
219, two-tailed). Finally, I compared the proportions of correct 
predictions based on the expected values of the different quartiles of the sequence 
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by conducting a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with the different quartile 
splits as a within-subject factor. Mauchly's test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated (, (5) = 12.755, p=0.026); therefore degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (c = . 74). 
The results show that the proportions of correct predictions are not significantly 
affected by the position of the quartile (F(2.204,55.896) =. 174, p =. 861), 
indicating that earlier samples predict choices as well as later samples (see also 
Figure 2.7). 
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Figure 2.7. Mean percentages of correct predictions for the different quartiles. All 
quartiles provide similar levels of correct predictions. 
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2.3.2.5 Application of descriptive choice models 
Under Comprehensive Sampling, expected value maximisation based on the 
actually experienced probabilities could account for only 65% of the choices 
correctly. The predictive power of PT with the median value- and weighting- 
function parameters reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) did not exceed 
chance level (51 %). Again, the advantage of the EV model was significant (t(24) = 
2.93, p= . 007, two-sided). When comparing the predictive power between the two 
sampling conditions in Experiment 1 both models, EV (t(49) = 2.07, p= . 044, two- 
sided) and PT (t(49) = 2.96, p= . 005, two-sided), performed significantly better on 
the basis of the data from the Free-Sampling Condition. 
2.4 Discussion 
The main purpose of this first experiment was two-fold. Firstly, I aimed to test the 
stability of the choice pattern observed by Hertwig et al. (2004). The results from 
the Free-Sampling Condition can be interpreted as a successful replication of 
almost every aspect of the original experiment, including sampling behaviour, its 
impact on the representation of the available options and the distinct choice pattern. 
In terms of the information search prior to choice analogous sample sizes have 
been observed and a comparable pattern of underrepresentation of low probability 
events has been replicated. The maximising choice proportions found in the Free- 
Sampling Condition, also matched the data mentioned in earlier experiments and 
deviated in the same direction from their descriptive counterparts, providing 
additional support for less overweighting of small probabilities in DfXP. The same 
59 
Chapter 2: Comprehensive Sampling 
applies to the predictive power of the EV model based on the participants 
experienced probabilities. However, no support was found for recency weighting. 
Early and recent samples predicted choices equally poorly. 
Secondly, I included the Comprehensive-Sampling Condition to test whether 
the reversed choice behaviour can still be observed when sampling error is reduced 
as a consequence of increased sample size. Notably, due to the higher number of 
random samples drawn, the extent of sampling error in the Comprehensive- 
Sampling Condition was substantially reduced and there was also less 
underrepresentation of rare events. However, I still found significant differences in 
the direction of less overweighting of small probabilities in the choice behaviour, 
although to a lesser degree than under Free Sampling. This provides evidence for a 
DfXP choice pattern under conditions were undersampling is less apparent. Again 
no recency effect was observed and the extent with which descriptive choice 
models can account for the data is significantly reduced. The results presented here 
are confirmed by findings recently reported by Hau, Plescak, Kiefer and Hertwig 
(in press), who also found a remaining gap between descriptive and experiential 
choice proportions when using incentives to motivate participants to explore the 
options more thoroughly. 
In general, this experiment confirms the robustness of the reversed choice 
pattern under DfXP and reduced overweighting of small probabilities within 
experiential choice. However, as we actually observe differences between choice 
proportions that cross the 50% line, implying actual reversals in participants' 
modal choices, this reduction of overweighting can be interpreted as apparent 
underweighting of small probabilities. Whether people actually underweight small 
probabilities, however, has to be inferred from the actual shape of the weighting 
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function and its parameters, which will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 5 
and 6. 
Moreover, the experiment indicates that phenomenon holds even when the 
samples provide representations with less sampling error in the form of 
underrepresentation. This extension seems to be contradictory to the predictions of 
the sampling error hypothesis by Fox and Hadar (2006). However, due to the 
uneven number of samples the experienced probabilities are not exactly matching 
the objective probabilities and residual sampling error remains. The descriptive 
choice problems and their experiential counterparts are still not structurally 
identical. It is therefore not possible to refute sampling error as one of the causes 
for the effect. The observed reduction of the effect in the second condition seems to 
indicate that sampling error is involved in causing the phenomenon but is not 
sufficient to explain it. To clarify the impact of deviations from objective 
probability it would therefore be necessary to alter the design in a way that allows 
the presentation of an outcome sequence without any sampling error, completely 
mirroring the descriptive choice problems. 
Furthermore, this first experiment does not provide any support for the 
existence of recency weighting, which was originally assumed to be involved in 
causing the choice pattern. In the Free-Sampling Condition this seems to be the 
only aspect of the original study that could not be replicated. If recently-sampled 
information has more impact on choice, then the impact of outcomes experienced 
earlier in the sequence should be even smaller the higher the total sample size. 
However, even in the Comprehensive-Sampling Condition there is no significant 
difference between the predictive power of the first and second half of the outcome 
sequence or between the predictions of the different quartiles. This test was based 
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on the assumption though that people extract information regarding the outcomes 
and their probabilities in order to maximise expected value, as it was done in 
similar experiments. Thus, there might still be some underlying recency effect 
when predicting choice based on other properties of the experienced sequences. 
This point will be discussed further in Chapter 4 and 6. 
Regarding the accountability of established choice models, two observations 
are important to mention. Firstly, the overall fit with actual choice is lower than is 
usually observed in the descriptive choice experiments. Secondly, and more 
interestingly, under both conditions the simpler EV model predicts choice 
significantly better than PT. This is the opposite of what is usually observed when 
gambles are presented as summary descriptions. It is important to point out though 
that this comparison is made with a PT model that is based on the parameters that 
have been established in descriptive choice tasks. One possibility is that the 
weighting function does not provide the same improvement for the PT model in the 
context of experiential choice that we normally find in descriptive choice tasks 
because the probability weighting function under DfXP differs from the one 
established under DfD. A better predictive power for PT might therefore be 
achieved with weighting function parameters estimated on the basis of experiential 
choice data. A more comprehensive model comparison will be provided in Chapter 
6. 
One potential problem with the Comprehensive-Sampling Condition is that 
it does not only differ in terms of the sample size but also in terms of the control 
over when to stop sampling. As participants in the second condition were forced to 
continue the sampling process until they reached the fixed number of samples it is 
not possible to investigate the potential influence of individual stopping rules. On 
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the other hand, the experimental results by Hau et al. (in press) mentioned above, 
seem to indicate that similar results can also be obtained when individuals draw 
larger samples without losing control over when to stop. Another problem could be 
the usage of an uneven number of samples which makes it more difficult to 
translate the experienced sequence into a description format. Participants might 
have extrapolated in different ways and might have used probabilities different 
from those deriving directly from the frequencies that they actually experienced to 
make their final decision. 
This first experiment shows once more how difficult it is to identify the 
properties behind the reversed choice pattern in experiential choice tasks as the 
sampling process in the form it has been used until now is actually changing the 
structure of the underlying task. A comparison with descriptive choice is therefore 
difficult as both tasks are in practice no longer identical. The clarification of the 
effect of sampling error in particular demands a design that provides structurally 
similar tasks. In Chapter 3,1 will therefore introduce a new experiential choice 
paradigm which will help to overcome experimental flaws that have been 
underlying previous designs. By using a novel sampling mechanism this new 
experiential task will resemble descriptive choice more closely. More importantly, 
by providing outcome sequences matching the objective probabilities, this 
approach will allow a more suitable investigation of the impact of sampling error. 
This will bring us back to the question of whether choice behaviour depends on 
whether the choice problem is presented in the form of a description or is 
experienced as a sample of outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MATCHED SAMPLING DESIGN 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the unusual choice pattern in 
decisions from experience can be replicated even under conditions where sample 
size is increased and sampling error is consequently reduced. Differences in 
choice proportions were still found but the gap was noticeably reduced. Therefore, 
it remains unclear whether the gap between decisions from experience (DfXP) 
and decisions from description (DfD) can be completely closed if participants are 
forced to experience perfectly representative samples. Yet, with the design used 
so far, sampling error can not be eliminated. In this chapter, I present an 
alternative design in which the frequencies people sample precisely match the 
underlying probabilities of the options. This eliminates sampling error completely 
and so allows a direct test of the sampling error hypothesis. If Hertwig et al. 
(2004) and Fox and Hadar (2006) are correct, then apparent probability 
underweighting should be eliminated, or indeed, reversed under such 
experimental conditions. 
3.2 Matched Sampling in the Lab (Experiment 2) 
The following laboratory experiment will introduce the Matched Sampling design. 
By sampling exhaustively and without replacement from an underlying 
distribution where the probabilities exactly match those in the descriptive choice, 
it is possible to compare experiential choice under conditions where sampling 
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error is eliminated with choice under Free Sampling (where sampling error 
remains) and descriptive choice. 
3.2.1 Methods 
3.2.1.1 Participants and Stimuli 
75 participants were recruited from students at the University of Warwick through 
flyer advertisement and a subject panel of the Psychology department. The 
majority (88%) of the participants were first year undergraduate students from 
different disciplines; the rest consisted of postgraduate students and members of 
staff. The age within the sample ranged from 18 to 52 years with an average age 
of 21. The gender split was approximately 2: 1 with 46 male and 29 female 
subjects. For the completion of six choice tasks in the laboratory the participants 
received £2. Performance dependent incentives were not provided. The six 
decision problems were the same used in the previous experiment. 
3.2.1.2 Design and procedure 
The experiment was implemented as a between-subject design with three different 
conditions; a Free-Sampling Condition, a Matched-Sampling Condition, and a 
Description Condition to which participants were assigned randomly. The two 
experiential conditions consisted of a sampling phase in which participants 
explored the two options represented by two buttons, `A' and `B', on a computer 
screen, followed by a final decision phase where they chose the option they would 
like to play once for real. The Free-Sampling Condition follows Hertwig et al. 's 
(2004) paradigm: Participants could stop the exploration of the buttons as soon as 
they felt confident enough to make a decision; and outcomes were drawn with 
replacement for each participant from the underlying distributions. 
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In the crucial Matched-Sampling Condition, however, I ensured that the 
experienced probabilities for a given option matched the objective probability of 
its underlying distribution. This was achieved by several alterations to the Free 
Sampling design. Firstly, participants had to sample exactly 40 outcomes from 
each option. Once this limit was reached the button became shaded and no further 
sample could be obtained. Only after both buttons had been sampled 40 times 
could the participant proceed to the decision phase. More importantly, the 
proportions of outcomes within this sequence of 40 events precisely matched the 
options' underlying probabilities, with the order of outcomes randomly generated 
for each participant (see also Figure 3.1). Finally, the sampling mechanism was 
altered. Instead of sampling with replacement, participants sampled exhaustively 
from 40 outcomes, with the frequency of each outcome exactly matching the 
probabilities from the Description Condition. Together, these properties 
completely eliminate sampling error from the experienced sequence. For example, 
in the first decision problem (3,1.0; 4,. 8), the second option, offering 4 points 
with a probability of .8 and nothing otherwise, can 
be represented as a sequence of 
forty outcomes with 32 `4's and eight `0's. When sampling all 40 outcomes from 
this sequence, participants will experience the exact objective probability (see also 
Figure 3.1). 
66 
Chapter3: Matched Sampling 
40 samples 
'4' with a probability of . 
80,32 x '4' j8x '0' 
'0 otherwise. Outcome 40 
=32x, 4' 
8 x'0' 
4 
2 
Outcome 1'40 
4 
4 
Figure 3.1. Scheme of the matching process under Matched Sampling to eliminate 
sampling error. 
For both, the Free- and the Matched-Sampling Conditions, the order in which to 
sample from the two buttons during the sampling phase was arbitrary. The basic 
layout of the sampling experiments was the same as in the first experiment (see 
Figure 3.2). 
The Description Condition involved the presentation of summaries of the 
same lotteries in the format: 
20% chance to win 4 points; 
80% chance to win 0 points. 
The Description Condition provided an alternative set of descriptive choice data 
which will allow a within-experiment analysis of the data rather than a between- 
experiment comparison with the proportions reported in the original experiment 
by Hertwig et al. (2004). 
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Find out what payoffs the buttons have to offer and how likely It 
Ia to get them. Just click on the buttons in whatever order you 
like and observe the outcomes. Wait for the outcome to 
disappear before you click again. 
Plu, * keep on clicking' 
EI O 
LEARNING PHASE 
Which of the following options do you prefer? Read the 
summaries of the two gambles given below and select the one 
you prefer to play once at the end of the experiment by clicking 
on its button. 
20% chance w vnn 4 points, 26% chance to win 3 points, 
90% chance to win 0 points: 75% chance to wino paw; 
O0 
Figure 3.2. Screenshots of the sampling phase of the Matched-Sampling Condition (left) 
and the gamble description in the Description Condition (right). 
All participants were instructed to maximise the number of points they 
accumulated within the six choice problems. At the end of the experiment, the 
selected lotteries were played randomly for each participant before they were 
informed of their points total. 
3.2.2 Results 
Similar to the presentation of results in Experiment 1,1 will first provide a 
summary of the sampling behaviour within the two experiential conditions before 
I compare the observed choice behaviour across all three conditions. In the 
context of the Free-Sampling Condition particularly, the information search 
pattern and the resulting representation of the different outcomes is a prerequisite 
to understanding the choice pattern discussed later on. 
3.2.2.1 Information search under Free Sampling 
With a median number of 19 (M = 24) draws per choice problem, participants did 
sample slightly more data than in the previous experiments using Free Sampling. 
Across the different choice problems the number of draws turned out to be less 
stable than in earlier Free Sampling tasks with a median correlation of r =. 42. 
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Only in 26% of all lotteries was the number of samples drawn from both options 
identical, which is very close to the percentage reported in Chapter 2. The median 
absolute difference between samples from both options was 2 (M = 4.43). No 
significant difference was observed between the sample sizes of options with high 
or low expected values (t(24) = .57, p= . 
573). 
The median number of switches observed was 3 (M = 6.27). The actual 
distribution of switches is provided in Figure 3.3. When put in context of the 
possible number of switches the median switch ratio was. 16 (M = . 
38) which 
indicates slightly more switching than in the previous experiments. Consistency 
was also found in the sampling strategies where a total of 29% of all sequences 
were completed only switching once. Alternating sampling was observed in 13% 
of the sequences, leaving 58 % for mixed strategies. The switching also proved to 
be relatively stable across the six problems with a median correlation of r =. 77. 
50 
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Figure 3.3. Histogram with the number of switches observed under Free Sampling 
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Inspection of the differences between the experienced probabilities and the 
objective probabilities of the rare events revealed a median absolute difference of 
6% (SD = 10.83) and, across all problems, the rare event was encountered less 
frequently than expected in 50% of the sequences. This is still substantial but less 
than observed within the replication of the previous chapter (69%). The reduced 
positive skew in the difference between observed and objective probabilities could 
be due to the higher number of samples drawn. In 71 % of the reported cases of 
underrepresentation (the same percentage found in the first experiment) the rare 
event was not encountered at all. This equals 35% of all the sequences involving 
rare events. Sequences with relative frequencies of rare events that actually 
matched the rare event's objective probability were only experienced in five 
percent of the cases (see also Figure 3.4). 
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Figure 3.4. Histogram with the distribution of differences between experienced and 
objective probabilities in the Free-Sampling Condition. 
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In summary, the sampling process in the Free-Sampling Condition resembles all 
the properties typical for DfXP formats with undersampling resulting in extensive 
sampling error in the direction of underrepresentation of the rare outcomes. 
3.2.2.2 Information search under Matched Sampling 
In the Matched-Sampling Condition both options had to be explored 40 times. 
However, in this condition we could still observe switching between the two 
buttons during sampling (see Figure 3.5 for a histogram depicting the distribution 
of switches). This happened less often than under Free Sampling with a median 
number of switches of 1 (M = 4.79). Given a high number of 79 potential switches 
this led to very small switch ratios with a median of only . 01 (M = . 06). In terms 
of the sampling strategy used, the picture was quite different to the observations 
under free sampling. The majority of the sequences (75%) were explored with 
only one alternation between the sets of forty outcomes from each button. 
Constant switching was found to be used by only I%, leaving 24% with mixed 
strategies. The median correlation between the switching ratios across the six 
problems was only . 21 though. A potential reason 
for the decreased swapping 
could be the higher number of samples: it simply requires less effort to stay on 
one button and sample through all the 40 outcomes than switching between 
buttons. 
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Figure 3.5. Histogram with the number of switches observed under Matched Sampling 
3.2.2.3 Choice behaviour 
The proportions within the Description Condition were remarkably similar to the 
descriptive choice proportions reported by Hertwig et al. (2004) (r(4) = . 
89, p= 
. 
02, with a mean absolute difference of only 4.67%. The proportions of 
participants choosing the H option across the six choice problems within the three 
conditions are summarised in Table 3.1, which shows that most of the proportions 
differ across the 50%-line (i. e., with the description proportion and the 
experiential proportion either side of . 5), 
indicating actual reversals of 
preferences. This applies to five out of six problems under the Free-Sampling 
Condition and two out of six problems in the Matched-Sampling Condition. 
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TABLE 3.1 
Summary of the observed choice proportions for the three experimental conditions including the p- 
values (Fisher's exact tests) for the differences between the experiential and descriptive choice 
proportions. Significant differences are highlighted with asterisks. 
Percentage choosing H 
Decision 
HL Description Free 
Matched 
Problem Sampling P Sampling p 
1 4,. 8 3,1.0 36 64 . 089 48 . 567 
2 4,. 2 3, 
. 
25 72 56 
. 
377 60 
. 
551 
3 -3,1.0 -32, .1 
64 16* 
. 
001 28* 
. 
022 
4 -3,1.0 -4,. 8 36 68* . 
046 32 1.00 
5 32, 
.1 
3,1.0 48 8* 
. 
003 16* 
. 
031 
6 32,025 3, 
. 
25 52 28 
. 
148 28 
. 
148 
A further illustration is provided in Figure 3.6 which shows the differences 
between proportions converted so that positive bars indicate deviations in the 
direction of less overweighting of small probabilities in DfXP. All the bars, except 
one, have the same direction consistent with the original findings. The only 
exception is choice problem 4 in the Matched-Sampling Condition where the 
percentage of H choices is more similar to the one found in DfD. 
However, when comparing the average differences in proportions in the 
direction of less overweighting of small probabilities across all six choice 
problems (the mean bars in Figure 3.6), there were significant differences between 
choice proportions in Description Condition and the Free-Sampling Condition 
(t(48) = 6.03, p< . 0001) and 
between the Description Condition and the Matched- 
Sampling Condition (t(48) = 3.43, p= . 
001), independent of sampling method. 
Furthermore, a comparison between the two experiential conditions shows that in 
the Matched-Sampling Condition, where sample size is controlled and sample 
frequencies precisely match the underlying probabilities, the apparent 
underweighting is reduced in comparison to the Free-Sampling Condition (t(48) = 
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-2.61, p= . 
012, two-sided). Crucially, though, it is not eliminated. Thus, sampling 
error seems to explain some of the differences, but is not sufficient to account for 
the whole phenomenon. 
ö 80 
IS Free-Sampling Condition (Experiment 2) 
Q Matched-Sampling Condition (Experiment 2) 0 
Ö 60 Q Free-Sampling Condition (Hertwig et al, 2004) 
a #. 
a) 
0 40 
c 
a) 
20 
aý 
-0 
a) 
00 ---- 
123456 
-20 H: (4,0.8) (4,0.2) (-3,1.0) (-3,1.0) (32,0.1) (32,0.025) 
L: (3,1.0) (3,0.25) (-32,0.1) (-4,0.8) (3,1.0) (3,0.25) mean 
Choice problem 
Figure 3.6. Differences in choice proportions between the experiential and descriptive 
choice tasks across the different decision problems used. Positive bars indicate less 
overweighting under experiential choice. The results reported by Hertwig et al. (2004) 
have been added for comparison. Significant differences are marked by asterisks (* p< 
. 
05, ** p< . 
01). 
3.2.2.4 Recency weighting 
One potential explanation why the effect is maintained with matched, equal 
samples for each option is that, even when presented with a large sample, it is 
possible that people can only remember a small sample of the most recent items. 
Thus although the matched sample accurately represents the objective 
probabilities, if only a part of this sample can be held in memory, then this sample 
will typically underrepresent rare events. If people only remember the most recent 
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samples, then more recent outcomes should predict actual choices more accurately 
then outcomes sampled earlier. Following the analysis conducted in Chapter 1,1 
split the outcome sequences for each button into two halves and predicted final 
choice separately for both buttons and both halves on the basis of the expected 
value of the outcomes included in sequence splits, assuming people to choose the 
highest. There was no significant difference between the percentage of correct 
predictions of earlier and later samples, neither under Free Sampling (69% vs. 
65%, t(24) = 0.54, p =. 596, two-sided) nor under Matched Sampling (48% vs. 
42%, t(24) = 1.12, p= . 272, two-sided). With 40 samples from each participant, 
the data from the Matched- Sampling Condition also allowed for a comparison of 
the proportions of correct predictions based on the expected values of quartile 
splits. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA with the different quartiles as a 
within-subject factor, similar to the analysis in the previous chapter, showed that 
the proportions of correct predictions are not significantly affected by the position 
of the quartile (F(3,72) = 1.098, p =. 356), indicating that the four sequences 
predicted choices equally well (see Figure 3.7). 
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Figure 3.7. Mean percentages of correct predictions for the different quartiles of the 
Matched-Sampling Condition in Experiment 2. 
3.2.2.5 Application of descriptive choice models 
To investigate the extent to which established models can account for the choice 
behaviour found in this experiment, I again calculated the rate of correct 
predictions that can be obtained when using either EV maximisation or the PT 
model. In the Free-Sampling Condition the EV model based on the experienced 
probabilities predicted 72% of the choices correctly. For the PT model with 
parameters taken from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) this rate of correct 
predictions dropped to 60%. In the Matched-Sampling Condition both models 
performed at below chance with 39% for the EV model and 43% for PT. The 
difference between the predictive power of the EV and PT model was significant 
under Free-Sampling t(24) = 3.304, p =. 003, two-sided) but not in the Matched- 
Sampling Condition t(24) = -0.824, p =. 418, two-sided). When comparing 
between conditions the higher predictive power was always found in the Free- 
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Sampling Condition, for both the EV model t(48) = 5.216, p <. 001, two-sided) 
and PT t(48) = 2.887, p =. 006, two-sided). 
3.2.3 Discussion 
In summary, Experiment 2 demonstrates the robustness of the underweighting 
under DfXP even when there is no sampling error involved. The Free-Sampling 
Condition provided evidence that the original result is stable and can be 
replicated, both in terms of the sampling behaviour and the resulting choice 
behaviour. The switch from Free-Sampling to Matched-Sampling reduced the 
amount of underweighting, but did not eliminate underweighting: Reducing 
sampling error seems to have a moderating effect but is not sufficient to explain 
the choice phenomenon. Similar to the findings in the previous chapter, the effect 
was found without any indication of recency weighting. Instead, the percentages 
of correct predictions were found to be similar for the different sequence splits. 
Furthermore, there was a significant difference between the predictive 
power of the expected value and prospect theory models. The superiority of the 
simpler EV model indicates that the addition of a weighting function with 
parameters estimated under descriptive choice, describing overweighting of small 
probabilities, is less suited to describe the probability weighting under DfXP than 
the linear weighting that is incorporated in the simpler EV model. The difference 
in model fit between the two experiential conditions is slightly puzzling. One 
possible explanation could be the use of different strategies when exploring the 
options in the two conditions. This issue and the question of whether the 
performance of the PT model can be increased with a different set of parameters 
will be picked up again in Chapter 6. 
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Taken together, findings from Experiment 2 suggest that all of the 
explanations put forward by Hertwig et al. (2004,2006) to explain the original 
results, the reliance on small samples and recency weighting, are not sufficient. 
This also applies to the sampling error Hypothesis by Fox and Hadar (2006). 
Their deconstruction of decisions from experience described earlier provides one 
last alternative explanation though: People could systematically misjudge the 
probabilities from their sample. However, this possibility cannot be ruled out by 
the previous experiment, because people's judgements of the probabilities that 
they experienced were not collected. The assessment of judgement error under 
Matched Sampling will therefore be the focus of the following experiment. 
3.3 Matched Sampling with Frequency Estimations (Experiment 3) 
In order to investigate the potential impact of judgement error I extended the 
Matched Sampling design with a judgement task that captured the differences 
between the experienced probability of an outcome and its subjective probability. 
Due to the nature of the sampling task, providing counts for the occurrences of 
various outcomes, a frequency estimation task was selected to assess the 
participant's representation of the experienced variability of the outcomes. As I 
pointed out in the introduction on probability and frequency judgements, the 
results usually reported in similar tasks indicate that people are quite accurate with 
a slight tendency to overestimate low-frequency events. The only way in which 
judgement error could account for the underweighting of rare events, though, 
would be the opposite pattern, a systematic underestimation of the occurrence of 
rare events. Fox and Hadar (2006) failed to find such a pattern in the context of 
probability judgements under Free Sampling. Yet, if judgement error is 
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responsible for the underweighting of rare events under Matched Sampling, one 
should expect systematic underestimation of low frequencies 
3.3.1 Methods 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
The design was implemented in the form of a Web-based experiment which was 
completed by a total of 197 participants, consisting of 94 men and 103 women, 
aged between 13 and 63 years with a mean of 28 years. The participants were 
recruited through different portals advertising psychological experiments on the 
Internet provided by the University of Warwick, the Hanover College and the 
University of Central Lancashire. 
3.3.1.2 Design and procedure 
For this experiment only a Matched-Sampling Condition was employed using a 
design similar to the Matched-Sampling Condition in Experiment 2, with 40 
outcomes per button matching the underlying probabilities, sampling without 
replacement and arbitrary sampling order. Only after both buttons had been 
sampled 40 times could the participants proceed to the decision phase to select the 
option they would like to play once for real. The judgement task was added after 
the decision phase to avoid any impact on the final choice. Estimating the 
frequency beforehand could change the representation of the problem, making it 
more similar to a descriptive choice task. Participants estimated the number of 
times they had seen the rare event for both of the options. For the option offering 
4 points with a probability of 80%, for example, they had to estimate the number 
of times they encountered the outcome `0' within the 40 outcomes sampled from 
this option (which would have actually been eight times). Also, to prevent 
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participants from using a counting strategy in subsequent problems, each 
participant only received one of the six choice problems previously used. Both the 
choice problem and the assignment to the two buttons were randomised. Again, 
subjects were instructed to maximise their score which was determined by a 
random draw from the underlying distribution of the chosen option. The 
experiment ended with the presentation of feedback on the number of points 
received from the chosen lottery, the participant's frequency estimates for the rare 
events, and their true frequencies. 
Instead of running the experiment in the laboratory from a server it was 
made accessible through the World Wide Web. This allowed participants to run 
the experiment on their own computers. By using the same Adobe Flash 
technology the layout of the experiment was identical to the one in the previous 
laboratory experiment. Only the instructions had to be changed slightly to ensure 
the self-contained program execution of the Web-based format. 
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3.3.2 Results 
3.3.2.1 Information search 
Due to the design, there was no difference between the objective and experienced 
probabilities as the latter were matched to the former. The number of samples 
drawn from each button was fixed to 40 for all participants. The order in which 
samples were drawn from the two options though did differ between participants. 
In terms of the exploration strategies used the majority of the participants (90%) 
seemed to switch several times between the available options. Nine percent of the 
participants switched only once which means that all 40 samples from one button 
were sampled exclusively before starting the exploration of the remaining button. 
Continuous alternation between the two buttons was only observed in 1% of the 
participants. The median number of switches was 16 (M = 18.74) and the median 
switch ratio was 0.41 (M = 0.48) which indicates that there was more swapping 
between options than in the previous Matched Sampling Condition. The reasons 
for this could be the fact that there was only one choice problem which makes the 
task less tedious. A histogram with the complete distribution of switches is 
provided in Figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.8. Histogram with the number of switches observed in Experiment 3. 
3.3.2.2 Choice proportions 
The observed proportions of choices in the direction of overweighting of small 
probabilities in the Matched-Sampling Condition from Experiment 3 were 
compared with the proportions in the Description Condition from the previous 
experiment. Although sampling error was eliminated, there were still a 
significantly smaller proportions of choices in the direction of overweighting 
under Matched Sampling, t(220) = 4.22, p< . 
0001. However, with a mean 
absolute difference of 22.67 percentage points between the two sets of 
proportions, the differences were less extreme again than the ones observed under 
Free Sampling (Experiment 1,2 and Hertwig et al. 's data). 
Significant differences were also observed within the proportions of H 
choices in the individual choice problems. Both sets of proportions are shown in 
Table 3.2, together with the p-values of the Fisher exact tests, and the number of 
participants behind each cell in Experiment 3. The fact that five out of the six 
pairs of proportions lie on opposite sides of the 50% line indicates that the 
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differences found are actual reversals in preferences from overweighting to 
underweighting. 
TABLE 3.2 
Summary of the observed choice proportions under Matched Sampling and descriptive choice 
(Experiment 2). The p-values have been calculated using Fisher's exact tests. Significant 
differences between the two are highlighted with asterisks. 
Percentage choosing H 
Description Matched Decision 
H L (Experiment Sampling pn Problem 
2) 
(Experiments 
3) 
1 4,. 8 3,1.0 36 68 * . 
030 31 
2 4,. 2 3, 
. 
25 72 39 * . 
017 31 
3 -3,1.0 -32, .1 
64 42 
. 
116 31 
4 -3,1.0 -4,. 8 36 55 . 198 
38 
5 32, .13,1.0 48 45 
1.00 31 
6 32, 
. 
025 3, 
. 
25 52 26 . 
056 35 
This point is also illustrated in Figure 3.9 which depicts the converted differences 
between experiential and descriptive choice proportions. All the proportions 
consistently deviate from the ones in descriptive choice tasks in the direction of 
less overweighting of small probabilities. 
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Figure 3.9. Differences in choices proportions between the Matched-Sampling Condition in 
Experiment 3 and the Description Condition in Experiment 2 across the six decision problems. 
Positive bars indicate choices in the direction of less overweighting. Significant differences are 
marked by asterisks (* p< . 
05, **p< 
.0 1). The mean 
bars on the right correspond to the t-test 
results provided in the text. The results for the data reported by Hertwig et al. (2004) have been 
added for comparison. 
3.3.2.3 Frequency judgements 
In order to examine the frequency data provided by the participants, the mean 
absolute differences between the actual experienced frequencies of the rare events 
and their estimates were calculated and extreme values (more than 3 standard 
deviations away from the mean) were reiteratively removed. Out of the 384 
judgements 22 had to be excluded. The majority of these extreme outliers did 
actually match with the frequency of the common event and might have been the 
result of misreading the instructions. The judgements observed here were well- 
calibrated with a high correlation between judged and actual frequencies, r(370) = 
. 98, p< . 
0001. The mean absolute difference was 1.57 (SD = 2.37). Figure 3.10 
shows a scatter plot of the estimated frequencies across the five frequencies 
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together with their estimation means. There was no obvious tendency to 
underestimate small frequencies. 
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Figure 3.10. Deviations of the frequency judgements for the rare events in Experiment 3 
plotted against the actually experienced frequencies. Due to the overlap of the 
probabilities in the six choice problems used there were only 5 different rare event 
frequencies. The dotted line indicates perfect calibration. The black dots are the mean 
estimates. The white dots indicate the observed estimation errors. One white dot may 
represent several data points from different participants. 
Instead, an examination of the means of the estimation errors showed small 
deviations in the direction of overestimation of low frequencies and 
underestimation of high frequencies (from low to high frequency: t(34) = 1.46, p 
=0.154; t(61)=5.16, p<0.001; t(90)=3.18, p=0.002; t(64)=2.71, p=0.009; 
t(118) = 2.89, p=0.005, all two-sided). 
3.3.2.4 Recency Weighting 
Recency weighting in the form of a higher rate of correct predictions of the last 
half of the sampling sequences was again not found, 51 % and 47% respectively, 
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McNemar (1) = 0.006, p=0.93 8. As in Experiment 2,1 also compared the 
percentages of correct predictions on the basis of the expected values of the four 
quartiles of each option (from 1 to 4: 50%, 51%, 53%, and 50%). Again, no 
evidence for a recency effect was found, as there were no significant differences 
between the four percentages, Cochran's Q (3,197) = . 404, p= . 
909. 
In addition, a separate analysis was conducted focusing on the data from 
decision problem 6, which provides a special property. The high H option in this 
problem offers 32 points with a probability of 2.5 %. Matched onto the sequence 
of 40 trials this payoff is therefore only observed once. Testing whether 
maximisation within this problem can be predicted by the location of the rare but 
high payoff within the sequence also provides an assessment of recency 
weighting. If an outcome's impact on choice is an increasing function of its 
position within the experienced sequence then recency weighting of such a form 
should be picked up by this analysis. The maximisation rate of participants who 
have seen the outcome in the first or second half (22% vs. 29%) did not differ 
significantly though, Fisher's Exact p= . 711. Similarly, experiencing 
it in the first 
It 
7 of last 7 samples did not have a significant impact on maximisation either (20% 
vs. 44%, Fisher's Exact p =. 301). 
3.3.2.5 Application of descriptive choice models 
On the basis of the experienced probabilities, the EV and PT model (using the 
same set of parameters as used to model the data in Experiment 1 and 2) did not 
predict choices better than chance, accounting for 46% and 38% of choices 
respectively. With the availability of the frequency judgements, it was also 
possible to test the predictions of the two-stage model (Fox & Tversky, 1998; 
Tversky & Fox, 1995). Recall, from Section 1.3, that the two-stage model 
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assumes a transformation similar to PT, but on the basis of judged probabilities, in 
this case generated from the frequency estimates. Following Fox and Hadar 
(2006), 1 used the PT parameters reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). By 
using the judged probabilities to predict participant's choices, this model also 
provides an indirect assessment of the involvement of judgement error in the 
observed choice pattern. If the performance of the model is substantially enhanced 
when using the subjective probabilities instead of the objective ones, this would 
be an indication for the mediation of the effect through judgement error. However, 
the actual model fits remained below chance performance of 50% (see Figure 
3.11). 
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Figure 3.11. Percentage of correct predictions for the different choice models: expected 
value, expected value based on judged probabilities, prospect theory and the two-stage 
model (also based on judged probabilities). The latter two the fits were calculated on the 
basis of the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) parameters. 
The fit of the EV model on the basis of the judged probabilities was very similar 
with 45% correct predictions (x2 McNemar (1) = 0, p=1.00). The two-stage 
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model predicted 44% of the observed choices correctly, which is a small but 
significant improvement compared to the performance of the PT model presented 
above (, 2 McNemar (1) = 5.263, p= . 022). However, overall, the 
best fit is 
provided by the EV model based on the objective probabilities. 
3.3.3 Discussion 
In summary, the results of this second Matched-Sampling Experiment provide 
further support for the existence of deviations in the direction of underweighting 
of small probabilities in decision from experience under conditions where 
statistical sampling error is eliminated. Moreover, in the light of well-adjusted 
frequency estimations (with a slight tendency to overweight small frequencies), 
judgement error in the form of underestimation of small frequencies can also be 
excluded as an explanation. In fact, judgements were significantly overestimated, 
in line with previous research. This conforms to other findings in the people are 
quite good in storing and accurately judging various kinds of frequencies 
(Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; Peterson & Beach, 1967; Zacks & Hasher, 2002). 
According to Hertwig et al. (2006), recency effects are the result of giving 
the most recent information proportionally more weight than it deserved. Recency 
weighting should therefore occur even in conditions in which respondents have 
accurate explicit probability estimates. This could not be confirmed within this 
experiment as there was again no evidence for recency weighting under Matched 
Sampling within the various tests of recency weighting employed. 
With regard to the application of established choice models, I again found 
that rates of correct predictions that did not exceed chance level. The results of the 
comparison of models based on the actually experienced frequencies within the 
sample and models using the judged frequencies as input are also interesting. 
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Even the usage of subjective probability measures did not help any of the models 
to lift the predictive power above chance level. Given that the judgements were 
more or less unbiased this is not surprising as their inclusion does not add any 
information that could help increase the performance of the models. This can 
therefore be seen as additional evidence against the judgement error hypothesis. 
Further claims regarding the validity of the two-stage model cannot be made at 
this point, but will be discussed following a more detailed model comparison in 
Chapter 6. 
Furthermore, as Experiment 3 was conducted over the Web, this study also 
shows that the effect is robust enough to be replicated in a more general 
population with demographics that go beyond that of undergraduate students. At 
the same time, the wider range of risk attitudes within the Web-sample might have 
been the reason for the reduction of the effect. A potential issue could be the 
comparison of the Matched Sampling data, which was collected in a Web-based 
environment, with the description data from Experiment 2, which was collected in 
a laboratory setting. It could thus be argued that the differences in choice 
proportions are due to differences in the demographic characteristics of the two 
samples. Nevertheless, as we have already replicated the effect within one sample 
of subjects (undergraduate students in Experiment 2) this seems less problematic 
but I will return to this issue in Chapter 4. 
The use of frequency judgements instead of probability judgements could 
also be a source of potential criticism. However, I have justified this on the basis 
of findings from the judgement literature which seems to indicate that the 
accuracy of both formats is similar and that one can be easily transformed into the 
other. Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) mention that such a transformation requires the 
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incorporation of both occurrences and non-occurrences of an event. In the context 
of dichotomous outcomes within sequences this should not constitute a problem 
as non-occurrence can be derived without difficulty by subtracting the number of 
occurrences from the total number of samples. Nevertheless, it remains unclear 
whether participants actually translate estimated frequencies directly into 
probabilities. Even if participants do, there is still the possibility of a potential bias 
during the translation process. As a consequence, even in the case of well adjusted 
frequency judgements, participants' subjective probabilities could still be biased 
and therefore impact the decision making process in a systematic way. This 
extreme case could also explain the poor performance of the two-stage model on 
the data based on frequency estimations presented above. Under such 
circumstances the frequency estimations method might not be able to assess the 
actual judgement bias that is linked to the choice behaviour on the appropriate 
level. Another issue is the focus on frequencies of the rare events only, which, in 
the context of the six choice problems used, leaves us with only a small range of 
five probabilities to assess judgement error. An alternative method would be to 
ask for estimates of both the rare and the common event. Fox and Hadar (2006) 
have essentially done this by asking participants to provide probability 
judgements for all the encountered outcomes. However, this comes with the 
downside of forcing subjects into a representation of the events and their 
probabilities which conforms with probability theory (e. g. the fact that 
probabilities must add up to one), and might not be an accurate description of the 
people's subjective probabilities either. Asking for all possible outcomes could 
undermine the existence of super- or subadditivity as it has already been found in 
the domain of uncertainty (e. g. Fox & Tversky, 1998; Tversky & Fox, 1995; 
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Tversky & Koehler, 1994). All these issues will be addressed in the last 
experiment of this chapter which will look into probability judgements in the 
context of the Matched Sampling paradigm. 
3.4 Replication with probability judgements (Experiment 4) 
In the previous experiment, I demonstrated that underweighting of small 
probabilities can be observed under Matched Sampling without any evidence for 
biased frequency judgements. This experiment will investigate whether this can 
be generalised to probability judgements. In addition, I will test whether the 
representation of uncertainty information attached to an outcome can be altered by 
the order of the judgement task and whether this has an indirect effect on choice. 
In the last experiment, participants were only asked to provide judgements after 
they had made their decision to explicitly avoid a potential switch in 
representation from experiential to descriptive choice. Fox and Hadar (2006) seem 
to have collected data with probability judgements before and after choice but do 
not report any analysis on their equivalence. The following experiment will 
investigate whether recalling the experienced probabilities before choice 
facilitates a representation of the problem more similar to a descriptive choice task 
and whether this is also reflected in the observed choice pattern. 
3.4.1 Methods 
3.4.1.1 Participants 
Like in the Matched Sampling design of the last section, the experiment was 
implemented as a Web-based experiment using Adobe Flash. This time the 
advertisement of the experiment and payment of the participants was organised 
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through the "ipoints" reward scheme (www. ipoints. co. uk). All ipoints collected in 
this scheme can be exchanged for CDs, flights and other goods. In this way 
ipoints is able to maintain a fairly large database with a good spread across a wide 
range of demographic variables. For this particular experiment, participants 
received a reward of 50 ipoints (worth £ . 5) 
for taking part. Datasets from 360 
participants were collected. Their age ranged from 13 to 80 years with an average 
age of 42 years. Around two thirds (245) were female. 
3.4.1.2 Design and procedure 
The main structure of the experiment was the same as in the previous Matched- 
Sampling Condition with a learning phase, a choice task and a judgement task. 
Again, the same six gambles were used to compare the results with previous 
findings. Two independent variables -'order of the judgement task' (before or 
after choice) and `type of event' (common or rare event) - were systematically 
varied in the form of a 2x2 between-subjects design with four groups of 90 
subjects each (see Figure 3.12). The second variable was mainly introduced to 
collect judgements for a wider range of probability values providing a more 
accurate assessment of potential judgement bias. The allocation to one of the four 
experimental conditions was randomised. During the first stage the participants 
had to sample 40 outcomes from the two options in whatever order they liked. In 
the decision phase they then had to choose the option they preferred to play once 
at the end of the experiment. 
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Order of the judgement task 
before choice after choice 
Type of 
common 
event' 
Rare 
common events common events after 
before choice choice 
rare events before rare events after 
choice choice 
Figure 3.12.2x2 design with the factors `order of the judgement task' and `type of event' 
One of the differences to the previous design was that, depending on the 
experimental condition, the judgement task had to be completed before or after 
the decision phase. In addition, instead of frequency estimations participants were 
asked to provide probability judgements for the rare or common events (again 
depending on the allocated condition), separately for both options previously 
sampled. The exact wording of the question was the following: "How likely do 
you think it is to receive the outcome x when pressing button y? Please provide a 
probability (0-100) in the window below the button and confirm by pressing the 
'NEXT' button". For the risky option in choice problem 1, for example, the 
probability of the rare event ('0') would have been 20% and the probability of the 
common event `4' would have been 80%. As in the previous experiment, each 
participant only received one of the six choice problems to prevent counting in 
subsequent problems. Both the choice problem and the assignment of the two 
options to the buttons `A' and `B' were randomised. All participants were 
instructed to maximise the number of points they received, which would be 
determined by a random draw from the chosen option. The feedback presented at 
the end of the experiment contained the outcome of the chosen lottery, their 
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estimated probabilities (rare or common) for the two buttons, and the actual 
probabilities. Finally, participants also had the opportunity to provide comments 
and feedback regarding the experiment in a text box. Overall, the completion of 
the whole experiment took only between 3 to 5 minutes. 
3.4.2 Results 
3.4.2.1 Information search 
Switching between options was even more prominent than in the previous design 
using only one choice problem. Only a very small proportion of participants did 
not switch more than once while exploring the options (4%). However, 
continuous alternation between options was also rare with less than I% of the 
cases. The median number of switches was overall higher with 22 (M = 25.1). The 
median switch ratio was 0.28 (M = . 
32). The overall distribution of switches is 
shown in Figure 3.13. 
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Figure 3.13. Histogram with the number of switches observed in Experiment 4. 
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3.4.2.2 Effect of the experimental variables 
In order to assess whether the experimental variables affected the decision- 
experience gap observed in previous experiments, I calculated the mean 
proportions of choices in the direction of overweighting of small probabilities 
across all six choice problems for the four experimental groups. A first inspection 
of these proportions in Table 3.3 shows that proportions are quite similar within 
all of the groups and that overweighting is observed in less than 50% of the 
choices. 
TABLE 3.3 
Mean proportions of choices in the direction of overweighting across the four 
experimental groups 
Order of the judgement task 
before choice after choice 
Type of Common . 35 . 
43 
event' Rare . 
41 
. 
46 
A logistic regression revealed no effect of the type of event judged (p =. 653), or 
for the order of the judgement task (p = . 
286). The interaction was also not 
significant (p =. 815). The proportion of choices in the direction of overweighting 
did therefore not depend upon which event was judged or when it was judged. A 
complete summary of the logistic regression results is provided in Table 3.4. 
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TABLE 3.4 
Logistic regression results for the effects of order of judgement task and type of event 
Estimate Std. Error Z P 
Model 1 
(Intercept) -. 268 . 
211 -1.261 . 
207 
Order of the judgement task -. 326 . 
301 -1.066 . 
286 
Common or rare events . 
135 
. 
298 
. 
449 
. 
653 
Order of the judgement task 
x Common and rare events . 
101 
. 
429 
. 
234 
. 
815 
Similar results were also obtained when comparing the proportions of H choices 
for participants judging the probabilities before choice and after choice within the 
individual choice problems. No significant difference was found in any of the six 
problems (see Table 3.5). 
TABLE 3.5 
Percentages of H choices for the two judgement order conditions across the six choice 
problems 
Percentage choosing H 
Decision Before After p-value (2-Tail) 
Problem choice choice Fisher's exact test 
1 47 60 
. 
437 
2 50 63 
. 
435 
3 17 33 . 233 
4 50 53 1.00 
5 20 47 
. 
054 
6 40 40 1.00 
As there were no significant differences in terms of the inherent overweighting of 
small probabilities the data of the four experimental groups was combined for the 
subsequent analyses. 
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3.4.2.3 Comparison with DfD choice proportions 
In order to test whether the actual decision-experience gap could be replicated for 
the Matched Sampling data in Experiment 4, the obtained choice proportions were 
compared with the descriptive choice proportions from Experiment 2. The mean 
absolute difference between the proportions within the two formats was 19, which 
is again smaller then the differences observed under Free Sampling in the earlier 
experiments. However, the comparisons of the overall mean choice proportions in 
the direction of overweighting reveal that there are actual differences between the 
two formats in the direction of less overweighting under DfXP, t(383) = 3.934, 
< 0.001). This is also partly evident within the six choice problems (see Table 
3.6). 
TABLE 3.6 
Percentages of H choices for the combined Matched-Sampling Conditions from 
Experiment 4 and the descriptive choice proportions reported in Experiment 2. 
Percentage choosing H 
Matched 
Descriptive 
Decision Sampling Choice p-value 
(2-Tail) 
Problem (Experiment 4 (Experiment 2) 
Fisher's exact test 
combined) 
1 53 36 . 
161 
2 47 72 . 
227 
3 20 64 . 
001 
4 27 36 . 236 
5 20 48 . 
227 
6 40 52 . 
344 
As the proportions in four out of the six choice problems lie on opposite sides of 
the 50% line this can be interpreted as a transition from overweighting to 
underweighting. Significant differences though were only found in choice 
problem 3. Figure 3.14 demonstrates this once more, showing the net differences 
between of the converted choice proportions of the DfD data (Experiment 2) and 
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the combined Matched Sampling data. Across all six problems and their mean, the 
bars point consistently in the direction of less overweighting of small probabilities 
under DfXP. Again the differences are smaller than the ones observed under Free 
Sampling, replicating the finding from Experiment 2 and 3, that Matched 
Sampling is attenuating the effect but not eliminating it. 
O 
f 
O 
0- 
0- 
a) U 
O 
t 
U 
C 
O 
O 
N 
-0 
U, 
N 
U 
C 
O 
0 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
-20 
Free Sampling & Description 
(Hertwig et al.. 2004) 
13 Matched Sampling (Experiment 4) & Description (Experiment 2) 
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Figure 3.14. Differences in choice proportions between the combined Matched Sampling 
data from Experiment 4 and the DfD data from Experiment 2 (grey bars). Positive bars 
indicate differences in the direction of less overweighting. The differences for the 
proportions reported by Hertwig et al (2004) are included for comparison. The two 
asterisks for the mean relates to the t-test results presented above. 
3.4.2.4 Probability judgements 
Before analysing the data, extreme outliers (more than 3 standard deviations away 
from the mean) were successively removed, which applied to 81 out of the 720 
judgements. Across the remaining data, probability judgements were again well 
adjusted with a correlation between the provided judgements and the actual 
probabilities of r= . 
92, p< . 0001 and a mean absolute difference of 10.12 (SD = 
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12.07). From the scatter plot in Figure 3.15, it is evident that there is again no 
systematic underestimation of small probabilities. Rather, the mean estimation 
errors implied significant deviations in the direction of overestimation for low 
probabilities (from 0 to 25%: t(93) = 5.09, p<0.001; t(20) = 2.45, p=0.023; t(45) 
= 2.37, p=0.022; t(71) = 2.14, p=0.035; t(45) = 1.55, p=0.128, all two-sided) 
and significant deviations in the direction of underestimation of high probabilities 
p (from 75 to 100%: t(59) = 3.43, p=0.001; t(89) = 7.6 1, p<0.001; t(59) = 4.7 7, 
< 0.001; t(29) = 2.28, p = 0.030; t(119) = 6.7 1, p<0.001, all two-sided). 
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Figure 3.15. The deviations of the probability judgements for both rare and common 
events in Experiment 4 plotted against the actually experienced probabilities. The dotted 
line indicates perfect calibration. The black dots are the mean estimates. The white dots 
indicate the observed estimation errors. One white dot may represent several data points 
from different participants. 
When analysing the probability judgements separately for the groups of 
participants providing their judgements either before or after choice task, the 
99 
Chapter3: Matched Sampling 
Before-Choice Condition was found to provide more accurate judgements with a 
smaller mean absolute difference (M before = 8.54, SD = 10.55, M after = 11.79, SD 
= 13.32; t(637) ==-1.50, p = . 13). However, a stronger relationship 
between judged 
and actual probabilities, between the Before-Choice Condition (r(329) = . 
94, p< 
. 
0001) and the After-Choice Condition (r(310) = . 
90, p< . 
001) was not confirmed 
(z = 3.99, p> . 
999). Figure 3.16 gives the distribution of the means for the 
different probability values, separately for the two groups. It can be seen that the 
difference between the two conditions stems mainly from slightly higher 
overestimation within the small probabilities in the After-Choice Condition. 
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Figure 3.16. Mean deviations of the probability judgements across the actually 
experienced probabilities, separately for the Before-Choice and After-Choice Conditions. 
A significant difference between the mean absolute differences of the participants 
judging rare or common events was not found (t(637) = -1.50, p= . 
13). 
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3.4.2.5 Recency Weighting 
Consistent with the results from previous experiments there was no indication for 
recency weighting, neither between the rate of correct predictions from the first 
and second half of the outcome sequences (50% and 47% respectively, ,2 
McNemar (1) = 0.12, p=0.73 1, nor between the rates of correct predictions from 
the four quartiles (from 1 to 4: 49%, 48%, 49%, and 48%), Cochran's Q (3,360) 
=. 199, p=. 978. 
Again, the position of the rare but high outcome of 32 points within the 
sampled sequences of Problem 6 did not seem to have an impact on the rate of 
maximising choices. This applies to predictions based on the first or second half 
of the sequence (37% versus 43% correct predictions, Fisher's Exactp =. 793) 
and the more extreme comparison of participants encountering the rare event 
either in the first or last seven outcomes of the sequence (29% versus 40%, 
Fisher's Exact p=1.00). 
3.4.2.6 Application of descriptive choice models 
On the basis of the data with two valid probability judgements per participant (N 
= 294), the predictions of EV and PT models were calculated. EV maximisation 
based on the experienced probabilities predicted 43% of the choices correctly. By 
using the estimated probabilities this could be increased by 7% V McNemar (1) 
= 3.375, p= . 066). PT 
based on the experienced probabilities (using the same set 
of parameters as in previous analyses) could account for 43% of the choices 
correctly. Again using the judged probabilities instead (two-stage model) could 
increase the percentage of correct predictions slightly (48%), but not significantly 
so (X2 McNemar (1) = 1.750, p= . 186). The differences between the EV and PT 
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models were also not significant, neither for the models based on experienced 
probabilities (, McNemar (1) = . 
006, p= . 
94), nor for the models based on 
judged probabilities (, McNemar (1) = 0.352, p= . 
553). Table 3.7 provides a 
summary of the rate of correct predictions across all the different subgroups of the 
two experimental variables. 
TABLE 3.7 
Rate of correct predictions across the subgroups of the experimental variables in Experiment 4 
EV 
(experienced 
probabilities) 
EV 
(estimated 
probabilities) 
PT 
(experienced 
probabilities) 
Two-stage 
(estimated 
probabilities) 
All 
. 
43 (128/294) 
. 
50 (146/294) 
. 
43 (127/294) 
. 
48 (141/294) 
Before 
. 
39 (60/155) 
. 48 
(75/155) 
. 
42 (65/155) 
. 
49 (76/155) 
After 
. 
49 (68/139) 
. 
51 (71/139) 
. 
45 (62/139) 
. 
47 (65/139) 
Rare 
. 
41 (63/154) 
. 
47 (73/154) 
. 
45 (70/154) 
. 
49 (76/154) 
Common 
. 46 
(65/140) 
. 
52 (73/140) 
. 
41 (57/140) 
. 
46 (65/140) 
Before & Rare . 
35 (29/83) 
. 
48 (40/83) 
. 
47 (39/83) 
. 52 
(43/83) 
Before & Common 
. 
43 (31/72) 
. 
49 (35/72) 
. 
36 (26/72) 
. 
46 (33/72) 
After & Rare 
. 
48 (34/71) 
. 
46 (33/71) 
. 
44(31/71) 
. 
46 (33/71) 
After & Common . 50 
(34/68) 
. 56 
(38/68) 
. 46 
(31/68) 
. 
47 (32/68) 
In order to assess the impact of the two independent variables used in this 
experiment on the rate of correctly predicted choices four logistic regressions 
were conducted with the prediction of the four models presented above as a 
dependent variable and the two experimental factors as explanatory variables. A 
significant coefficient was not found in any of the four analyses. It can therefore 
be concluded that the proportion of correctly predicted choices does not depend 
on whether the probabilities were judged before or after choice or whether rare or 
common events had to be judged during the estimation phase. 
3.4.3 Discussion 
Experiment 4 has shown once more that the apparent underweighting in DfXP can 
still be observed under Matched Sampling, in which sampling error is eliminated. 
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As in the previous experiments, the differences between the proportions in 
descriptive and experiential choice are less extreme which seems to indicate that 
sampling error has only a moderating effect. The analysis of the probability 
judgements has confirmed the findings from the preceding experiment, providing 
clear evidence against a systematic underestimation of small probabilities that 
would have been able to account for the apparent underweighting of small 
probabilities. Instead, the judgements provided by the participants were again well 
calibrated with deviations in the opposite direction. The overall accuracy though 
seems to have been lower in probability judgements than in frequency 
judgements. The reasons for this remain unclear but it could indicate that 
frequency counts are not directly transformed into probability judgements, 
although both are following a similar pattern. 
The two experimental variables employed in the last experiment did not 
have an impact on the extent of the apparent underweighting of small probabilities 
under Matched Sampling. This is not necessarily a surprise for the `type of event' 
to be judged which only had the purpose to provide an extended range of 
probabilities. More interesting, is the observation that it does not seem to make a 
difference whether probability judgements are made before or after choice. The 
transformation of observed frequencies into probability values does not seem to 
result in a representation similar to descriptive choice as the resulting choice 
behaviour still resembles an experiential choice pattern. This is even more 
surprising as we know that the judged probabilities of rare events are slightly 
overestimated. 
In terms of recency weighting, the results are again in line with the general 
observation that the position of the rare events within the sample does not explain 
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the choice pattern either. This does not necessarily allow the conclusion that the 
whole sequence is actually used for the decision process but it seems to show that 
choices are not made on the basis of average payoffs derived from parts of the 
whole sequence. The results from the application of descriptive choice models 
have been very consistent again across all the experiments presented here 
supporting the conclusion that neither EV nor the established form of PT provide 
predictions better than chance. Further, whether the models are based on the 
actually experienced probabilities or the subjective probabilities in the form of 
frequency or probability judgements does not seem to make a real difference. 
Given that the judgements were either very well calibrated or deviating in the 
direction of overestimation of small probabilities, it is not surprising that the two- 
stage model does not provide a significant increase in performance. This can be 
seen as additional evidence against the involvement of judgement bias in 
decisions from experience. Taken together, the model applications seem to 
indicate that at least with the parameterisation established under descriptive 
choice PT does not seem to describe choice behaviour in decisions from 
experience appropriately. Whether this can be generalised across a wider range of 
parameter values, and whether we have to assume different underlying processes 
within DfXP, will be investigated in Chapter 6. 
Moreover, the results presented here are also interesting in the context of a 
recent explanation that has been put forward to reconcile the differences in 
weighting of small probabilities between decisions from experience and decisions 
from description. According to Erev, Glozman and Hertwig (2008), one of the 
factors that determines the psychological impact of rare events is explicit 
presentation. In the experiential sampling tasks, for example, where people have 
104 
Chapter3: Matched Sampling 
to rely on memory, the rare event might be neglected and therefore 
underweighted; whereas the explicit presentation of the event in a gamble 
description will have the opposite effect. However, the findings presented seem to 
indicate that this is not the appropriate explanation here. The group of participants 
who had to provide probability judgements for the rare events before choice, who 
hence had to explicitly recall the occurrences of the rare event and who on 
average tended to overestimate the rare event's actual frequency, still made 
choices as if they underweighted small probabilities. 
In summary, with the introduction of the Matched Sampling design and its 
combination with frequency and probability judgements, this chapter has 
contributed a range of new and important results suggesting that the phenomenon 
of underweighting in decisions from experience cannot be explained away by 
sampling error or judgement bias. In both Chapter 1 and 2,1 have already 
demonstrated that the effect can be repeatedly replicated without the coexistence 
of any form of recency weighting. Taken together, the results from the first four 
experiments have therefore provided evidence that systematically rebuts all of the 
existing explanations put forward in the current literature (Fox & Hadar, 2006; 
Hertwig et al., 2004) to account for the differences between descriptive and 
experiential choice. The results from the Matched Sampling experiment will be of 
particular help in concluding the sampling error debate which has been 
dominating the recent discussion on decision from experience. The end of this 
chapter can therefore also be seen as the end of the first section of the thesis which 
has dealt with the systematic examination of existing explanations of decisions 
from experience phenomenon. With no obvious lines of further investigation, the 
second part of the thesis will explore potential alternative mechanisms which have 
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not yet been considered. The following chapter will begin this process by drawing 
from observations that have been made in this first set of experiments and looking 
into the impact of sampling order in decisions from experience. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EFFECTS OF SAMPLING ORDER 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3,1 have shown that neither of the original explanations from the 
literature can fully explain the underweighting of small probabilities in decisions 
from experience (DfXP). I therefore devote the second part of this thesis to the 
exploration of alternative causes for the phenomenon. Before presenting a further 
series of experiments, I briefly want to address the problem of equivalence of the 
underlying cognitive tasks in descriptive and experiential choice. From the start, 
results in experiential choice tasks have mostly been investigated in terms of EV 
and PT frameworks. This was an obvious starting point as it provided 
sophisticated models which had already been established in descriptive choice 
problems. 
An alternative motivation from the beginning of the decision from experience 
work, has been to look at decision making processes that appear to connect to the 
reinforcement learning research tradition in animals (e. g., Erev & Haruvy, in 
preparation), which is based on completely different assumptions about the 
underlying mechanism. One of the few attempts that have been made in the context of 
DfXP to apply such a statistical learning model as an alternative to account for the 
findings was provided by Hertwig et al. (2006), who tried to model the underlying 
processes in terms of a variant of the fractional adjustment model (March, 1996). 
This will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6. 
In terms of the PT framework, the simplest way of applying it to DfXP 
was to divide the DfXP task into two distinct stages. In the first stage, the 
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outcomes and their probabilities are inferred from the samples drawn, either by 
actually calculating the average payoff or through estimation. In the second stage, 
subjective probabilities are then multiplicatively combined with the actual 
outcomes in a way identical to EV and PT models. It is therefore not surprising 
that the two-stage model has been applied to account for the DfXP, as it very 
closely resembles such a process based on very similar assumptions. In terms of 
the differences between the choice behaviour in decisions from experience, the 
causes have mainly been attributed to the first stage. In particular, the equivalence 
in terms of the summary statistics derived from the sequences as a whole has been 
the focus of the investigation. As pointed out by Fox and Hadar (2006), the 
involvement of sampling error in the original DfXP design did not allow the 
conclusion that the same choice problem can lead to different choice behaviour when 
presented in a series of outcomes instead of a gamble description. In the last chapter, I 
have shown that this can be remedied and that sampling error can be eliminated. The 
Matched Sampling paradigm has made it possible to present an experiential format 
that is at least equivalent to a gamble description in terms of the summary statistics 
regarding the enclosed outcomes and their probabilities as they can be extracted from 
the sequence. 
This does not necessarily mean, however, that the information within the two 
tasks are combined in the same way in order to be utilised for the decision making 
process. In the context of a sequential sampling process other strategies seem equally 
plausible and should be considered. Even if across the whole sequence the same 
information is presented, the aggregation of this information over time might trigger 
different cognitive processes and could result in a different representation of the 
uncertainty attached to the outcomes. This shows that there are limitations in terms of 
the equivalence between the two tasks. 
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After the rebuttal of sampling error and judgement error as the main causes 
for the underweighting, it is not clear what other hypotheses within the two-stage 
framework might yield more appropriate predictions. One option is to explore a 
potential difference in the actual weighing and value transformations in experiential 
choice and in descriptive choice, which will be the focus of Chapter 5 and 6. 
The claim of this chapter is that by imposing the two-stage framework onto 
the experiential choice task we may have missed out on an opportunity to discover 
alternative properties and processes that are part of the sampling task and which could 
provide a wider set of explanations for the differences in choice behaviour. I therefore 
want to take a step back and re-examine the sampling process by exploring some of 
its properties that have been observed in the experiments of the previous chapters. In 
particular, the repeated switching between options during the exploration phase has 
been shown to be a consistent finding in the information search within decisions from 
experience. This implies that participants form clusters of samples from the buttons 
which could facilitate repeated relative comparisons throughout the sampling process 
whenever they switch sampling from one option to the other. By assuming such 
additional cognitive processes preceding the final choice tasks we can see how, all of 
a sudden, different evaluation strategies have to be taken into account. Consequently, 
the same lottery can be processed in numerous ways depending on how it is 
partitioned into different sub-samples. 
One variable that determines this partitioning of the outcome sequence of an 
option is sampling order. Preventing participants from switching between options 
and forcing them to explore both options separately, for example, could facilitate 
an evaluation of two sequences as a whole and would provide representations of 
the options' outcomes and probabilities that map more naturally onto a two stage 
decision from experience model. Despite the differences in obtaining the 
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information during the first stage, the representations of the information that 
enters the second stage would then be more similar between experiential and 
descriptive choice tasks. As a result, choice behaviour might also be more 
comparable to descriptive choice. Controlling sampling order would therefore 
induce a closer equivalence between the descriptive and experiential decision 
problems, and could potentially reduce or eliminate the description-experience 
gap. 
By investigating decisions from experience under conditions with 
systematic manipulations of sampling order, the experiments presented in this 
chapter will provide an initial experimental test of the impact of different 
representations induced by properties of the sampling sequence and the 
involvement of relative evaluation of the two options in DfXP. A more theoretical 
analysis investigating additional properties of the experienced samples will be 
presented in Chapter 6. 
4.2 Fixed Sampling with Probability Judgements (Experiment 5) 
The first sampling order experiment takes up the example provided above and 
examines whether the underweighting of small probabilities can still be observed 
when the two options have to be explored separately. By fixing sampling order 
experimentally and preventing switching between options, the experiment 
provides an experiential choice task that resembles descriptive choice more 
closely, enabling the evaluation of the options as a whole. If the partitioning of the 
options into sub-samples and the opportunity for additional comparisons between 
these sub-samples has been involved in provoking the pattern of underweighting 
of small probabilities under unrestricted sampling in the experiments previously 
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reported, then we would expect the underweighting to be eliminated or reversed 
under conditions involving restricted sampling order. 
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
200 participants, 65 male and 135 female, aged between 15 and 60 with a mean of 
25 years completed the experiment which was again conducted over the Web. 
Recruitment was once more organised through various internet portals of the 
University of Warwick, the Hanover College and the University of Central 
Lancashire advertising psychological experiments. 
4.2.1.2 Design and procedure 
The design was identical to the Matched Sampling design in Experiment 3 with a 
frequency judgement task at the end of the experiment in which the participants 
were asked to provide estimates for the frequencies of the rare events in both 
sequences sampled. The same six choice problems were used and every 
participant was presented with only one problem which was randomly selected. 40 
samples had to be drawn without replacement from each button. The only 
difference was the order in which the options could be explored. Instead of 
allowing exploration in whatever order preferred, participants had to sample all 40 
outcomes from option `A' before they could start sampling from option `B' (40- 
40 sampling order). Both the gamble and the allocation of its options to the two 
buttons were randomly selected. The experiment ended with the presentation of 
feedback on the subjects' obtained score, their frequency estimates, and the actual 
frequencies. 
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4.2.2 Results 
As both the number of samples (Matched Sampling design) and the actual order in 
which to sample from the two options was fixed and identical for all participants, 
there were no differences in the actual information search pattern between 
participants. The result section presented here will therefore start with the analysis 
of the observed choice behaviour without further delay. 
4.2.2.1 Choice proportions 
I first tested whether there were any deviations in the direction of overweighting 
of small probabilities observable under fixed sampling order by comparing the 
choice proportions obtained in this experiment with the descriptive choice 
proportions from Experiment 2 reported in the previous chapter. The mean 
absolute difference between the proportions was 15%. The overall mean of 
choices in the direction of overweighting of small probabilities was significantly 
higher under descriptive choice (61%) than under 40-40 sampling (49%), t(273) = 
2.25 5, p= . 027, two-sided. The proportions of H choices within the different 
choice problems are provided in Table 4.1., together with the actual number of 
participants in each choice problem. The p-values of Fisher's exact test for the 
comparisons of the differences between the two conditions across the six decision 
problems are presented in the column next to the choice proportions. Reversals in 
terms of preferences across the 50% line are still observed for four out of six 
choice problems (3,4,5 and 6). Significant differences though were only found in 
decision problem 4. 
In a second analysis, I tested whether there were any differences between 
the Matched-Sampling Condition with fixed order (40-40) and the Matched- 
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Sampling Condition with free sampling order from Experiment 3. The mean 
absolute difference between the proportions of the two Matched-Sampling 
Conditions was relatively high though with 14.33%, which is also very similar to 
the value reported for the comparison of fixed sampling and descriptive choice. 
The overall proportions of choices in the direction of overweighting was higher 
under Matched Sampling with fixed sampling order (49%) than under Matched 
Sampling with free sampling order (38%), though the difference was not 
significant with Fisher's exact p= . 83. Within the different choice problems only 
one significant difference was found for choice problem 1 (see last two columns 
in Table 4.1) for which the proportion under fixed sampling was close to the 
proportion found under descriptive choice. 
TABLE 4.1 
Summary of the observed proportions of H choices for the experimental conditions including the 
p-values (Fisher's exact tests) for the differences between the experiential and descriptive choice 
proportions. Significant differences are highlighted with asterisks. 
Percentage choosing H 
Fixed Matched 
Decision 
H L Sampling n 
Description 
P Sampling P Problem Order 
(Exp. 2) ( 
(Exp. 3) 
1 4,. 8 3,1.0 38 29 36 1.00 69* 
. 
037 
2 4,. 2 3, 
. 
25 55 33 72 . 
274 39 
. 
222 
3 -3,1.0 -32,. 1 48 31 64 . 288 42 . 799 
4 -3,1.0 -4,. 8 66 36 33* . 040 55 . 486 
5 32, .1 
3,1.0 59 32 48 . 
432 45 
. 
317 
6 32, 
. 
025 3, . 
25 36 39 52 . 
300 26 
. 
452 
mean all problems 49 200 61* . 
027 38 
. 
832 
The differences between the different conditions across the six decision 
problems are again presented in Figure 4.1. The grey bars show that the 
differences between description and fixed sampling are still pointing in the 
direction of less overweighting of small probabilities with the exception of 
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decision problem 5. However, the differences are also no longer as large as under 
Matched Sampling with free sampling order. 
V, 80- C 0 Free Sampling & Description (Hertwig et al., 2004) 
V- 
ö 60 0 Matched Sampling 40-40 (Experiment 5) & Description (Experiment 2) 
40- 0 
U 
2456 
H: (4,. 8) (4,. 2) (-3,1) (-3,1) (32,. 1) (32,. 025) 
L: (3,1) (3,. 25) (-32,. 1) (-4,. 8) (3,1) (3,. 25) mean 
Choice problem 
Figure 4.1. Differences in proportions of maximising choices between Matched Sampling 
with fixed 40-40 sampling order (Experiment 5) and descriptive choice (data from 
Experiment 2) across the different decision problems. For comparison the proportions 
reported by Hertwig et al. (2004) have been added (* p< . 
05, ** p< .0 
1). The asterisk for 
the mean refers to the t-test results provided above. 
Given all these results, it seems like the proportions from the 40-40 
sampling condition lie somewhere between descriptive choice and Matched 
Sampling with free sampling order. To test whether the proportions from the 
different conditions follow a qualitative ordering an additional analysis was 
conducted. The details of this analysis are described in Barlow (1972) and Fleiss, 
Levin and Paik (2003). For this test, I assumed that the three proportions of 
maximising choices are ordered in terms of the extent to which they exhibit 
underweighting of small probabilities. The following ordering was predicted: 
Hl : pxp_free > pxp_tixed> Pdescr. 
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This was tested against the null hypothesis that all proportions are equal: 
HO: Pxp_free = pxp_fixed = Pdescr. 
The X2 statistic for the test is shown in Table 4.2. In four out of the six choice 
problems a significant ordering could be found in the predicted direction, 
indicating less underweighting under fixed sampling order. 
TABLE 4.2 
Statistics and p-values for the tests of equality of ordered proportions 
Descriptive choice proportions from previous experiment 
Choice 
problem 
xý 
C p 
1 8.069 0.489 <. 01 ** 
2 6.082 0.457 <. 05 
3 2.797 0.472 >. 05 
4 4.106 0.459 <. 05 
5 0.678 0.465 >. 1 
6 4.268 0.430 <. 05 
The p-values are looked up from the table provided by Barlow (1972) 
In addition, a logistic regression was conducted using the data from (a) the 
40-40 Sampling Condition, (b) the equivalent Matched-Sampling Condition with 
free sampling order, and (c) the Description Condition from Experiment 2. The 
categorical explanatory variables were presentation format ('experienced' vs 
`description') and exploration mode ('sub-samples' vs. `whole sequence'), and 
choice in the direction of underweighting was the dichotomous dependent 
variable. The exploration mode `whole sequence' included Matched Sampling 
with 40-40 sampling order and descriptive choice, as they were assumed to have 
similar representations. The mode `sub-samples' included the Matched Sampling 
data with free sampling order. Both factors' effects on the likelihood of making 
choices in the direction of underweighting was statistically significant (see Table 
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4.3), with no significant interaction. The significant slopes in the table indicate 
that proportionately more choices in the direction of underweighting can be 
observed under conditions where information is experienced and under conditions 
where information can be sampled freely. 
TABLE 4.3 
Logistic regression results for the variables of presentation format and exploration mode 
Estimate Std. Error zp 
(Intercept) 
-. 433 . 
167 -2.592 . 
010 
Presentation format 
. 
427 
. 
204 2.092 . 
036 
('experienced' vs. `description') 
Exploration mode 
. 
493 
. 
219 2.253 . 
024 
('sub-samples' vs `whole') 
In summary, the proportions found under fixed exploration do still reflect 
underweighting of small probabilities although to a lesser extent than observed in 
the earlier DfXP experiments. The intermediate position of the proportions 
exhibited under Matched Sampling with fixed sampling order seems to be a result 
of the separate contribution of the two variables presentation format and 
exploration mode. 
4.2.2.2 Frequency judgements 
The provided frequency estimations were again analysed after reiteratively 
removing extreme outliers that deviated by more than 3 standard deviations from 
the mean. Out of the 400 judgements 26 were excluded. The mean absolute 
difference between the actual experienced frequencies and their estimates was M 
= 2.45 (SD = 3.96). In terms of their accuracy participants were again very well 
adjusted, r (372) _ . 96, p< . 
001; R2 =. 91, F(1,372) = 3953, p < 0.001). It is 
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obvious from Figure 4.2 that there is again no indication for potential 
underestimation of small frequencies. Rather, there are deviations from the 
diagonal in the direction of overestimation of small frequencies and 
underestimation of high frequencies. This is confirmed by a series of tests 
examining whether the means of the estimation errors are different from zero 
(from low to high frequency: t(37) = 2.32, p =. 026; t(61) = 1.86, p = . 068; t(86) = 
3.24, p= . 002; t(68) = 2.26, p= . 027; t(117) = 3.82, p<0.001, all two-sided). 
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Figure 4.2. Deviations of the frequency judgements for the rare events in Experiment 5 
plotted against the actually experienced frequencies. Due to the overlap of the 
probabilities in the six choice problems used there were only 5 different rare event 
frequencies. The dotted line indicates perfect calibration. The black dots are the mean 
estimates. The white dots indicate the observed estimation errors. One white dot may 
represent several data points from different participants. 
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Taken altogether, the results of the frequency estimations under fixed sampling 
order match the results presented in Experiment 3. A greater accuracy of the 
frequency judgements due to fixed sampling order was not found. Instead, the 
strength of the relationship between actual and estimated frequencies was the 
same for the two experiments (z = 4.75, p=1.00), independent of sampling order. 
4.2.2.3 Recency weighting 
Fixing the sampling order did not make any difference in terms of recency 
weighting. As in the previous experiments, the rate of correct predictions based on 
different parts of the two sequences were just around 50% and did not differ 
significantly between the different splits. This applies to the predictions on the 
basis of the expected values of the first and second half of the sequences (50% vs. 
49%, x2 McNemar (1) = 0.022, p=1.00) and to the predictions based on the 
expected values of the four quartiles of the sequences (from 1 to 4: 55%, 50%, 
53%, and 50%, Cochran's Q (3,200) = 1.065, p= . 747). 
Also, the comparison of the proportions of maximising choices for the 
appearance of the 32 points within different parts of the sequence of choice 
problem 6 does not indicate any significant differences between earlier and later 
parts of the sequence. This is the case for encounters within the first or second 
half of the sequence (41% versus 29% correct predictions, Fisher's Exact p =. 518 
and the more extreme comparison of encounters within the first or last seven 
outcomes of the sequence (60% versus 50% Fisher's Exact p=1.00). The actual 
trends within both comparisons point more towards a primacy effect. 
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4.2.2.4 Application of descriptive choice models 
The rate of correct predictions on the basis of the experienced probabilities was 
50% for EV maximisation and 47% for the PT model using the parameters by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). When using the valid frequency judgements 
instead, EV maximisation could account for 63% of the choices correctly, which 
is a significant increase (, 3ý 2 McNemar (1) = 8,643, p= . 003), whereas the two- 
stage model still predicted only 48% correctly (1ý2 McNemar (1) = .25, p= . 
617). 
Compared with the data from the Matched-Sampling Condition of Experiment 3 
with free sampling order reported in Chapter 3, the rates were slightly higher. A 
significant difference though was only found for the EV maximisation rates based 
on the estimations (Fisher's exact p= . 
005). However, overall the fits remain still 
rather low, as illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3. Percentage of correct predictions for the different choice models: expected 
value, prospect theory, expected value based on the estimated frequencies, and the two- 
stage model (also based on estimated frequencies). Only the expected value model based 
on the estimated probabilities performs above chance which is shown by the dotted line. 
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4.2.3 Discussion 
The results of this experiment suggest that the exploration of the options one after 
the other acts as a moderating variable which makes the problem more similar to 
descriptive choice but does not reverse the underweighting into overweighting 
observed in DfD. Instead, we find the choice proportions to be between 
descriptive choice and Matched Sampling with free sampling order. Interestingly, 
the fixed sampling order does not affect any of the other properties observed in 
experiential choice. Although the fixed sampling order facilitates the aggregation 
of the sequential information, the accuracy of the frequency judgements was not 
found to be more accurate than under free sampling order. There was also no 
difference in terms of the absence of recency weighting. Only the rate of correct 
predictions of descriptive choice models did differ slightly, with an increased 
performance of EV maximisation based on the frequency estimations. However, 
the predictive power of the PT model remains around chance level. With linear 
probability weighting the EV model seems to be better capable of incorporating 
the reduced overweighting under fixed sampling order. Taken together, these 
results show that making the task even more equivalent to descriptive choice by 
facilitating the integration of the outcome information separately and as a whole is 
not enough to eliminate the DfXP pattern. 
However, a few potential problems need to be addressed. Firstly, we have 
only looked at one choice problem per participant. In order to get an idea of the 
robustness of the choice pattern under fixed sampling it would be helpful to have 
participants completing all six decision problems. It is also important to keep in 
mind that a small percentage of participants in the Matched-Sampling Condition 
with free sampling order did actually sample in the same order as the fixed 
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exploration group (9%). Unfortunately, though, this group is too small to conduct 
a separate analysis with its data. The remaining participants are difficult to 
classify, and it might be inappropriate to compare such an amalgamation of 
different sampling orders. To provide clarification it would therefore be expedient 
to compare the fixed exploration with an alternative sampling strategy that is more 
distinct and also more homogeneous. Continuous alternation between options 
represents such a more extreme partitioning of the sequence. It has the highest 
degree of partitioning into sub-samples with a sample size of one for each sub- 
sample. The integration of the sequential information per option in this condition 
is most difficult due to higher working memory loads. The following experiment 
aims to address these issues with an extended sampling order design. 
4.3 Within-Participant Analysis (Experiment 6) 
The purpose of the second sampling order experiment was to address the 
methodological problems described above. Consequently, it includes the addition 
of an order condition that is more distinguishable from the 40-40 Sampling 
Condition, by forcing participants to switch after every single sample. 
Furthermore, it comprised the completion of all six choice problems in order to 
get a more reliable measure of the extent of the underweighting of small 
probabilities under fixed sampling order. The rationale was the same as above, 
assuming that observing the sampled outcomes in different orders could result in a 
different representation of the probabilities of the options. However, the 
experiment goes further by introducing a design that allows me to test whether the 
reversals between descriptive and experiential choice tasks can also be replicated 
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within participants. Until now, the experiments in the literature have only 
compared descriptive choice and experiential choice between participants. 
4.3.1 Method 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
150 participants (56 men and 94 women, aged between 18 and 56 years, with an 
average age of 32) completed the Web-based experiment. The recruitment was 
conducted through `ipoints', by sending out an invitation email to a random 
sample of their database. In exchange for their participation the participants 
received 200 ipoints, which is equivalent to U. 
4.3.1.2 Design 
The six choice problems used in the previous experiments were presented to all 
participants in two formats, once in the form of a description format and once in a 
Matched Sampling format. Every participant therefore took part in the DfD 
condition and one of the three DfXP conditions (either Free Sampling, 40-40 
Sampling or 1-1 Sampling). A summary of the design is provided in Table 4.4. 
TABLE 4.4 
Experimental design used in Experiment 6 
Within- 
participants 
measures 
6 choice 
problems 
6 choice 
problems 
Between-participants conditions 
1-1 Sampling 40-40 Sampling Free Sampling 
Order Order Order 
Descriptions 
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The overall order of the resulting 12 decision problems in the two different 
presentation formats was mixed and completely randomised for each participant 
(e. g., XP3, Des4, XP5, Des2, Des 1, XP6). Within the descriptions of the 
prospects, probabilities were expressed as percentages and presented in the 
following format: 
p% chance to win/lose x points, 
1-p % chance to win/lose 0 points. 
q% chance to win/lose y points, 
or 
1-q % chance to win/lose 0 points. 
In the Matched Sampling format, probabilities had to be inferred from 40 
outcomes sampled from each of the two options available. The prospects were 
matched onto the sequences according to the Matched Sampling design 
introduced earlier. Whereas the descriptive choice tasks were identical for all the 
participants, the Matched Sampling task was implemented in three different order 
conditions, a Free-Sampling-Order Condition a 40-40 Sampling-Order Condition, 
and a Forced-Alternation Condition (1-1 Sampling-Order). The former two have 
already been used in the first sampling order experiment described above. New 
was the Forced-Alternation Condition in which participants had to alternate 
between the options after every single sample ({A, B, A, B, A, B,... }). Sampling 
within all the predetermined orders started with button `A' and continued 
according to the specific schedule of the condition. Non-available buttons turned 
grey indicating when to switch to the other option. The assignment of participants 
to one of the three order conditions was randomised as was the placement of the 
options ('A' or `B' button) within each prospect. 
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After the sampling phase, participants had to choose their preferred option 
which was played once at the end of the experiment. The points obtained were 
added to the final score. This phase was identical for both the descriptive and the 
experiential conditions. Participants were not asked to estimate frequencies in this 
task. As in previous designs, the experiment ended with the presentation of 
feedback including the points total and a summary of the outcomes of all the 
chosen lotteries. 
4.3.2 Results 
4.3.2.1 Information search 
As the information search in the two predetermined sampling order conditions, the 
40-40 Condition and the 1-1 Condition (Forced-Alternation), was restricted there 
was no need to analyse the information search within these conditions separately. 
Within the Matched-Sampling Condition with free sampling order, on the other 
hand, a separate analysis was necessary to explore the sampling strategies used. 
The median number of switches was higher than in Experiment 2 with 2 (M = 
10.82) switches per choice problem. Only 45% of the sequences were explored in 
the same way as in the 40-40 Condition with only one switch after finishing the 
sampling from one option exhaustively. Exploration similar to the 1-1 Condition 
(79 switches) was observed in only 1% of the sequences. The majority of the 
sequences (54%) were explored with a number of switches somewhere between 
the two extremes. The overall distribution of the number of switches is provided 
in Figure 4.4. When put in relation to the possible number of switches the median 
switching ratio was . 025 
(M = . 1). 
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Figure 4.4. Distribution of the number of switches between buttons in the Matched- 
Sampling Condition with free sampling order in Experiment 6. 
4.3.2.2 Choice behaviour 
In a first analysis I tested whether there were any differences between choice 
behaviour in the three order conditions for descriptive and experiential choice 
problems. When analysing the data on the level of individual choice problems, the 
proportions of choices in the direction of overweighting within the individual 
choice problems did not differ between the three order conditions, neither within 
the experiential choice problems nor between the descriptive choice problems (see 
p-values in Table 4.5). 
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TABLE 4.5 
Proportions of choices in the direction of overweighting across the individual choice problems for 
experiential and descriptive choice within the different experimental conditions. The chi square 
statistics and p-values from the tests of equality of proportions between the three conditions for the 
data from both choice formats are provided in the last two columns in each block. 
Matched Sampling Decision from Description 
% choices in the direction 
of overweighting 
% choices in the direction 
of overweighting 
Decision 2 
Problem 
40-40 Free 1-1 X p 40-40 Free 1-1 x p 
1 56 40 52 2.774 . 
25 58 60 68 1.189 . 
552 
2 56 62 72 2.813 . 
245 64 50 70 4.442 . 
109 
3 46 28 46 4.5 . 105 32 38 18 
5.082 . 
079 
4 40 60 44 4.487 . 
106 68 76 78 1.029 . 
598 
5 46 32 34 2.451 . 
294 32 32 38 . 535 . 765 
6 40 40 46 . 
493 
. 
782 32 40 36 . 
694 
. 
707 
The proportions for the order conditions were therefore combined. A comparison 
based on these combined proportions shows that there was a significantly higher 
proportion of choices in the direction of overweighting under descriptive choice in 
two out of six choice problems (see Table 4.6). In three out of four problems 
where no significant difference could be found, the underlying reason seemed to 
be surprisingly low proportions in the direction of overweighting within 
descriptive choice. High proportions in the direction of overweighting within the 
experiential choice problems were only found in one of the six choice problems. 
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TABLE 4.6 
Combined choice data for the individual choice problems including the p-values for the 
McNemar tests conducted. 
Choices in the direction of 
overweighting 
Decision Descriptive Experiential 
Problem Choice Choice p 
1 62 49 . 027 
2 61 63 . 810 
3 29 40 
. 
056 
4 71 48 
. 
001 
5 34 37 
. 
576 
6 36 42 
. 
281 
In order to test whether there were any differences between the mean proportions 
in the direction of overweighting of the three order conditions for descriptive and 
experiential choice problems a mixed design ANOVA was conducted with 
Sampling Order as a between-participant factor and Choice Format as a within- 
participant factor. The results revealed that there was no main effect of Choice 
Format (F(1,147) = 1.202, p =. 275). There was also no main effect of the 
between-participants factor Sampling Order (F(2,147) = . 
435, p =. 648) and no 
significant interaction between the two (F(2,147) = . 
724, p =. 486). This is also 
illustrated in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5. Interaction plot for the mean choices proportions within the different order 
conditions with different degrees of partitioning into sub-samples in Experiment 6. 
Firstly, the mean percentages of choices in the direction of overweighting were 
very similar for all three order conditions around 50%. Secondly, the bars of both 
formats DfXP and DfD have also similar heights. It was therefore not possible 
replicate the between subjects difference between the mean proportions in the 
direction of overweighting for DfD and DfXP from earlier experiments. A higher 
rate of overweighting in the 40-40 Condition than under 1-1 Condition could also 
not be found. With no differences between the sampling order conditions, an 
analysis testing whether there was a significant ordering of the means in terms of 
overweighting of small probabilities was not indicated and thereby not conducted. 
The in-between position 40-40 Condition from the last experiment could 
consequently not be replicated either. 
The main reason for the reduced gap between the percentages of choices in 
the direction of underweighting between experiential and descriptive choice 
seems to be related to fact that the extent of overweighting under descriptive 
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choice was much lower than usually observed in such tasks. This could be 
confirmed in a comparison of the proportions of choices in the direction of 
overweighting between the descriptive choice conditions of Experiment 2 (61 %) 
and Experiment 6 (49%), t(173) =2.691, p =. 011. Conversely, a comparison 
between the combined experiential choice data of all order conditions in 
Experiment 6 and the Matched Sampling condition in Experiment 2 showed that 
there was no significant difference, t(173) = -1.179, p =. 246. However, the 
proportions of choices in the direction of overweighting between the same 
experiential choice data in Experiment 6 and the descriptive choice condition in 
Experiment 2 did differ significantly, t(173) = 3.2, p =. 003. Together, both results 
can be seen as evidence for a successful replication of choice in the direction of 
less overweighting within the experiential choice problems. 
4.3.2.3 Within participant reversals 
In addition to the between-participant analysis described above comparing the 
means across the different choice problems between the two formats, I also 
conducted an analysis investigating preference reversals within participants. For 
this analysis, I counted the number of times participants preferred different 
options when faced with the same choice problem in the two different choice 
formats. The overall rate of such preference reversals across the six choice 
problems was 41%. In the rest of the cases participants chose the same option in 
both formats. The actual reversals were further classified in terms of whether they 
occurred in the direction predicted by DfXP or in the opposite direction. In choice 
problem 1, for example, a choice reversal in the direction of DfXP would mean 
that a participant choose the sure option when presented with a gamble description 
and the riskier option after sampling from the buttons. The distribution of 
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reversals across the different choice problems and their split into the two 
categories is shown in Table 4.7. 
TABLE 4.7 
Breakdown of the observed proportions of preference reversals for the six choice problems 
including the statistics from the McNemar's tests on the differences between the proportions. 
% of 
% of 
Choice % of 
reversals in 
reversals in McNemar's 
proble H L observed direction 
direction 
x2 
p 
in reversals 
ofDfXP 
opposite of 
DfXP 
1 4,. 8 3,1.0 45 64 36 5.388 . 
020 
2 4,. 2 3,. 25 46 48 52 0.130 
. 
718 
3 -3,1.0 -32,. 1 41 37 63 4.129 . 042 
4 -3,1.0 -4,. 8 43 77 23 18.063 . 
001 
5 32,. 1 3,1.0 34 45 55 0.490 
. 
484 
6 32,. 025 3,. 25 37 42 58 1.473 . 
225 
In two out of the six choice problems (1 and 4), there were significantly more 
reversals in the direction of DfXP. For problem 3, on the other hand the opposite 
pattern was found. 
4.3.2.4 Recency weighting 
A comprehensive analysis of recency weighting was conducted comparing the 
mean percentage of correct predictions of the first and second half of the sampled 
sequence and the four quartiles of the sequence. Table 4.8 shows that the 
percentages of correct predictions are close together. 
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TABLE 4.8 
Mean percentages of correct predictions for the different splits across the three order 
conditions 
Sequence Split 
Sampling 
First 20 Last 20 
Quart. 1 Quart. 2 Quart. 3 Quart. 4 
Order (1-10) (11-20) (21-30) (31-40) 
1-1 
. 49 . 
52 
. 51 . 
49 
. 53 . 
47 
Free 
. 
48 
. 
47 
. 
51 
. 
46 
. 
47 
. 
50 
20-20 
. 
45 
. 50 . 
50 
. 
48 
. 
47 
. 
56 
All 
. 
47 
. 49 . 
51 
. 48 . 
49 
. 
51 
This is also confirmed by the set of repeated measures ANOVAs with the 
different sequence splits as a within-participant factor and Sampling Order as a 
between-participant factor testing whether recency weighting was facilitated by 
specific sampling formats. For the first and last half of the outcomes, there was no 
main effect of the part of the sequence the prediction was based on (F(1,147) = 
. 
477, p =. 491), no main effect of the between-participants factor Sampling Order 
(F(2,147) = . 
960, p =. 385), and no significant interaction between the two, 
F(2,147) = . 293, p =. 746). The same was confirmed 
for the percentages of correct 
predictions on the quartiles of the sequence. There was no significant main effect, 
neither for the different quartiles (F(1,147) = . 
844, p =. 470, nor for Sampling 
Order (F(2,147) = . 
545, p =. 581). A significant interaction was also not found, 
F(2,147) = 1.210, p =. 3. 
I then examined whether there was a significant difference in the number 
of maximising choices depending on the position of the rare event within the 
sequence. The analysis was conducted for the experiential choice data of choice 
problem 6 only using the combined Matched Sampling data (all sampling order 
conditions). The sequence-splits used were the same as in the previous analysis. 
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Again no indication for a potential impact of the serial position of the rare event 
on choice could be observed. There was no difference between the percentage of 
maximising choices for the cases in which the rare event occurred in the first or 
second half of the sequence (42% vs. 42%, Fisher's exact p=1.0), nor for the 
cases in which the rare event was encountered in the first or last second seven 
outcomes of the sequence (48% vs. 38%, Fisher's exactp =. 572). 
4.3.2.5 Application of descriptive choice models 
As all the experiential choice conditions were implemented in the form of a 
Matched Sampling design, the participants experienced exactly the same 
probabilities that were stated in the corresponding gamble descriptions. The 
number of correct predictions based on a model assuming that participants take 
the option with the highest expected value can therefore be directly calculated 
from the proportion of H choices. A breakdown of the rate of correct predictions 
of the two models across the two choice formats and the different sampling order 
conditions is presented in Table 4.9. 
TABLE 4.9 
Breakdown of the mean percentages of correct predictions 
Percent of correctly predicted choices 
Sampling EV (Descriptive EV (DescripT tive 
PT 
Order Choice) (Dý) (D ) Choice) 
1-1 . 
38 
. 
50 
. 
50 
. 
49 
Free . 
37 
. 
44 
. 
49 
. 
44 
40-40 . 
39 
. 
49 
. 
48 
. 
47 
All . 
38 
. 48 . 
49 
. 
47 
Interestingly, expected value maximisation seems to predict choices better in 
DfXP than in descriptive choice. This is also confirmed by the results of a mixed 
132 
Chapter 4: Sampling Order 
factorial ANOVA with Sampling Order as a between-participant factor and 
Choice Format and Type of Model as two within-participant factors. There was a 
significant main effect of the choice format on the rate of correct predictions of 
the models, F(1,147) = 4.445, p <. 042), and a significant main effect of the Type 
of Model (F(2,147) = 12.483, p =. 001). In addition, there was a significant 
interaction effect between Choice Format and Type of Model, (F(2,147) = 20.54, 
p <. 001). However, a significant main effect of Sampling Order (F(2,147) =. 695, 
p =. 501) or a significant interaction with any other factors was not found. Figure 
4.6 shows' how the percentage of correct predictions of the two models differs 
depending on the choice format used. PT seems to provide better predictions in 
the context of descriptive choice, whereas EV maximisation and PT provide 
similar rates of correct predictions under Matched Sampling. As the rates of 
correct predictions of the PT model are identical to the proportions of choices in 
the direction of overweighting this ANOVA can be related to the ANOVA on the 
choice proportions presented further above. The bar chart on the right side of 
Figure 4.6 is therefore identical to the bar chart in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.6. Interaction plots for the rates of correct model predictions in Experiment 6. 
4.3.3 Discussion 
Overall, this experiment provided no evidence for an effect of sampling order. 
Instead, similar proportions of choices in the direction of underweighting were 
found across all three order conditions. When compared with earlier descriptive 
choice data significant differences in the direction of underweighting of small 
probabilities could be replicated for the combined experiential choice data. 
Unexpectedly, the descriptive choice data of Experiment 6 also provided choice 
proportions that resembled underweighting of small probabilities more closely 
than overweighting, very similar to DfXP. Given the reversal within descriptive 
choice and its similarity with the DfXP proportions, there was also no strong 
evidence for preference reversals from overweighting to underweighting between 
the two formats. This applies to both the analysis across the means of all 
participants and the count of preference reversals within individuals. 
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More consistency was found with regard to the analysis of recency 
weighting. As in all the previous experiments, there was not the slightest 
indication for a recency effect, neither in the comparison of the rate of correct 
predictions based on earlier or later parts of the sampled sequence, nor in the 
analysis of the effect of the position of the rare event within the sequence on the 
proportions of maximising choices. 
The results from the analysis on the predictive power of the descriptive 
choice models are slightly different to the results found in previous experiments, 
where expected value maximisation predicted choice under Matched Sampling 
better than PT. The superiority of PT over EV in the context of descriptive choice 
tasks is less surprising though. Yet, the low absolute rate of the correct predictions 
of both models within descriptive choice is quite unusual and far below the rates 
usually reported in the literature. 
One potential reason for the unusual choice proportions found under 
descriptive choice could be some kind of an interaction between the two formats 
resulting from the mixed presentation of both formats. This could be either the 
dominance of the representation of one format over the other or the usage of 
alternative choice heuristics due to the exposure to both formats. Alternatively, 
participants might attempt to maintain consistency across the two formats and 
adjust their choice behaviour accordingly. To exclude the impact of such 
interaction an additional sampling order experiment was conducted which will be 
described in the closing section of this chapter. 
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4.4 Within-Participant Reversals II (Experiment 7) 
This experiment provides a replication of the experiment above re-examining 
sampling order effects and within-participant reversals under further experimental 
control, eliminating the potential impact of the mixed presentation of the two 
choice formats. Moreover, an additional sampling order condition was introduced 
to have an intermediate degree of partitioning (5-5) in addition to the extreme 
cases of 1-1 and 40-40 sampling. 
4.4.1 Method 
4.4.1.1 Participants 
The Web-based experiment was completed by a total of 250 participants (164 
male and 86 female). Their age ranged from 18 and 76 years with a mean of 32 years. 
The recruitment was again organised through `www. ipoints. com' and participants 
received 200 ipoints (= £2.0) for the completion of the experiment. 
4.4.1.2 Design 
The design was very similar to the previous experiment. All participants had to 
complete the whole set of the same six gambles, both in a descriptive format and 
in a Matched Sampling format with a specific sampling order. The main 
difference was the order in which the choice problems of the different formats 
were presented. For the different sampling order conditions, participants first 
received the six problems in the Matched Sampling format in one block before 
they saw the six choice problems in the form of gamble descriptions. The order of 
the choice problems within each block was randomised. 
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Furthermore, two more conditions were added resulting in a total of 5 
conditions. The first three conditions were the same as described above; Free 
Sampling Order (Matched Sampling) Condition, Fixed Order Condition (40-40) 
and a Forced Alternation Condition (1-1). One of the new conditions was a 5-5 
Condition in which the two buttons had to be explored in clusters of 5 samples 
from each button, starting with button `A' ({A, A, A, A, A, B, B, B, B, B, A... 1). The 
second new condition (Reversed 5-5) was added as a control group which was 
similar to the 5-5 Condition but with the reversed order of choice formats (DfD 
first, DfXP second). This condition allowed to test whether the presentation of one 
format had an impact on the choice behaviour in the subsequent choice formats. 
The rest of the procedure was the same as described in the previous experiment. A 
summary of the design is given in Table 4.10. 
TABLE 4.10 
Experimental design used in Experiment 7 
Between-participants conditions 
Within- 
participants 
measures 
4 Sampling Order 
Conditions 
Control Group 
(Reversed 5-5) 
First block of 6 1-1 5-5 40-40 Free Descriptions 
choice problems 
Second block of 6 Descriptions 5-5 
choice problems 
4.4.2 Results 
4.4.2.1 Information search 
Within the Matched-Sampling Condition with free sampling order, the switching 
behaviour was very similar to the one in the previous experiment with a median of 
2 (M = 9.8) switches per choice problem. Put in context of the possible number of 
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switches (79), the median switching ratio was . 025 (M = . 12). 
Similarity was also 
found with regard to the observed sampling strategies. 45% of the sequences were 
explored in the same way as within the 40-40 Condition with only one switch 
after two blocks of 40 samples from each button. Exploration under free sampling 
order similar to the 1-1 Condition, resembling 79 switches, was again observed in 
only 1% of the sequences. The overall distribution of the number of switches is 
provided in Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7. Distribution of the number of switches between buttons for the Matched- 
Sampling Condition with free sampling order in Experiment 7. 
4.4.2.2 Choice behaviour 
Following the analysis of the previous experiment, a mixed design ANOVA was 
conducted first with Sampling Order as the between-participant factor and Choice 
Format as the within-participant factor in order to test whether there were any 
differences between the mean proportions of choices in the direction of 
overweighting of small probabilities. Again, there was no main effect of Choice 
Format (F(1,245) = . 965, p =. 
327), no main effect of Sampling Order (F(4,245) = 
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. 153, p =. 961) and no significant interaction (F(4,245) = 1.107, p =. 354). The 
interaction plot in Figure 4.8 shows how close the means for both choice formats 
lie together just below the 50% line across the different order conditions. 
1.0 
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o DfD 
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0 
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Sampling Order Condition 
Figure 4.8. Interaction plot for the mean choice proportions within the different order 
conditions with different degrees of partitioning into sub-samples in Experiment 7. 
As in the previous experiment, the underlying reason for the similarity of 
the choice behaviour in both formats seems to be reduced overweighting within 
the descriptive choice problems. Again, this was confirmed in a comparison of the 
proportions of choices in the direction of overweighting between the descriptive 
choice conditions of Experiment 2 (61%) and Experiment 7 (47%), which 
revealed that there was significantly less overweighting within the descriptive 
choice problems of Experiment 7, t(273) = -3.097, p =. 002. The experiential 
choice data in Experiment 7, on the other hand, exhibited proportions of 
overweighting similar to the ones observed in Experiment 2, t(273) = . 655, 
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=. 513. Furthermore, we find a significant reversal in the direction of 
underweighting under DfXP when comparing the experiential choice data from 
Experiment 7 with the descriptive choice data from Experiment 2 (t(273) =- 
3.221, p =. 001), but not when comparing the descriptive choice data from 
Experiment 7 with the experiential choice data from Experiment 2, t(273) = 1.122, 
p =. 263. The description-experience gap for the experiential choice data could 
therefore only be replicated between experiments, as both formats in Experiment 
7 provide choice proportions in the direction of less overweighing. The hypothesis 
in the last experiment was that this might be due to the mixed presentation of the 
two formats. This does not apply to the current design as the formats were 
presented in separated blocks. What remains, then, is a potential effect of the 
order of the two blocks. However, there was no evidence for such an effect. 
Instead, contrasts performed as part of the mixed ANOVA reported above 
comparing the 5-5 Order Condition with the Reversed 5-5 Condition, revealed 
that there was no significant difference between the proportions of choices in the 
direction of overweighting within these two conditions. 
The absence of any effect of sampling order on the proportions of choices 
in the direction of overweighting was also found on the level of individual choice 
problems (see Table 4.11). The only exceptions were choice problem 3 under 
experiential choice and choice problem 4 under descriptive choice. 
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TABLE 4.11 
Choices in the direction of overweighting under Matched Sampling 
Decision Reversed 
Free 
Problem 1-1 5-5 5-5 
Sampling 40-40 x2 p 
Order 
1 34 40 42 38 50 2.915 
. 
572 
2 76 56 68 58 66 5.717 
. 
221 
DfXP 3 38 52 20 38 42 11.375 
. 
023 
4 54 54 48 36 42 6.453 
. 
168 
5 52 50 40 36 38 4.336 
. 
362 
6 42 40 42 42 44 
. 164 1.0 
1 74 58 56 60 60 4.295 
. 
368 
2 50 58 52 70 62 5.335 
. 
255 
DfD 3 34 40 24 32 40 3.922 
. 
417 
4 62 54 84 58 60 11.991 
. 
017 
5 38 30 30 40 20 5.811 
. 
214 
6 28 34 32 34 30 
. 629 . 
96 
However, a comparison of the data with all order conditions combined 
shows that there were significant differences between the proportions of choices 
in the direction of overweighting between the two formats on the level of 
individual choice problems. This stands in contrast to the results on the 
comparisons of the means across all six choice problems mentioned above. A 
closer look at Table 4.12 allows us to explain the coexistence of both findings, 
though. In four of the six choice problems the choice proportions in the direction 
of overweighting were even lower under descriptive choice than under DfXP. In 
two problems this difference was significant (see problems 5 and 6). 
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TABLE 4.12 
Combined choice data for the individual choice problems including the p-values for the 
McNemar tests conducted 
Choices in the direction of 
over-weighting 
Decision Descriptive Experiential 
Problem Choice Choice p 
1 62 41 
. 
001 
2 58 64 . 
18 
3 34 38 . 
353 
4 64 43 
. 
001 
5 32 43 
. 
003 
6 32 42 
. 
018 
In choice problems 1 and 4, on the other hand, we find the typical gap between of 
choices in the direction of underweighting for DfXP and choices in the direction 
of overweighting under descriptive choice. Taken together, both results on the 
level of individual gambles may reconcile the absence of a difference for the 
mean proportions across choice problems. 
4.4.2.3 Within participant reversals 
The overall rate of within-participant preference reversals between choice formats 
in one direction or the other across the six choice problems was 42%. An 
inspection of the Table 4.13, showing the breakdown of the reversals across the 
different choice problems and their split into the two categories of DfXP and Non- 
DfXP reversals, again provides inconclusive results. Similar to the results reported 
previously there were significantly more reversals in the direction of DfXP 
observed within choice problems 1 and 4. However, I also found significantly 
more reversals in the opposite direction for choice problems 5 and 6. 
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TABLE 4.13 
Breakdown of the observed proportions of preference reversals for the six choice problems 
including the result from the McNemar's test on the differences between the proportions 
% of 
% of 
Choice % of reversals in 
reversals in McNemar's 
problem 
H L observed direction direction x2 
p 
reversals opposite of 
of DfXP DfXP 
1 4,. 8 3,1.0 46 73 27 24.426 . 
001 
2 4,. 2 3,. 25 44 43 57 2.064 . 
151 
3 -3,1.0 -32,. 1 38 45 55 1.064 . 
302 
4 -3,1.0 -4,. 8 47 73 27 24.009 . 
001 
5 32,. 1 3,1.0 37 34 66 9.043 
. 
003 
6 32,. 025 3,. 25 41 38 62 6.068 . 
014 
4.4.2.4 Recency weighting 
The potential impact of recency weighting on choice was examined in the same 
way as is in Experiment 6 using a set of mixed ANOVAs comparing the mean 
percentage of correct predictions based on the expected values of different 
sequential splits (see Table 4.14) across the five order conditions. For the 20-20 
split there was no significant main effect of the sequence (F(1,245) = 3.43, 
=. 065), no significant main effect of Sampling Order (F(1,245) = 1.382, p =. 241), 
and no significant interaction between the two (F(4,245) = . 06, p =. 993). 
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TABLE 4.14 
Mean percentages of correct predictions based for the different splits across the three order 
conditions 
Sequence Split 
Sampling 
Order First 20 Last 20 
Quant. 1 
(1-10) 
Quant. 2 
(11-20) 
Quant. 3 
(21-30) 
Quant. 4 
(31-40) 
1-1 
. 
54 
. 
50 
. 
52 
. 
50 
. 
48 
. 
54 
5-5 
. 
51 
. 
46 
. 
47 
. 54 . 
51 
. 
50 
Reversed (5-5) 
. 
49 
. 
45 
. 
54 
. 
45 
. 
43 
. 
49 
Free (matched) 
. 54 . 
49 
. 
61 
. 
46 
. 
49 
. 
48 
40-40 
. 52 . 
49 
. 
54 
. 
52 
. 54 . 
43 
All 
. 52 . 
48 
. 54 . 
50 
. 
49 
. 
49 
The mixed ANOVA using the quartiles provided a significant main effect of the 
Sequence Splits, F(3,245) = 3.05, p =. 028. It also showed a significant interaction 
effect between the Sequence Splits and Sampling Order (F(4,245) = 2.54, p 
=. 003), indicating that the occurrence of a primacy effect that depending on the 
sampling order during exploration. The inspection of the interaction plot (Figure 
4.9) shows that the rate of correct predictions based on the expected values 
derived from the outcomes of quartile 1 were higher than in the later quartiles and 
that this difference is more pronounced in the Matched-Sampling Condition with 
free sampling order, in the Reversed 5-5 Condition and in the 40-40 Condition. A 
significant main effect of Sampling Order itself was not found, F(1,245) = 1.07, p 
=. 372. 
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Figure 4.9. Interaction plot for the mixed ANOVA on the quartile splits. 
The analysis of the proportions of maximising choices conditional on the 
position of the rare event within the experiences samples of choice problem 6 
provided different results. Here, the percentage of maximising choices was higher 
for the cases in which the rare event occurred in the first half of the sequence than 
for encounters in the second half (50% vs. 32%, Fisher's exact p= . 
007). This 
means that encountering the rare event of 32 points in the last 20 outcomes from 
that option coincided with a higher rate of choosing the other option with a sure 
outcome of 3 points. The same was observed for the first or last second seven 
outcomes of the sequence (53% vs. 29%, Fisher's exact p =. 029). 
4.4.2.5 Application of descriptive choice models 
In order to assess whether the descriptive validity of the EV and PT model vary 
across the different formats and order conditions another mixed ANOVA was 
conducted with Type of Model (EV vs. PT) and Choice Format (DfD vs. DfXP) 
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as within-participant factors and Sampling order as a between-participant factor. 
Only the main effect of Choice Format was significant, F(1,245) = 12.367, p= 
001. In addition, there as was a significant interaction between Type of Model 
and Choice Format, F(1,245) = 46.508, p <. 0001. Both findings are illustrated by 
the mean rates of correct predictions in Table 4.15 and Figure 4.10. 
TABLE 4.15 
Breakdown of the mean rates of correct predictions of the two models across choice 
formats and sampling order conditions for Experiment 7 
Percent of correctly predicted choices 
Sampling EV EV PT PT 
Order (Descriptive (DfXP) (Descriptive (DfXP) 
Choice) Choice) 
1-1 . 
36 
. 57 . 
48 
. 
46 
5-5 . 
42 
. 51 . 
46 
. 
49 
Reversed (5-5) . 
32 . 46 . 
47 . 
43 
Free (Matched) 43 . 50 . 
49 
. 
41 
40-40 39 . 
50 . 
45 
. 
47 
All . 
38 
. 
51 . 
47 
. 
45 
The interaction shows that the model predictions based on expected value 
maximisation provide better predictions than PT in experiential choice and that 
PT can account better for choices under descriptive choice tasks. The former 
finding is also in agreement with the results reported in the previous chapters. 
None of the models performs at above chance level. This is rather unusual, 
especially for descriptive choice data. 
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Figure 4.10. Interaction plots for the rates of correct model predictions in Experiment 7. 
4.4.3 Discussion 
Although there was no evidence for an interaction between the two blocks of 
choice formats a significant order effect was still not observed. Instead, apparent 
underweighting in DfXP was found across all the different sampling order 
conditions. The consistency of this finding suggests that the partitioning due to 
sampling order cannot explain the differences in choice behaviour between DfD 
and DfXP. On the other hand, there might be a difference between partitioning the 
sequence independently and being forced to sample a sequence according to an 
externally fixed schedule. Whereas in the former case the sub-samples are a result 
of different hypothesis testing strategies, the schedules in the latter case might not 
be able to induce similar processes. Interestingly, both modes lead to similar 
DfXP choice patterns. More important is the finding that it is not possible to 
eliminate choices in the direction of under-weighting by fixing the sequence in a 
way that facilitates the separate evaluation of the options as it was done in the 40- 
40 sampling order which is structurally more equivalent to a descriptive choice 
0.8 
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task. Following Hertwig et al. (2004), an explanation for this result could be that 
people evaluate choices by drawing a mental `sample' of the input they have 
received; and that this sample is much smaller than the full sample to which they 
have been exposed, and hence may often not contain low probability events at all. 
However, this would contradict the observation, shown earlier, that participants 
are well aware of the overall frequencies within experienced samples. 
Also puzzling is the finding of reduced overweighting in the descriptive 
choice proportions of the last two experiments. This could be due to increased 
noise in the data or due to specific differences in the characteristics of the 
demographics of the populations of participants. In the case of the last two 
experiments, the average age was slightly higher with 32 years which could 
coincide with differences in risk preference. 
The most consistent finding across all seven experiments has been the 
absence of any form of overweighting of recent items. However, Experiment 7 
has provided some indication for a primacy effect. Given the absolute rate of 
correct predictions observed, this effect does not exceed the predictive power of 
the sequence as a whole. Unusual are also the findings from the analysis of choice 
problem 6 as they indicate that the risky option with the rare event is avoided 
more often when participants have experienced the rare event more recently. This 
also contradicts Hertwig et al. 's assumption that people behave as if they 
underweight small probabilities as a consequence of not encountering the rare 
event recently. Instead, the results of Experiment 7 point in the opposite direction, 
indicating that people chose as if they underweight small probabilities when they 
have actually seen the rare event more recently, which is counterintuitive. One 
potential interpretation of this phenomenon could be that participants have 
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specific assumptions regarding the underlying sampling mechanism which makes 
it more likely for them to assume the reoccurrence of the event after a series of 
non-occurrences than after a recent encounter. I will pick up this idea again in the 
discussion of a run-based model in Chapter 6. 
Additional confirmation of earlier findings could also be obtained with 
regard to the applicability of descriptive choice models. The accumulated results 
seem to indicate that the superiority of the PT model in terms of its predictive 
power usually found under descriptive choice does not hold under experiential 
choice in which expected value maximisation seems to be able to account for the 
data slightly better but still unsatisfactorily low. 
Finally, although the examination of the within-participant reversals did 
not provide conclusive evidence regarding the description-experience gap within 
participants, the results from Experiment 6 and7 have shown consistent evidence 
for DfXP reversals in choice problems 1 and 4. Taken together, both reversals 
constitute a reversed reflection effect under DfXP which was observed in 12% of 
the participants in Experiment 6 and in 15% of the participants of Experiment 7. 
This way of analysing the data, focusing on the comparison across different 
choice problems has been omitted so far, but the following chapter will be 
dedicated to provide a re-analysis of the data collected so far in terms of 
established choice paradoxes like the reflection effect. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF COMMON DECISION MAKING BIASES 
5.1 Introduction 
In all the previous chapters I have examined the choice behaviour within 
individual decision problems between decisions from description and various 
experiential choice formats, following the approach of Hertwig et al. (2004). This 
has mainly been done in the form of between-subject comparisons, with the 
exception of Chapter 4, which also provided a within subjects analysis of 
differences between DfD and DfXP. For example, I have compared choice 
proportions for the choice "100% chance of 3 or 80% chance of 4" between 
description and experience formats. However, this is not the only way that this 
data can be examined. Another approach is to look at specific biases based on 
preference reversals within sets of choice problems that have been observed in 
descriptive choice tasks, following Gottlieb et al. (2007). In the introduction to 
this thesis I reviewed a variety of such decision making biases, including the 
common ratio effect, the common consequence effect, and the reflection effect. 
Continuing the above example, in DfD, the common ratio effect is a reversal in 
preference for 100% chance of 3 over 80% chance of 4 to a preference for a 20% 
chance of 4 over a 25% chance of 3. Will this reversal also be observed under 
DfXP? Furthermore, the choice problems used to examine these biases allow one 
to draw conclusions regarding specific properties of the value- and probability 
weighting function within the PT framework. Investigating such biases under 
experiential choice could provide further insights on the causes of the differences 
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between the two formats and clarify whether these are due to different properties 
of the weighting function, as has been suggested in the literature. Consequently, 
this chapter aims to provide such a re-analysis of the data obtained in the 
experiments presented earlier. By rearranging the six choice problems used, two 
pairs of common-ratio effect problems and two pairs of reflection effect problems 
can be formed. Common-consequence problems were not included in the original 
Hertwig et al. (2004) set that I have been using, and can therefore not be 
investigated. 
5.2 The common ratio effect 
The interesting property of common ratio type problems is that they allow for a 
direct examination of non-linearity of the probability weighting under PT. To 
illustrate how underweighting or overweighting of probabilities is inferred from 
people's choices, consider the impact of underweighting or overweighting of 
small probabilities on the choice between two lotteries, (A1) a .8 chance of £4 and 
a .2 chance of winning nothing, or 
(B1) £3 for sure. If we divide the probabilities 
by a common factor of 4 we get the resulting lotteries A2 (. 2 chance of £4 
otherwise nothing) and B2 (. 25 chance of £3 otherwise nothing). From a 
normative point of view, the division should be irrelevant: The preference for A or 
B should be the same in both cases, because the second lottery can be viewed as 
identical with the first, except that it has a 3/4 chance of being `called off. As the 
values are the same, any change in preferences between the prospects must be due 
to decision weights not scaling linearly with probabilities. Therefore, the 
observation that people prefer B1 over Al and A2 over B2 can be explained by an 
inverse S-shaped weighting function in which the ratio between the weights of .2 
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and. 25 may be higher than between. 8 and 1.0. That is, w(. 20)/w(. 25) > 
w(. 80)/w(l. 0). This is prospect theory's explanation of Allais' (1953) paradox. In 
other words, in the PT framework the choice behaviour within this problem 
allows us to make inferences regarding the slopes of the nonlinear weighting 
function between particular points which, in the case of DfD, implies that the 
function is steeper between the weights of .8 and 1.0 than between the weights 
of. 2 and . 25. , 
The traditional interpretation of this result is an inverse-S-shaped 
weighting function, though there are other - perhaps more contrived - functional 
forms that would also have this property. 
As pointed out earlier, behaviour in experiential choice tasks has been 
shown to deviate from this descriptive choice pattern and complete reversals of 
this bias have been reported. Barron and Erev (2003), for example, found a 
mirrored common ratio effect which underlined their hypothesis of 
underweighting of rare outcomes in small feedback-based decisions. Hertwig et 
al. (2004,2006) replicate a reversed common-ratio effect under DfXP which they 
explained by an underrepresentation of the rare events and recency weighting. 
Using the example provided above (4,. 8; 3,1.0), the underrepresentation of the 
probability. 2 of receiving 0 will make the riskier option more attractive, resulting 
in a reversed common ratio effect. Following the logic of the common ratio effect 
within the PT framework, such a reversal of the effect would imply that 
w(. 20)/w(. 25) < w(. 80)/ w(1.0), thereby constraining the weighting function in the 
opposite way than under DfD with a function steeper nearer 0 than nearer 1. If the 
underrepresentation is the only reason for the reversal then it should not be 
observed in experiential choice problems where sampling error is eliminated. In a 
very recent paper Gottlieb et al. (2007) have examined the effect of different 
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presentation formats of uncertainty information on common ratio and common 
consequence type decision making biases. One of the presentation formats 
implemented was an experiential sampling task, similar to the Matched Sampling 
paradigm described earlier, involving decks of cards. In another format 
participants were provided with the actual percentages of the outcomes within the 
decks resembling a descriptive choice task. Instead of the inverse common ratio 
effect reported by Hertwig et al. (2004), Gottlieb et al. (2007) found the usual 
common ratio effect within their experiential format. However, they failed to 
replicate the common ratio effect in the descriptive choice task (an extremely well 
replicated effect) which prevents a comparison of the description and experience 
formats and thus makes it hard to interpret their data. 
Throughout the earlier chapters, I have been able to show preference 
reversals within different individual choice problems under conditions where 
sampling error is eliminated. Taken together these effects could imply reversed 
common ratio effects in contrast to the findings of Gottlieb et al. (2007). Further 
clarification regarding the existence of common ratio effects under experiential 
choice with and without inherent sampling error will therefore be provided in the 
following section in which the presented data is re-analysed in the context of the 
common ratio effect. 
In order to do so, four of the six choice problems used across the 
experiments presented in Chapters 2 to 4 were regrouped into two pairs. The first 
pair consists of Problems 1 (4,. 8; 3,1.0) and 2 (4,. 2; 3,. 25) and the second pair is 
based on Problems 5 (32, . 1; 3,1) and 
6 (32,. 025; 3,. 25). In both pairs the second 
problem can be generated by dividing the probabilities within the first problem by 
four. A summary of both problems is provided in Table 5.1. 
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TABLE 5.1 
Common ratio problems used in the reported experiments 
High probability context Low probability context 
High risk Low risk High risk Low risk 
CR1 4,. 8 3,1.0 4,. 2 3,. 25 
CR2 32,. 1 3,1.0 32,. 025 3,. 25 
The data were analysed separately for each experiment and pooled together across 
experiments wherever the same experimental conditions were implemented in 
order to increase the power of the tests. As different numbers of gambles were 
presented within the experiments the equivalence of the observed choice 
proportions within the common ratio problems was analysed using either 
McNemar's Chit test (multiple choices within subjects) or Fisher's Exact test 
(single choice between subjects). 
5.2.1 The common ratio effect under descriptive choice 
As pointed out earlier, the common ratio effect under descriptive choice is 
denoted by people preferring the riskier option more often in the low probability 
context of the problem (p/x) than in the high probability context (p). In the 
Problems 1 and 2, for example, the majority of the participants have been shown 
to prefer (3,1.0) when presented together with (4,. 8), but chose (4,. 2) when 
presented together with (3,. 25). Figure 5.1 presents the proportions of riskier 
choices within the two common ratio problems (CR1 and CR2) from the 
experiments deploying descriptive choice conditions (Experiment 2 and 7). As 
both designs demanded participants to make choices within all choice problems, 
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McNemar's Chit test was used to determine whether the two proportions within 
problems were equivalent. For comparison, the choice proportions from other 
experiments involving gamble descriptions (Hertwig et al., 2004; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) have been included where available. As the raw data for this 
external data were not available no inferential statistics could be computed. 
CR1 
A: 4,. 8 B: 3,1.0 
A: 4,. 2 B: 3,. 25 
Experiment 2 
(multiple choices) 
Experiment 7 
(multiple choices) 
Experiments 2&7 
(multiple choices) 
Hertwig et al. 
(2004) 
Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) 
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% choosing the riskier option (A) choosing the riskier option (A) 
Figure 5.1. Proportions of riskier choices within the two common ratio problems under 
descriptive choice across the different experiments. Significant differences are 
highlighted by asterisks 
Within the first set of problems (CR1) the typical common ratio effect 
could be replicated, consisting of a higher percentage of H choices in the low 
probability context. Significant reversals crossing the 50%-line were found for 
Experiment 2 and for the data set pooled across experiments. However, in the 
second set of problems (CR2) no significant differences between the two choice 
proportions were found. 
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5.2.2 The common ratio effect under Free Sampling 
A different pattern was observed for the same set of problems within the Free- 
Sampling Condition, the original DfXP design used by Hertwig et al. (2004) in 
which participants are allowed to draw with replacement from the underlying 
distribution as often as they wanted. As we have seen earlier, due to the 
underrepresentation of rare events in this task, preference reversals in comparison 
to descriptive choice are commonly observed. Consequently, this can also lead to 
reversed common ratio effects with the risky option being chosen more often in 
the context of the sure alternative than when presented together with the low 
probability options. Figure 5.2 shows that such a trend could be replicated within 
CR1 across all the Free-Sampling Conditions and the Comprehensive-Sampling 
Condition, which is also based on sampling with replacement using a fixed 
number of samples. For comparison, the proportions from Hertwig et al. (2004) 
have been included in the chart. However, none of the differences have been 
found to be significant. Also, both proportions lie beyond the 50%-line, indicating 
that the riskier option is preferred in both contexts. 
156 
Chapter 5: Decision Making Biases 
CR1 
Q A: 4,. 8 B: 3,1.0 
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Figure 5.2. Proportions of risky choices for the CR problems in the Free-Sampling 
Conditions 
For CR2 the results are less clear. Across all data sets, including the Hertwig et al. 
data, the proportion of riskier choices remains below 50%. Within the Free- 
Sampling Conditions the trend points in the direction of a typical common ratio 
effect. Under Comprehensive Sampling, on the other hand, a significant reversal 
of the common ratio effect was observed. Overall, the results seem to indicate a 
confirmation of earlier results within the Free Sampling paradigm. In order to 
assess whether this finding is due to the underlying sampling error the findings 
have to be contrasted with the proportions obtained under Matched Sampling 
which will be described in the following section. 
5.2.3 The common ratio effect under Matched Sampling 
For the Matched Sampling design a variety of different data sets has been 
collected including data from experiments involving frequency estimations for 
CR2 
Q A: 32,. 1 B: 3,1.0 
  A: 32,. 025 8: 3,. 25 
6m 
6: 1 
100 0 20 40 60 80 100 
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which only a single response was collected from each participant (Experiments 3 
and 4). These data demand a between-participants analysis. For Experiment 4 
only the data from the condition asking for probability judgements `after choice' 
were included as this was the only design that was comparable with Experiment 3. 
Data with choices from all four relevant problems were available from 
Experiments 2,6 and 7. The results are presented in Figure 5.3. Within CR1 the 
results are not as coherent as in the previous cases. Across most of the conditions 
the proportions of riskier choices in both contexts are at a similar level beyond the 
50% line. Experiment 2 shows non-significant deviations in the direction of a 
common ratio effect. However, a significant preference reversal in the direction of 
a reversed common ratio effect was found in Experiment 3. As in the earlier 
analysis, the proportions of risky choices in the second pair of common ratio 
problems were generally below 50%. For the experiments involving all 4 
problems there was a trend in the direction of a common ratio effect. 
CR1 
Q A: 4,. 8 8: 3,1.0 
  A: 4,. 2 8: 3,. 25 
Experiment 2 
(multiple gambles) 
Experiment 6 
(multiple gambles) 
Experiment 7 
(multiple gambles) 
Experiments 2,6&7 
(multiple gambles) 
Experiment 3 
(single gamble) 
Experiment 4 
(single gamble) 
Experiment 3&4 
(single gamble) 
0 20 40 60 80 
% choosing the riskier option (A) 
CR2 
Q A: 32,. 1 8: 3,1.0 
  A: 32,. 025 B: 3,. 25 
6ým 
100 0 20 40 60 80 100 
% choosing the riskier option (A) 
Figure 5.3. Proportions of risky choices for the CR problems under Matched Sampling 
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The opposite was found for Experiments 3 and 4 which are based on comparisons 
between the choices of different subjects. None of the differences was significant 
though. In summary, the data from the majority of the Matched-Sampling 
Conditions seems to indicate that there is no difference between the proportions of 
riskier choices in the high and low probability contexts, meaning that there was 
neither a common ratio effect nor a clear reversal of it. 
5.2.4 The common ratio effect under fixed sampling order 
A separate analysis was conducted for experiments involving Matched Sampling 
under a restricted 40-40 sampling order. Experiment 5 provided an experiment 
with only one choice problem per person whereas Experiments 6 and 7 
contributed complete sets of data allowing for within-participant analyses. Figure 
5.4 illustrates the results. No significant differences were found for either of the 
two pairs of problems. Within CR1 the overall trend showed slightly higher 
proportions of risky choices in the low probability context, conforming to a 
common ratio effect. No clear trend was observed under CR2. For the data from 
experiments involving multiple choices per participants the proportions were 
similar under both contexts and below 50%, indicating that there was no common 
ratio effect. A trend towards a reversed common ratio effect was only found in 
Experiment 5. 
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Figure 5.4. Proportions of risky choices for the CR problems under 40-40 sampling order 
The results for the remaining sampling order conditions have been 
summarised in Figure 5.5. Under 1-1 sampling order significant differences in the 
direction of a common ratio effect were found for problem CR1. For the second 
problem the results were incoherent within the two different experiments. The 
pooled data from both experiments shows similar proportions under both contexts. 
For the 5-5 sampling order condition there was a non-significant difference in the 
direction of a reversed effect under both problems. As in previous results, the 
proportions of riskier choices were above the 50% line in CRI and below 50% in 
CR2. 
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Figure 5.5. Proportions of risky choices for the CR problems under the remaining order 
conditions and across all Matched-Sampling Conditions (all orders) 
Finally, the data from all available Matched-Sampling Conditions, 
including all different sampling orders, were pooled together. This was done 
separately for single gamble conditions and multiple gamble conditions. The 
results of this analysis (also in Figure 5.5) show a significant common ratio effect 
for the data using multiple gambles in CR1. No difference was found for the 
proportions from the data based on a single gamble per participant. Under CR2 no 
significant differences were found. 
5.2.5 Within participants analysis of the common ratio effect 
Furthermore, the within- participants data from Experiments 6 and 7 allowed an 
examination of whether there were any within-participants reversals for the CR 
problems between DfD and DfXP. Before analysing the data, the two preferences 
within the choice problems under each choice format were combined to one of 
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four categories according to the common ratio pattern observed. This first 
classification is illustrated in Table 5.2. 
TABLE 5.2 
Classification for the CR problems, separately for each choice format. 
Choice Problem 2 (Low Probability Context) 
Choice Problem 1 
(High Probability 
Context) 
High risk Low risk 
High risk HH Common Ratio Effect 
(CR) 
Low risk Reversed Common LL Ratio Effect (revCR) 
With the classification within the two 2x 2-tables, one for each format, one new 
4x4-table was produced, reflecting the agreement of preferences within the 
common ratio problems under DfD and DfXP. The scheme for classification 
within this 4x4-table is illustrated in Table 5.3. 
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TABLE 5.3 
Classification for the CR problem agreement between the two choice formats. In the 
actual analysis only the corresponding non-diagonal cells with similar shades of grey are 
compared. 
CR classification within DfXP 
CR 
classification 
within DfD 
CR HH LL revCR 
CR CR_CR CR_HH CR_LL CR_revCR 
HH HH CR HH HH HH LL 
LL LL_CR LL HH LL LL WL" ' 
revCR revCR CR revCR revCR 
To test whether this resulting contingency table was symmetric, a generalisation 
of McNemar's test for Ix I-contingency tables with I>2 by Bowker (1948) was 
used. For this analysis only, the corresponding non-diagonal frequencies are 
considered, which indicate actual changes in preference. In the example in Table 
5.3, this corresponds to the six pairs of cells with similar shades of grey. 
Following the suggestion of Zwick, Neuhoff, Marascuilo and Levin (1982), 1 also 
conducted all six possible individual a priori contrasts for these corresponding cell 
pairs to identify the causes for a potential asymmetry within the contingency 
table. Of particular interest was the comparison between the cells with participants 
showing either a common ratio effect or a reversed common ratio effect within the 
two formats ('revCR_CR' and 'CR_revCR'). The critical values for these 
comparisons were obtained from the Bonferroni inequality tables by Dayton and 
Schafer (1973). 
For the data from Experiment 6, the choice behaviour within the common 
ratio problems was found to be symmetrical, both for CR1 (Bowker's X' (6, 
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N=150) = 8.616, p =. 196) and CR2 (Bowker's x2 (6, N=150) = 5.743, p =. 453). 
However, for Experiment 7 the null hypothesis of internal symmetry had to be 
rejected for CR1 (Bowker's x2 (6, N=250) = 32.126, p <. 0001) and CR2 
(Bowker's x2 (6, N=250) = 17.774 (6), p= . 007). The inspection of the results 
from the planned comparisons of the six possible 2x2 breakdowns of the original 
table (see Table 5.4. ) shows that the found asymmetry for CR1 in Experiment 7 
seems to stem from shifts between the pattern of always choosing the riskier 
option and never choosing the riskier option (AHH LL). More specifically, in nearly 
all of the cases involving shifts between these two patterns (21 out of 23) 
participants choose both sure options under DfD and the riskier options under 
DfXP. 
TABLE 5.4 
Results for all six non-directional comparisons of the 4x4 McNemar Tables for Experiment 7. 
Significant ' values are highlighted by asterisks. 
ZCR_HH ZCR LL ZCR revCR 
ZHH 
LL ZHH revCR 
ZLL 
revCR 
Experiment CR1 2.496 1.121 1.091 3.962* 1.177 2.524 
7 CR2 
.5 . 
686 
. 
47 2.2 1.569 3.087* 
For the six non-directional comparisons of the off diagonal cells in the table and their 
corresponding mirror image counterparts (the cells in Table 5.3 with corresponding shades of 
grey) with a family wise alpha level of . 
05, equally divided, the critical value was 2.649 (from the 
tables by Dayton & Schafer, 1973). 
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For the second common ratio problem (CR2), significant shifts were 
observed between the pattern of always choosing the sure option and the reversed 
common ratio effect (OLL ,,, CR). Similar to finding in CR1, there were more shifts 
from choosing the sure option in both contexts under DfD to a reversed common 
ratio effect under DfXP than the other way round (68 times vs. 9 times). 
Statistically significant asymmetries regarding direct shifts between common ratio 
effects and reversed common ratio effects (AcR revcR), which were found in the 
between-participants analysis, could not be confirmed within subjects in either of 
the two experiments. 
5.3 The Reflection Effect 
The rationale behind the reflection effect is very similar. The pairs of prospects 
compared are of the form (x, p; y, q) and (-x, p; y, q). This means that the 
probabilities are the same in both pairs but the signs of the outcomes involved are 
reversed. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), such a reflection of the 
values around 0 results in a reflection of the preferences between the two 
prospects, hence the name reflection effect. To provide an example, consider the 
choice between the first pair of prospects used above, (A1) a .8 chance of £4 and a 
.2 chance of winning nothing, or 
(B1) £3 for sure. As mentioned earlier, in 
decision from description, people prefer the sure gain (B1) over the riskier option 
(A1). However, if we now reverse the sign of the values, moving into the domain 
of losses but keeping the probabilities constant, (A3) a .8 chance of losing £4 and 
a .2 chance of 
losing nothing, or (B3) a sure loss of £3, people prefer the riskier 
option (A3) over the sure loss (B3). This reversal implies v(3) > w(. 8)v(4) and v(-3) 
< w(. 8)1, (-4), which is in line with a value function under PT that is concave for 
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gains and convex for losses, reflecting diminishing sensitivity for both domains 
with increasing distance from the reference point. 
Evidence for this reversal under DfD has been provided in a number of 
studies (e. g., Abdellaoui, 2000; Schoemaker, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
In experiential choice, on the other hand, the reflection effect has not received 
much attention. As pointed out earlier, the causes for the differences in choice 
behaviour under DfXP and the apparent underweighting of small probabilities 
have been mostly attributed to differences in the probability weighting function. 
Barron and Erev (2003) have provided related results in the context of feedback- 
based decisions where participants showed a reversed reflection pattern which 
they referred to as a reversed payoff domain effect. An inspection of the raw 
proportions reported by Hertwig et al. (2004) does not provide a clearly 
identifiable trend. Within one of the problems there seems to be a reversed 
reflection effect whereas a second pair of problems exhibits the reflection effect 
usually observed under descriptive choice. Studies systematically examining the 
reflection effect similar to the approach used for common ratio problems by 
Gottlieb et al. (2007) in DfXP are therefore missing. 
Consequently, this section will provide a further contribution by providing 
an initial investigation of the reflection effect patterns and the properties of the 
value function under DfXP. These results may have ramifications for the 
interpretation of the differences in choice behaviour found under experiential 
choice within the PT framework. From the six choice problems employed, two 
pairs of reflection effect problems (REF1 and REF2) could be extracted, which 
are summarised in Table 5.5. 
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TABLE 5.5 
The two reflection effect problems in the set of choice problems used 
Gain domain Loss domain 
High risk Low risk High risk Low risk 
REF I 4,. 8 3,1.0 -4,. 8 3,1.0 
REF2 32,. 1 3,1.0 -32,. 1 -3,1.0 
The analysis was conducted in the same way as the in the context of the common 
ratio problems, separately and on pooled data wherever possible. Choice 
proportions from multiple problems were analysed using McNemar's Chit test. 
Fisher's Exact tests were used for the between-participants analyses involving 
choices in a single problem. 
5.3.1 The reflection effect under descriptive choice 
Within the descriptive choice conditions used the reflection effect could be 
replicated in both pairs of problems (see Figure 5.6. ). Subjects preferred the sure 
option (B) in the set of gains and the riskier option (A) within the set of losses. In 
the first pair of problems (REF1) all the observed differences stretched across the 
50% line. Significant differences were found for Experiment 7 and within the 
pooled data for Experiments 2 and 7. The only case in which the reflection effect 
could not be replicated was in Experiment 2 under REF2. Instead, these 
proportions matched the results of Hertwig et al. which are presented in the same 
figure. 
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REF 1 
0 A: 4,. 8 B: 3,1 
" A: -4,. 8 B: -3,1 
Experiment 2 
(multiple gambles) 
Experiment 7 
(multiple gambles) 
Experiments 2&7 
(multiple gambles) 
Hertwig et at. 
(2004) 
Kahnernan and 
Tversky (1979) 
** 
1 
1 
** 
1 
1 
1 
REF 2 
EI A: 32,. 1 B: 3,1 
" A: -32,. 1 B: -3,1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
1 
I 
kf 
1 
1 
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% choosing the riskier option (A) % choosing the riskier option (A) 
Figure 5.6. Proportions of riskier choices within the reflection effect problems across the 
different Description Conditions. Significant differences are highlighted with asterisks. 
5.3.2 The reflection effect under Free Sampling 
The data collected within the Free Sampling paradigms in Chapter 2 and 3 shows 
a reversed reflection effect with differences across the 50% line for REFI within 
all the experiments, including the Comprehensive-Sampling Condition. 
Statistically significant differences were obtained within Experiment 2 and within 
the combined data set. However, in REF2 the opposite result, a strong reflection 
effect was found across all the experiments, again crossing the 50% line 
indicating full reversals in preferences. The contrasting results obtained in both 
problems exactly match the results apparent from Hertwig et al. 's proportions. 
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REF 1 
O A: 4,. 8 B: 3,1 
  A: -4,. 8 B: -3,1 
Experiment 1 
(free Sampling, 
multiple gambles) 
Experiment 2 
(free Sampling, 
multiple gambles) 
Experiments 1&2 
(free Sampling, 
multiple gambles) 
Experiment 1 
(compr. Sampling, 
multiple gambles) 
Hertwig et al. 
(2004) 
r. 
REF 2 
Q A: 32,. 1 B: 3,1 
  A: -32,. 1 B: -3,1 
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## 
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choosing the riskier option (A) % choosing the riskier option (A) 
Figure 5.7. Proportions of risky choices for the REF problems under Free Sampling 
5.3.3 The reflection effect under Matched Sampling 
The same pattern of a reversed reflection effect under REF 1 and the usual 
reflection effect under REF2 was also observed within the Matched-Sampling 
Conditions (see Figure 5.8). However, within REF I. the reversed trend was only 
significant for the data from Experiment 7. Experiment 2 was the only case of a 
trend in the direction of a reflection effect. Identical proportions were observed in 
Experiment 6. More consistency was found within single gamble conditions 
(Experiment 3 and 4). The differences for the reflection effect proportions 
observed in REF2 crossed the 50% line without exception and were significant for 
all the experiments employing multiple decision problems. 
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REF 1 
Q A: 4,. 8 B: 3,1 
  A: -4,. 8 B: -3.1 
Experiment 2 
(multiple gambles) 
Experiment 6 
(multiple gambles) 
Experiment 7 
(multiple gambles) 
Experiments 2,6&7 
(multiple gambles) 
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(single gamble) 
Experiment 4 
(single gamble) 
Experiemnt 3&4 
(single gamble) 
i 
i 
I TI 
i 
i 
i 
0 20 40 60 80 
choosing the riskier option (A) 
REF 2 
O A: 32,. 1 B: 3,1 
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% choosing the riskier option (A) 
Figure 5.8. Proportions of risky choices for the REF problems under Matched Sampling 
5.3.4 The reflection effect under fixed sampling order 
As can be seen in Figure 5.9, the two different trends are observed in the 
conditions with 40-40 sampling order as well. Whereas all choice proportions in 
REF1 stay below 50%, reversals crossing the line are observed in REF2. The 
differences are much smaller though and none of them is statistically significant. 
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REF I 
O A: 4,. 8 B: 3,1 
  A: -4,. 8 B: -3,1 
Experiment 6 
(multiple gambles) 
Experiment 7 
(multiple gambles) 
Experiments 6&7 
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Experiment 5 
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% choosing the riskier option (A) % choosing the riskier option (A) 
Figure 5.9. Proportions of risky choices for the REF problems under 40-40 Sampling 
Additional confirmation for the reversed choice behaviour in REF 1 and REF2 was 
obtained within the rest of the conditions. Significant reversed reflection effects 
under REF 1 were found for 1-1 sampling order in (Experiment 7) and within the 
combined data from all the Matched-Sampling Conditions involving the 
presentation of multiple decision problems. Significant reversals in accordance 
with the reflection effects were observed for the combined Matched Sampling 
data in REF2, both for the experiments involving single and multiple decision 
problems (see Figure 5.10). 
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Experiment 6 
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Figure 5.10. Proportions of risky choices for the REF problems under the remaining order 
conditions and across all Matched-Sampling Conditions (all sampling orders). 
5.3.5 Within- participants analysis of the reflection effect 
Finally, similar to the analysis conducted earlier on the common ratio problems, 
the within-participants reversals between descriptive and experiential choice for 
the REF problems were examined using the data from Experiments 6 and 7. 
Again, prior to the analysis, the two preferences within the choice problems under 
each format were combined to a single category, similar to the CR analysis above. 
The scheme for this classification is presented in Table 5.6. 
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TABLE 5.6 
Classification for the REF problems, separately for each choice format 
Choice Problem 4 (loss context) 
Choice Problem 1 
(gain context) 
High risk Low risk 
High risk HH Reversed Reflection 
Effect (revREF) 
Low risk Reflection Effect LL (REF) 
With the classification within each format, new 4x4-tables (for an illustration see 
Table 5.7. ) were created and their symmetry was tested using the Bowker test 
with a priori contrasts on the six individual 2x2 breakdowns of the table (the six 
pairs of cells with similar shades of grey). 
TABLE 5.7 
Classification for the REF agreement between the two choice formats. In the actual analysis only 
the corresponding non-diagonal cells with similar shades of grey are compared. 
REF classification within DfXP 
REF 
REF REF I REF REF 
classification HH HH REF 
within DfD LL LL REF 
revREF revREF_REF 
HH I LL I revREF 
revREF_revREF 
For the data from Experiment 6 the choice behaviour within the reflection 
effect problems was found to be symmetrical for REF2, Bowker's x2 (6, N=150) _ 
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5.166, p= . 523. However, for REF1 a significant asymmetry was observed within 
the table, Bowker's x2 (6, N=150) = 21.903, p= . 001. For Experiment 7 the null 
hypothesis of internal symmetry had to be rejected for both pairs of problems, 
REF 1 (Bowker's x2 (6, N=250) = 41.375, p <. 001) and REF 2 (Bowker's x2 (6, 
N=250) = 16.168, p= . 013). To identify the sources for the asymmetries within 
the tables the planned comparisons were examined. It can be seen from Table 5.8, 
that in all three cases significant shifts were found between the reflection effect 
and the reversed reflection effect (AREF revREF). Specifically, more shifts were 
observed between a reflection effect under DfD to a reversed reflection effect 
under DfXP, than in the opposite direction. This confirms the differences found 
for the reversal of the reflection effect between subjects on a within-subject level. 
In addition, within Experiment 7 under REF 1 an asymmetry was also observed for 
the comparison of choosing the low risk option in both cases and the reflection 
effect (OLL REF). Again, more participants shifted from a reflection effect pattern 
under DfD to the pattern of consistently choosing the low risk option under DfXP 
than the other way round. Together, both findings show that there seems to be a 
consistent pattern of changing the choice behaviour within reflection effect 
problems when faced with different choice formats. Instead of a reflection effect 
observed in DfD, participants shift to different patterns under DfXP which has 
been found to be either a reversed reflection effect or consistent preference of the 
low risk alternatives. 
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TABLE 5.8 
Results for all six non-directional comparisons of the asymmetric 4x4 McNemar Tables. 
Significant X% values are highlighted by asterisks. 
ZHH LL 
ZHH REF 
ZHH 
revREF 
ZLL 
REF 
ZLL 
re REF 
ZREF 
rei REF 
Experiment 6 REF1 1.508 1.706 1.387 2.357 . 577 2.985* 
REF1 1.0 1.915 2.2 3.053* 1.964 4.323* 
Experiment 7 
REF2 
.0 . 
906 
. 
853 1.298 2.324 2.746* 
For the six non-directional comparisons of the off diagonal cells in the table and their 
corresponding mirror image counterparts (the cells in Table 5.8 with corresponding shades of 
grey) with a family wise alpha level of . 
05, equally divided, the critical value was 2.649 (from the 
tables by Dayton & Schafer, 1973). 
5.4 Discussion 
Overall, the findings presented here suggest that in order for PT to account for the 
choice behaviour under DfXP the shape of its value and weighting function must 
be different to the ones inferred from decisions under DfD. In terms of common 
ratio effect under Matched Sampling, there seems to be some support for a 
common ratio effect under CR1, similar to the results by Gottlieb et al. (Gottlieb 
et al., 2007), at least for the combined data including all different sampling orders. 
Within CR2, on the other hand, no effect was found. The proportions of riskier 
choices were similar in both the high and low probability context and remained 
generally at a lower level than in CR1, below the 50% line. Furthermore, the 
comparison between the different sampling conditions seems to provide a similar 
picture for the decision biases as seen for the raw choice proportions in the 
previous chapters. Whereas the usual common ratio effect was replicated under 
DfD, a reversed common ratio effect was observed under Free Sampling and 
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intermediate results were obtained under Matched Sampling. This shows once 
more that Matched Sampling attenuates the effect but it doesn't eliminate it. 
The reason for difference between the two pairs of problems remains 
unclear but the result matches the trend within the Hertwig et al. data. The within- 
participants analysis shows that differences in terms of the behaviour in common 
ratio type problems under different choice formats can also be observed within 
participants, but the observed asymmetries are not direct shifts from a common 
ratio effect under DfD to a reversed common ration effect under DfXP, as 
suggested by the between-participants comparisons. These results imply that the 
weighting function must have a shape for which holds w(. 20)/w(. 25) > 
w(. 80)/w(1.0) and w(. 025)/w(. 25) = w(. 1)/w(1.0). The second part of this 
constriction is unfortunately much less informative as one of the slopes stretches 
from 
.1 to 1.0. How the 
function behaves in-between remains unclear. A generally 
flatter and more linear weighting function might be sufficient to explain the 
pattern. This would be in line with the findings presented earlier indicating that 
EV provides better predictions than PT. An alternative interpretation for the 
differences between CR1 and CR2 could be an interaction with the value function 
which possesses different properties for experienced values. 
However, with only two pairs of common ratio type problems no further 
constraints regarding the functional form can be derived. A more systematic 
examination with specially selected problems accompanied by common 
consequence problems similar to the procedure used by Wu and Gonzalez (1996) 
would be useful to get a finer grained picture of different segments of the 
weighting function. 
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More consistency across the different choice conditions was observed for 
the reflection problems where a shift from a reflection effect under Df) to a 
reversed reflection effect under all experiential choice conditions was found for 
REF 1 between and within participants. For REF2, on the other hand, a reflection 
effect was confirmed across all DfXP conditions. Both effects therefore replicated 
independently of the coexistence of sampling error. Again, there was an 
asymmetry between the two pairs of problems. The finding of a reversed 
reflection effect under REF 1 on its own would seem to suggest a value function 
with a form opposite to the one found under DfD with v(3) < w(. 8)v(4) and v(-3) > 
w(. 8)v(-4), implying convexity for gains and concavity for losses. However, with 
the second and equally consistent finding of a reflection effect in REF2 with v(3) 
> w(. 1)v(32) and v(-3) < w(. 1)v(-32), implying the usual shape of the value 
function with concavity for gains and convexity for losses, the interpretation 
seems to be more complicated. An alternative explanation, reconciling the 
reversed risk preferences in the two problems, could be a dependence of the 
pattern on the properties of the probability weighting function and its impact on 
the different probabilities involved, as in the fourfold pattern of risk (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992), where the relationship between risk aversion and risk seeking 
for gains and losses is reversed for small probabilities. However, as similar 
probabilities occur in REF 1 and REF2 the explanation seems to lie within the 
value function itself, which on its own would only be able to incorporate the 
results by assuming a more complicated functional form. 
In summary, this chapter has provided a few new and interesting insights 
that will help to get a clearer idea regarding the shapes of the transformations of 
values and probabilities for a PT model in order to account for the experiential 
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choice data presented here. The patterns emerging are noticeably different to the 
ones usually observed under descriptive choice. In contrast to the existing 
literature which attributes the description-experience gap solely to a different 
weighting function, the findings observed here suggest that the differences might 
instead be the result of different properties of both the weighting and the value 
function. This is an entirely new insight that could give the search for the potential 
reasons behind the observed choice phenomena in DfXP an important new 
direction. 
Furthermore, with regard to the interpretation of the apparent 
underweighting of small probabilities under DfXP, as the examined choice 
problems do not allow constraint of the functions any further there still remain a 
variety of different shapes for the weighting function that can accommodate the 
findings. As the involvement of over- or underweighting under DfXP is a model 
dependent statement, such conclusions cannot be drawn at this point. In order to 
further narrow down the set of potential shapes, I will use the next chapter to 
estimate the best fitting sets of parameters for the different experimental 
conditions that have been examined here. In addition, this analysis may also help 
to develop some hypotheses regarding the mechanism behind the changes of the 
functional forms when gamble descriptions are translated into experiential choice 
tasks. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MODELLING DECISIONS FROM EXPERIENCE 
6.1 Introduction 
Throughout the experimental chapters of this thesis, I have presented various 
results indicating that PT based models are not very well suited to explaining 
experiential choice behaviour. When modelling DfXP results using cumulative 
prospect theory with the median value- and weighting-function parameters from 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) the model performs at about chance level. In 
addition, I have provided evidence reinforcing the current view expressed in the 
literature that there is a difference in terms of the weighting of probabilities 
between DfXP and DfD. Furthermore, the reanalysis of the data in the context of 
decision biases in the last chapter has shown that the PT framework is more likely 
to account for the observed data when assuming different parameter values for 
both transformations. A number of constraints regarding the shapes of potential 
candidate functions have also been identified. However, in the light of these new 
results it is obvious that the initial model fits in the earlier chapters, which were 
based on a very limited range of parameter values, do not allow for an accurate 
assessment of the potential accountability of PT-based models for the reported 
data. In order to remedy this methodological shortcoming, and to test the 
convergence of evidence regarding the identified constraints, it is necessary to 
conduct a more comprehensive parameter estimation for the PT model. The 
evaluation of such a complete model fit will be the objective of the first part of 
this chapter. 
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Once it has been established what specific forms of the PT model give the 
best explanatory account of the experimental data this information can be used as 
a benchmark to evaluate the ability of a wider range of alternative models to 
explain the observed choice behaviour. This will be the objective of the second 
part of the chapter. However, given the scope of the thesis I do not claim this to be 
an exhaustive survey of all available models. Instead, I will try to explore the 
applicability of approaches that are the focus of the current literature, including 
simple heuristics and approaches derived from stochastic learning models. 
A further contribution will be the exploration of a completely new 
theoretical approach that has not previously been applied in the context of DfXP. 
This model has some tradition in the probability learning literature and tries to use 
different aspects of the sequential information that are inherent to experiential 
choice tasks and that might not be captured by the alternatives considered so far. 
The chapter will close with a discussion of the obtained results. 
6.2 Models based on prospect theory 
Before I describe the modelling procedure and its results, I want to briefly go 
through the parameterisation of both the weighting and the value function of the 
PT model again, in order to illustrate the impact of these parameter values on the 
shape of the functions and their interpretation. This will also set the foundations 
for the predictions regarding the parameter values in the context of decisions from 
experience (DfXP) that follow from the results presented so far. 
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The value function v (") with the parameterization of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992), has the following form: 
xi " , 
if xi >0 
v(x') 
-2(IX jI)ß , lf xj < 
0. 
(6.1) 
There are three adjustable parameters (a, ß, and k) of which a and ß separately fit 
the curvature of the function for gains and losses. The third parameter, X, scales 
loss aversion and is only needed for mixed gambles which contain both gains and 
losses. As the problems used throughout the experiments presented here contain 
either all gains only or all losses only, this parameter cannot be estimated and is 
omitted. This leaves us with only two parameters (a, 8) and the following 
function: 
I xia , if xý >_ 0 v(xý)= t-(IxjV 
, 
ifxj < 0. 
(6.2) 
The weighting function w("), according to Tversky and Kahneman (1992), has two 
parameters (y, 6) which fit the shape of the weighting functions, again separately 
for gains and losses: 
Pi 
, 
ifx. 
rr 
Pi +(1 p. i 
w(pj)= s p' ifxj <0. 
p+ pj )Y5 ýý1 
(6.3) 
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Under the two-stage model (Fox & Tversky, 1998; Tversky & Fox, 1995) the 
same function is applied to subjective probability estimates instead of objective 
probabilities. 
Taken together, this leaves us with four parameters, which in the context 
of descriptive choice, are usually assumed to take on values between 0 and 1, 
resulting in both an S-shaped value function, concave for gains and convex for 
losses, and an inverse S-shaped weighing function, implying overweighting for 
small probabilities and underweighting of high probabilities. This is illustrated by 
the grey lined functions in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1. Different shapes of the value- and weighting function for parameter values 
between 0 and 2. 
As I have shown in the previous chapter there is accumulating evidence that both 
functions have different properties under DfXP. The reversed reflection effect 
makes it necessary to assume a value function that is concave for losses and 
convex for gains (black lines in Figure 6.1 A). A reversed common ratio effect, 
together with the choice behaviour in the earlier chapters, seems to imply a 
weighting function that is steeper between .2 and . 
25 than between 1.0 and . 
8, and 
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which accommodates underweighting of small probabilities (black lines in Figure 
6.1 B). 
Interestingly, the only parameter estimation for the PT model reported in 
the DfXP literature so far (Hau et al., in press) has only allowed parameters to 
vary between 0 and 1. Given such a limitation of the parameter range the authors 
clearly bypassed an opportunity to explore the fit of alternative shapes that would 
actually describe their findings of choice behaviour in the direction of 
underweighting of small probabilities within the PT framework. Instead, they 
found an optimised performance of 69% for parameters indicating linear 
transformations for both probabilities and values. Effectively, the best fitting 
parameter values for gamma and delta in the range 0-1 are at 1. This suggests that 
better fitting values might be found outside this range. Consequently, the 
estimations reported here will circumvent this methodological shortcoming by 
providing the first estimation across an extended range between 0 and 2 which 
incorporates the functional forms that are in line with the results reported earlier. 
6.2.1 Parameter estimations for prospect-theory-based models 
Given the inherent dependencies of these two functions it is necessary to fit both 
transformations together. For example, risk averse responding is typically 
interpreted as a concave value function, but equally good fits can be obtained 
assuming a linear value function but a convex probability weighting function 
(e. g., Birnbaum's (2007) TAX model). 
Using the decision problems involving only gains, I estimated a and y and 
using the decision problems involving only losses, I estimated ß and b. The 
number of correct predictions was used as the optimisation criterion. For each 
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choice parameter values were optimised using an exhaustive grid search. 
Parameter values were selected to maximize the number of model predictions in 
the same direction as the modal preference. Given the small number of decision 
problems per person (1 or 6), there was not enough information to estimate the 
parameters separately for each subject. Rather, the choices from different subjects 
were pooled together and parameters were estimated across all choices at the 
population level. 
Note that as the dichotomous outcome predicted by the model (A or B) 
stays constant across a wide range of parameter values for both the value- and the 
weighting function and does not change continuously. The same is true for the 
overall rate of correct predictions. As a result, there is not one unique set of 
parameters that produces the maximum number of correct predictions. Instead, 
there are discrete steps with the same rate of correct predictions across a range of 
different pairs of parameter values. In a three dimensional space the resulting 
surface will therefore have various plateaus with the same fit (e. g., like a hill with 
terraces of rice fields). Optimisation algorithms like the Nelder-Mead method 
(Neider & Mead, 1965) or, more broadly, methods that depend on local gradient 
information, can therefore not be employed here as the simplex would get stuck 
on one of these plateaus, failing to find the true best fit. Given the small number 
of parameters, I therefore avoided this problem by calculating the number of the 
correct predictions for each combination of parameter values of the value- and 
weighting function between 0 and 2 in steps of 0.01. This will provide an estimate 
for the upper limit of the predictive power that this model can achieve on the basis 
of experiential choice data. To avoid overfitting, the parameter estimations are 
conducted for both combined sets of data, wherever possible, and separately for 
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each individual set of data. The same methodology was used for the calculation of 
the model fits of the two-stage model. Due to the reliance on subjective 
probability estimates, the predictions of the two stage model could only be tested 
on data from the experiments involving either frequency or probability 
estimations (Experiments 3,4 and 5). 
6.2.2 General performance of the prospect theory model 
Although the performance of the model was examined across a wider range of 
parameter values than usual, the mean maximum fit obtained across the different 
experiential data sets remained still low with 65% (SD = 9%). This is also lower 
than the performance for PT usually reported under DFD. 
The maximum proportions of correct predictions obtained across the 
different sets of data are provided in Figure 6.2. The best performances were 
observed for the Free Sampling data of Experiment 1 (83%) and Experiment 2 
(81%). 71% correct predictions were obtained for the descriptive choice data in 
Experiment 7 and the Comprehensive-Sampling data in Experiment 1. However, 
for the Matched Sampling data the performance was found to be much lower (M = 
60%, SD = 3%). The lowest fits (58 %- 55%) were observed within the data from 
conditions with restricted sampling orders in Experiments 5 and 7. 
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Figure 6.2. Summary of the maximum rates of correct predictions for the PT model. The 
conditions sorted by performance are: FS = Free Sampling, Des = Description, CS = 
Comprehensive Sampling, MS = Matched Sampling (1,5 and 40 are the restricted 
sampling orders). The numbers at the end indicate the numbers of the experiment. 
As important as the fits are the sets of parameter values under which these 
values were obtained. This information will also tell us to what extend the best 
fitting shapes of the functions overlap with the constraints inferred from the 
decision biases in the previous chapter. The following sections will therefore 
explore the parameters of these maximum fits in more detail, separately the 
different experimental conditions. 
6.2.3 Prospect theory in the free sampling paradigm 
As shown in the previous section, the best fits for PT could be observed within the 
Free-Sampling Conditions. But where do these best fitting parameter values 
actually lie? In Figure 6.3 1 have plotted the rates of correct predictions as a 
function of the two parameters across the entire range (0-2), separately for gains 
on the left and losses on the right. Areas of the same shade indicate that equally 
good fits can be obtained by trading off value-function and probability-weighting- 
function parameters. Thus, one cannot talk of the best fitting parameter for the 
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value function without constraining the probability weighting parameters and vice 
versa. In other words, there is no best fitting set of parameters, but rather a large 
region of parameter space over which equally good fits are obtained - this type of 
problem is known as the problem of flat maxima, in the literatures on optimization 
and statistics. 
To facilitate the interpretation, I have added a vertical and a horizontal line 
at position 1.0 for both parameters, dividing each range of values into two halves, 
thus forming four quadrants. Firstly, this division helps to detect inherent 
characteristics of the best fitting parameters and their interaction. Secondly, the 
lines help to identify the regions that are tangent to a linear value- and weighting 
function. 
Within all eight plots the darkest regions, representing the best fits, lie 
predominantly within the top left and top right quadrants which are marked by 
weighting function parameters greater than 1. Conversely, the brightest areas with 
the lowest fit are mostly found for weighting function parameters smaller than 1, 
especially within the estimates for losses on the right side, for which the rate of 
correct predictions seems to be generally lower. This confirms the earlier results 
of a potential underweighting of small probabilities within the observed choice 
data and would also roughly fit the restrictions implied by the reversed common 
ratio effect that was found for this data. 
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Figure 6.3. Filled contour plots with the rates of correct predictions for the tested combinations of 
parameter values in the context of the Free Sampling data. Left column: Fits to the gains-only 
gambles. Right column: Fits to the losses-only gambles. 
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In terms of the value function parameters the interpretation is less clear. 
Overall, the darkest areas seem to lie in the centre of the upper half of the plots 
with extensions into the right half. This clustering along the centre seems to be 
even more pronounced for losses and can be seen as an indication that the best fits 
are found for value function parameters around 1 and slightly greater than 1. As 
explained earlier, values greater than 1 are in line with the finding of a reversed 
reflection effect under Free Sampling because they result in a convex value 
function for gains and a concave value function for losses. 
Table 6.1 shows a different summary of the results with the highest overall 
fit and the best fit obtained under conditions in which either or both of the two 
functions are linear. It can be seen that a fit close to the overall maximum can still 
be observed within the different Free-Sampling Conditions when the value 
function is set to be linear. Under a linear probability weighting function or a 
combination of both linear functions, on the other hand, the maximum level of fit 
can no longer be obtained. 
TABLE 6.1 
Maximum fits within the different Free-Sampling Conditions including best overall fit and bestfit 
under a linear weighting and/or linear weighting function 
Free Free Free Comprehensive 
Sampling Sampling Sampling Sampling 
(Exp 1) (Exp 2) (Exp 1&2) (Exp 1) 
Best fit (all gambles) 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.71 
Best fit under a linear value 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.70 
function ( (x =ß= 1) 
Best fit under a linear 
weighting function 0.81 0.77 0.76 0.67 
(Y=S= 1) 
Best fit under a linear value 
and weighting function 0.81 0.68 0.75 0.65 
((X =ß=y=8= 1) 
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Taken together, the optimum performance for the Free Sampling data can be 
expected from PT models with a weighting function that incorporates 
underweighting of small probabilities and a value function that is either close to 
linear or slightly S-shaped. 
6.2.4 Prospect theory under Matched Sampling 
Equivalent error surfaces for the Matched-Sampling Conditions are shown in 
Figure 6.4. A few general remarks have to be made regarding this set of plots. 
First, they are all much brighter than the previous ones, demonstrating that the 
rates of correct predictions are generally much lower than within the Free- 
Sampling Conditions. Second, there are smaller numbers of areas with much 
bigger and clearer shapes. This is a result of the matching process which reduces 
the number of different probabilities experienced during the sampling process. 
Furthermore, the plots show a remarkable consistency regarding the form of the 
resulting shapes, providing a more consistent picture between experiments than 
the observed preferences. It can be seen from Figure 6.4 that the parameter 
combinations yielding the highest model performance for gains and losses lie 
predominantly in the top-right quadrant with both parameters greater than 1. 
Within a smaller number of plots these areas also reach into the bottom-left 
quadrant (e. g. Experiment 2 for gains and most of the loss plots). In terms of the 
weighting function parameters this means again that the best fits for this data are 
generally found for parameters incorporating an S-shaped weighting function with 
underweighting of small probabilities. 
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Figure 6.4. Contour plots with the rates of correct predictions for the Matched Sampling data. 
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The mixed results from Chapter 5 showing either no or a reversed common ratio 
effect would be consistent with probability weighting parameters close to one or 
slightly above, restricting the shape still further. 
With the plateaus of the highest fits covering both the left and the right 
side of the plots, the interpretation in terms of the value function is even more 
difficult than in previous cases. Within most of the plots the areas with the highest 
fit seem to cover parameter values between .7 and 1.8. However, in order to match 
the reversed reflection effects found for this data the values can be narrowed 
down to the right of the vertical line. 
An examination of the fits for the different combinations of linear 
functions in Table 6.2 provides additional confirmation for this interpretation. 
Under both, a linear weighting or value function performance close to the 
optimum can be obtained. Their combination, however, results in suboptimal 
performances. 
TABLE 6.2 
Maximum fits within the different Matched-Sampling Conditions including best overall fit and best 
fit under a linear weighting and/or linear weighting function 
Exp2 Exp7 Exp2&7 Exp3 Exp4 Exp3&4 
Best fit (all gambles) 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.59 0.59 
Best fit under a linear value 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.59 0.59 
unction (a = (3 = 1) f 
Best fit under a linear 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.59 0.59 
weighting function (y =5= 1) 
Best fit under a linear value 
and weighting function 0.39 0.5 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.47 
((X =ß=y=6= 1) 
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6.2.5 Prospect theory under restricted sampling order 
The maximum PT fits for these sets of data were found to be the lowest and this is 
also reflected in the low intensity of the plots. However, the shapes of the 
different plateaus look remarkably similar to the other Matched Sampling plots 
(see Figure 6.5). The first reading is therefore the same with optimal probability 
weighting function parameters greater than one and value function parameters 
close to one and greater than one. The constraints, on the other hand, have been 
found to be slightly different which needs to be taken into account when 
interpreting these values. For most of these conditions there was indication for a 
common ratio effect. As a result, the set of potential parameters within the domain 
of gains has to be found on the extension of the diagonal with the highest fit 
somewhere within bottom-left quadrant. For losses, however, the area with the 
highest fit does not reach into the lower half of the plot. Given these constraints 
we would therefore have to assume the actual performance to be lower than the 
obtained maximum. The only exception seems to be the 5_5 Condition. In terms 
of the value function, the spread is again very wide, especially for the 40_40 data 
for which no reflection effect of any form could be found. For the other 
conditions, the highest fitting value parameters have values greater than one 
which matches reversed reflection effects as they were observed within this data. 
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Figure 6.5. Filled contour plots with the rates of correct predictions for the Matched Sampling data 
with restricted sampling order. 
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Nevertheless, as the fits are generally rather low and vary only slightly, the 
figures in Table 6.3 show that for most of the conditions a similar level of fit can 
be obtained with linear functions and even for their combination. 
TABLE 6.3 
Maximum fits within the different Matched-Sampling Conditions with restricted sampling order 
for different combinations of linear value and weighting functions 
40_40 
(Exp 5) 
40_40 
(Exp 7) 
1_1 
(Exp 7) 
5_5 
(Exp 7) 
Best fit (all gambles) 0.57 0.58 0.64 0.55 
Best fit under a linear value 0.56 0.58 0.64 0.55 
function (a =ß= 1) 
Best fit under a linear weighting 0.55 0.58 0.63 0.55 
function (y =6= 1) 
Best fit under a linear value and 
weighting function 0.5 0.5 0.57 0.51 
(a=ß=y=8=1) 
6.2.6 Performance under descriptive choice 
In order to provide an additional validation of the observed difference between 
DfXP and DfD, I also tested the performance of the model in the context of the 
data from the Descriptive-Choice Conditions. As already pointed out above, the 
obtained fits for this data were not as high as usually reported (M = 65%) but still 
higher than the Matched Sampling fits. More important though, is the distribution 
of the actual parameter values providing the best fit for this data. It can be seen 
from Figure 6.6 that the distribution of the grey scale values is actually inversed 
for the descriptive choice data, compared to the results under experiential choice. 
In the context of losses the resulting areas of optimum fit is rather large which 
allows for a wide range of equally likely combinations. 
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Figure 6.6. Filled contour plots with the rates of correct predictions under descriptive choice. 
However, most of the top-right quadrant, which provided the best fitting 
parameter combinations for experiential choice, is now white, indicating the areas 
of the lowest fit under descriptive choice. For the gains, on the other hand, there is 
clear indication that the optimal values can be found within the bottom-left 
quadrant which overlaps with the parameter values usually reported in descriptive 
choice. All these findings illustrate again the obvious shift in terms of the 
parameter values that is necessary for the PT framework to account for choice 
behaviour within both formats. It is important to mention that this is actually the 
first time this difference between the formats has been found with such clarity and 
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consistency across such a wide range of evidence, including actual choice 
behaviour and parameter estimations. 
Furthermore, it is obvious from Table 6.4 that for the descriptive choice 
data the optimal performance can be achieved even under a linear value function, 
whereas a linear probability transformation on its own or in combination with 
linear value transformation results in a substantial drop in performance. 
TABLE 6.4 
Maximum fits within the different descriptive choice conditions for different combinations 
of linear value and weighting functions. 
Descriptive 
Choice 
(Exp 2) 
Descriptive 
Choice 
(Exp 2) 
Descriptive 
Choice 
(Exp 2&7) 
Best fit (all gambles) 0.61 0.71 0.64 
Best fit under a linear value 0.61 0.71 0.64 
function (a =ß= 1) 
Best fit under a linear weighting 0.51 0.60 0.58 
function (y=6= 1) 
Best fit under a linear value and 
weighting function 0.51 0.29 0.35 
(a=ß=y=6= 1) 
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6.2.7 The performance of the two-stage model 
In order to examine whether the performance of the PT-framework can be 
improved when using subjective probability estimates instead of the objective 
probabilities I also estimated the parameters for the two-stage model. However, 
the best fit observed on the basis of the available probability estimates did not 
provide any improvement. Instead, with a mean of 65% an upper limit close to the 
63% reported by Fox and Hadar (2006) was confirmed. 
As the number of different individual probability and frequency 
judgements exceeds the number of objective probabilities, the gradation of 
colouring for the two-stage plots in Figure 6.7 is much more complex, again with 
more variance and smaller areas. Similar to the earlier parameter estimations, the 
best fitting weighting function parameter values can be found above the horizontal 
line with values greater than one. Thus, even when taking sampling error out of 
the equation using probability estimates the best performance of the PT 
framework is still found under a probability transformation that allows for 
underweighting of small probabilities. This provides additional support for the 
claim made on the basis of the observed choice behaviour that the elimination of 
sampling error does not eliminate the apparent underweighting of small 
probabilities. 
Again, it is more difficult to interpret the plots in terms of the value 
transformations. In the case of the two-stage model plot this is made even more 
difficult due to the inconsistency between plots, especially within the plots for 
losses on the left of Figure 6.7. 
198 
Chapter 6: Modelling 
ý. 
Matched Sampling (Exp. 3), x>O 
20 
E 
12 1.5 { 
CL CO 1.0 
o. 5 -I C 0.0 1 
00 0.5 1.0 1.5 20 
Value function parameters (u) 
Y" 
Matched Sampling (Exp. 4), x>0 
2.0 
1.5 
a 
p 1.0 
U 
0.5 
rn 
ß 0.0 
0.0 0.5 10 1.5 2.0 
Value function parameters (c) 
r 
v 20 E 
15 
ö 1.0 
U 
7 0.5 
Q) 
C 0.0 
L 
O) 
Matched 40_40 (Exp. 5), x>0 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 20 
Value function parameters (a ) 
09 
08 
07 
0.6 
0.5 
04 
09 
08 
07 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.9 
08 
07 
0.6 
0.5 
04 
Matched Sampling (Exp. 3), x<O 
2.0 
E 
CO 1. S Co 
c. 
ö 1Ö 
Ü 
0.5 
0.0 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 
Value function parameters (6 ) 
LC Matched Sampling (Exp. 4), x<O 
20 
E 
f° ý5 
C1 
1.0 
U 
C 0,5 
Of 
00 L 
00 05 10 1.5 20 
Value function parameters (ß ) 
r 
2.0 
E 
E 1.5 
1.0 
U 
jM 
O) 
0.0 L 
3N 
Matched 40_40 (Exp. 5), x<0 
i.. _} 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 
Value function parameters (ß ) 
09 
08 
07 
06 
0.5 
0.4 
09 
08 
07 
06 
0.5 
0.4 
0.9 
08 
07 
06 
0.5 
0.4 
Figure 6.7. Filled contour plots with the rates of correct predictions for the two-stage 
model under Matched Sampling. 
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The performance under linear transformations seems to be close to the maximum 
for each linear function on its own. When combined though, the performance 
drops significantly again (see Table 6.5). 
TABLE 6.5 
Maximum fits for the two-stage model with combinations of linear value and weighting 
functions 
Matched 
Sampling 
(Exp 3) 
Matched 
Sampling 
(Exp 4) 
4040 
(Exp 5) 
Best fit (all gambles) 0.65 0.64 0.64 
Best fit under a linear value function 0.63 0.60 0.63 
((x =ß= 1) 
Best fit under a linear weighting 0.61 0.63 0.63 
function (ýy =6= 1) 
Best fit under a linear value and 
weighting function (a = (3 = ýy =6= 1) 
0.48 0.53 0.61 
In summary, this first section of the chapter has shown how the different 
results from the previous analyses can be integrated in the context of the best 
fitting parameter values for PT models under DfXP. Furthermore, the 
optimisations have helped to narrow down the shape of functions that a PT model 
would need to accommodate in order to describe choices under DfXP. The 
emerging picture confirms the initial hypothesis that the shapes must be different 
to the ones that have been established under DfD. For the first time this could also 
be shown in a direct comparison of the best fitting parameter values obtained for 
these two formats. Finally, the results of the two-stage model suggest that these 
findings can be obtained independent of the elimination of sampling error. 
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6.3 The application of an adaptive learning model 
The upper limits for the predictive power of PT-based models reported in the first 
part have left plenty of scope for improvement. It might therefore be indicated to 
compare these first results with the performance of alternative models that capture 
different aspects of the available information. What all PT-based models have in 
common is the usage of aggregated information from the experienced sequences 
including the overall probabilities of the different outcomes. They therefore do not 
take into account specific properties of the sequential accumulation which is also 
a characteristic of the task. 
One alternative class of models that incorporates the sequential updating of 
the experienced information and which has already been discussed in the context 
of decisions from experience are associative learning models. As mentioned in the 
introduction, there has been a tradition of using different variants of simple 
reinforcement models formerly developed in the animal and human learning 
literature to examine repeated-choice problems and learning phenomena in bandit 
problems (e. g., Barron & Erev, 2003; Denrell, 2007; Erev & Barron, 2005; 
March, 1996; Sarin & Vahid, 2001). A systematic comparison of the assumptions 
underlying these different models has been presented by Yechiam and Busemeyer 
(2005). All of these models can be seen as derivatives of the standard Bush- 
Mosteller type stochastic learning models (Bush & Mosteller, 1955; Estes, 1959). 
The basic assumption is that the probability of choosing on option increases or 
decreases depending on how choosing the option is rewarded. The decision 
maker's assessment of the expected value of an uncertain alternative at time t is a 
weighted average of the previous estimate and the most recent payoff which is 
usually weighted by a learning parameter that determines the rate of adaptation. 
201 
Chapter 6: Modelling 
6.3.1 The value-updating model 
Hertwig et al (2006) have tried to capture the sequential updating process within 
DfXP by applying a particular variant of a weighted adjustment model (March, 
1996), which they refer to as the value-updating model and which seems to follow 
an earlier form proposed by Barron and Erev (2003). Again, the basic assumption 
is that people update their expectation regarding the value of the option j at time t, 
Af(t), with every new piece of information according to the following mechanism: 
Ap(t) =(1- )AA-1)+()v(xt), (6.4) 
where the value at time t is modelled as a weighted average of the expectation 
according to the previously encountered outcomes from this option Aj(t - 1), and 
the latest value drawn, x1. Instead of a learning parameter, this model employs a 
recency parameter, (p, to weight the value of the latest outcome: co = (1/t)'°. Values 
for cp =1 indicate equal weighting whereas rp <1 imply recency weighting and (p >1 
primacy weighting. With no prior knowledge about the available options the 
initial expectations Aß(0) are set to 0. In addition, the last part of Equation 6.4 
shows that Hertwig et al. also incorporated a prospect theory type value function 
v(") to transform the experienced outcomes. Following Barron and Erev (2003), 
this function has the following form: 
r . r, , ifx >_ 0, v(x) 
-zlxl 
a5 ifx < 0.6.5 
Compared with the function used in the previous section, this parameterisation is 
unusual as it contains the loss aversion parameter A but only one parameter to 
determine the curvature of the transformation of both gains and losses. As 
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Hertwig et al. did not employ any mixed gambles A can be omitted and leaves 
only a as a free parameter. A slightly different variant was implemented by Hau 
et al. (in press) who dropped the value function altogether, assuming a linear 
value transformation. 
Rather than conducting a complete optimisation, Hertwig et al. (2006) 
implemented the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) parameters for the value function 
and estimated only the recency parameter cp. With a value of . 29 
for this parameter 
they could obtain a correlation of . 91 between predicted and actual choice 
proportions. Hau et al. (in press) found the maximum rate of correct predictions 
for their estimations to be 66% under a parameter value indicating much less 
recency weighting ((p =. 75). However, both studies looked only at DfXP under 
Free-Sampling Conditions. Given the consistent absence of any form of recency 
weighting in the analyses reported throughout this thesis, I expected this 
parameter to be much closer to 1 in the context of the Matched Sampling data. 
With the limitations of these original procedures, I have adapted the model 
slightly for my own test of the performance of the value-updating model and used 
a more comprehensive estimation procedure. First, instead of the value function 
parameterisation of Hertwig et al. (2006), 1 used the same function that I have 
employed for the PT model fits (see Equation 6.2). Second, given the earlier 
results underlining the unsuitability of the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) value 
function parameters in the context of experiential choice data I estimated a from 
the data (as well as 9). As in the first part of this chapter, the estimations were 
therefore conducted separately for gains and losses, with the rate of correct 
predictions as the optimisation criterion. Finally, for each set of parameters the 
estimations were conducted in steps of 0.01 within the limits of 0 and 2. 
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6.3.2 The value-updating model under Matched Sampling 
Although the model uses different properties of the information experienced by 
the subjects, the performance observed under optimal value and recency 
parameters was comparable to the maximum fits reported for the PT model with a 
mean of 66% (SD = 3%). These rates of correct predictions can also be seen as a 
confirmation of the results by Hau et al. (in press) within Matched Sampling. A 
summary of the best fits obtained across the different data sets is provided in 
Table 6.6. 
TABLE 6.6 
Maximum fits within the different Matched-Sampling Conditions. 
Matched 
Sampling 
(Exp 2) 
Matched 
Sampling 
(Exp 7) 
Matched 
Sampling 
(Exp 3) 
Matched 
Sampling 
(Exp 4) 
Best fit (all gambles) 0.71 0.65 0.66 0.63 
Best fit under a linear value function 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.61 
((x -ß- 1) 
Best fit under a equal recency 0.67 0.61 0.58 0.59 
weighting (cp = 1) 
Best fit under a linear value function 
and equal recency weighting 0.35 0.5 0.46 0.49 
(a=ß=y= 1) 
However, in terms of the best fitting parameter values the interpretation is much 
less clear than in the context of the PT models. Due to the functional form of the 
model there is more variance and we do not have the same big-sized plateaus as in 
the PT estimations. Nevertheless, there are still sets of parameter values that 
provide optimal fit. I therefore used contour plots again to illustrate the results 
(see Figure 6.8). 
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Figure 6.8. Filled contour plots with the rates of correct predictions for the value-updating model 
under Matched Sampling. 
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Whereas recency parameters greater than 1, indicating recency weighting, and 
value function parameters smaller than 1 provide the best fit for the data from 
Experiments 2 and 7, the opposite pattern was found for the data from 
Experiments 3 and 4 with best fitting parameter values in quadrant 4. However, as 
shown in Table 6.6 rates of correct predictions close to the optimum were still 
observed within all four data sets under the assumption of a recency parameter of 
1, which would also be more consistent with the actual findings of the recency 
analysis presented in the experimental chapters. Setting both parameters to 1, on 
the other hand, would result in a significant drop in predictive power which 
indicates the importance of a nonlinear value function in order to describe this 
data. More consistency than in the PT optimisations was found with regard to the 
differences between the separate estimations for gains (left side) and the 
estimations for losses (right side) within each data set, which were much more 
aligned. 
6.3.3 The value-updating model under restricted sampling order 
The observed rates of correct predictions for the Matched-Sampling Conditions 
with restricted sampling order were again slightly lower with a mean of 58% (SD 
= 4%). In terms of the optimum parameters, on the other hand, there was more 
overlap. In most of the data sets, the best fit was obtained under recency 
parameters close to 1 or slightly above. This is also reflected in rates of correct 
predictions close to the maximum for linear recency in Table 6.7. 
206 
Chapter 6: Modelling 
TABLE 6.7 
Maximum fits within the Matched-Sampling Conditions with restricted sampling order. 
40_40 40_40 11 55 
(Exp 5) (Exp 7) (Exp 7) (Exp 7) 
Best fit (all gambles) 0.56 0.58 0.64 0.55 
Best fit under a linear value function 0.56 0.58 0.64 0.55 
((x =ß=1) 
Best fit under a equal recency weighting 0.55 0.58 0.63 0.55 
((P= 1) 
Best fit under a linear value function and 
equal recency weighting (a =ß= (p = 1) 
0.5 0.5 0.57 0.51 
This is also more in line with the experimental findings confirming the absence of 
any form of recency weighting. The best fitting value function parameters, on the 
other hand, were generally found to be slightly below 1 (see also Figure 6.9). This 
applies to both gains and losses, and would imply an inverse S-shaped value 
function as it is usually assumed under prospect theory. Unlike in the Matched- 
Sampling Conditions with unrestricted sampling order the nonlinearity of the 
value function is not that important. As the summary in Table 6.7 shows, rates of 
correct predictions close to the maximum can still be observed under a linear 
value transformation without recency weighting (cp = 1). 
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Figure 6.9. Filled contour plots with the rates of correct predictions for the value-updating 
model under Matched Sampling with restricted sampling order. 
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Altogether the results from this section have provided additional support for the 
fact that under experiential choice tasks a similar level of predictive power can be 
obtained using simple reinforcement learning models. Contrary to previous tests 
of this model in the context of DfXP under Free Sampling (Hau et al., in press; 
Hertwig et al., 2006), the parameters that obtain the optimal level of performance 
under Matched Sampling do generally not make it necessary to assume any form 
of nonlinear recency weighing. Nevertheless, although the performance comes 
close to the benchmark set by the PT model it would still be desirable to have an 
even better model. More complex extensions of these learning models with 
additional parameters have already been proposed in other contexts. However, it 
remains open whether a similar performance can also be obtained by even simpler 
models. This question will be the examined in the following section. 
6.4 Predictions of choice heuristics 
Until now I have only considered parametric models. However, there are also 
alternative approaches, for example heuristics, which can do without any 
parameters. Heuristics claim to model the actual processes behind the choice 
behaviour more closely and have been shown to predict descriptive choice 
phenomena reasonably well despite their frugal nature (e. g., Brandstätter, 
Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 
1999; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). In a recent paper, Hau et al. (in press) 
have examined to what extent a wide variety of choice heuristics can account for 
experiential choice data within their Free Sampling design. They found heuristics 
like maximax (Luce & Raiffa, 1957), the lexicographic heuristic (Payne et al., 
1993) and the priority heuristic (Brandstätter et al., 2006) to be candidate 
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strategies for DfXP equivalent to PT-based models. The highest fits obtained 
within their analysis was 69% for maximax, followed by the lexicographic 
heuristic and the natural mean heuristic, a process model version of EV 
maximization, with 68% correct predictions. These levels of predictive power 
seem to be compatible with the ones obtained here, which make these heuristics 
interesting candidate models in the context of the Matched Sampling paradigm as 
well. 
In order to test whether they can actually perform equally well, I compared 
their rate of correct predictions with the ones reported in the earlier section in this 
chapter. Instead of the whole range of available strategies, I only selected a subset 
of six heuristics from the most successful candidates according to Hau et al's 
analysis for which it was possible to derive clear predictions within all six choice 
problems. A detailed description of the selected heuristics and their underlying 
processes is provided in Table 6.8. 
The natural-mean heuristic was not included as it has already been 
discussed in the context of the fits for PT models with linear value and weighting 
function parameters. 
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TABLE 6.8 
Descriptions of the chosen heuristics according to Hau et al. (in press) 
Heuristic Choice Policy Steps 
Step 1: Calculate the arithmetic mean of all experienced outcomes within a 
Equiprobable deck. 
Step 2: Choose the deck with the higher mean. 
Equal Weight Step 1: Calculate the sum of all experienced outcomes within a deck. 
Step 2: Choose the deck with the higher sum. 
Maximax Step 1: Choose the deck with the higher experienced maximum outcome. 
Step 1: Calculate the grand average of all experienced outcomes from all 
decks. 
Better than Step 2: For each deck, count the number of outcomes equal to or above the 
average grand average. 
Step 3: Choose the deck with the highest number of such outcomes. 
Lexicographic Step 1: Determine the most frequently experienced outcome of each deck. 
Step 2a: Choose the deck with the highest most frequent outcome. 
Step 2b: If both are equal, determine the second most frequent outcome 
of each deck, and select the deck with the highest (second most frequent) 
outcome. Proceed until a decision is reached. 
Priority Step 1: Examine the minimum gains experienced in the samples of 
outcomes from decks distributions A and B, respectively. If they differ 
by 1/10 (or more) of the maximum gain experienced (in both samples), 
stop examination and choose the deck distribution with the more 
attractive minimum gain; otherwise go to Step 2. 
Step 2: Examine the sample probabilities of the minimum gains. If the 
probabilities differ by 1/10 (or more) of the probability scale, stop 
examination and choose the deck distribution with the more attractive 
probability; otherwise go to Step 3. 
Step 3: Examine the maximum gain experienced in each deck 
distribution. Choose the deck distribution with the more attractive gain. 
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To calculate the rate of correct predictions, I first generated the predictions of the 
different models within each of the six decision problems under Matched 
Sampling (see Table 6.9). As the predictions of the equiprobable heuristic and the 
equal weight heuristic turned out to be identical in the context of the six choice 
problems, they were combined. 
TABLE 6.9 
Predictions of the different choice heuristics within the six choice problems used 
Options Preferences predicted by the different heuristics 
Equi- 
Better Decision probable / Maxi- than 
Lexico- 
Problem 
HL 
Equal max graphic 
Priority 
weight 
average 
1 4,. 8 3,1.0 HHLHL 
2 4,. 2 3, 
. 
25 HHLHH 
3 -3,1.0 -32, .1HLHLH 
4 -3,1.0 -4,. 8 HLLHH 
5 32, .1 
3,1.0 HHHLL 
6 32, 
. 
025 3, 
. 
25 HHHHL 
As the heuristics only take information into account which, as a result of the 
matching process, is identical for each participant, the predictions within the 
different decision problems are uniform for all participants. With a mean rate of 
50% (SD = 6%) the heuristics did not perform better than chance. The highest 
mean rate was observed for the lexicographic heuristic (54%) followed by the 
priority heuristic with 53%. A more detailed summary of their performance within 
the different choice problems is given in Table 6.10. 
212 
Chapter 6: Modelling 
TABLE 6.10 
Performance of the choice heuristics across the different data sets 
Matched Sampling 4040 11 5_5 
Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 7 Exp. 5 Exp. 7 Exp. 7 Exp. 7 
Equiprobable / 
0.35 0.46 0.49 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.57 0.51 Equal Weight 
Maximax 0.49 0.46 0.54 0.49 0.46 0.5 0.55 0.51 
Better than 0.39 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.47 0.42 0.37 0.47 
average 
Lexicographic 0.54 0.5 0.56 0.59 0.48 0.57 0.6 0.5 
Priority 
0.55 0.55 0.5 51 0 0 53 0 56 0 54 0 51 Heuristic . . . . . 
The success of the heuristics to account for experiential choice behaviour under 
Free Sampling could not be confirmed for the Matched Sampling paradigm. 
However, it is interesting to see that the low performance applies equally to 
strategies that incorporate probabilities, like the priority heuristics and strategies 
that do not use probabilities at all, for example the maximax heuristic. 
Problematic seems the uniform character of their predictions and the fact that 
strategies do not take into account any characteristics of the individual sequences. 
Instead, alternative strategies providing simple choice rules on the basis of 
sequential properties including patterns or other complex structures of the 
individual experiences should be explored. 
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6.5 An alternative model looking inside the sequence 
I have shown that the performances of the most prominent decision making 
models still leave room for improvement. Furthermore, there seems to be some 
indication that one potential source of information that can be utilised for 
alternative models lies within the individual sequences. The value-updating model 
has provided one way of capturing this information. A less successful approach, 
the incorporation of the observed switching behaviour, has already been tested 
experimentally in Chapter 4. However, there are still other ways of modelling the 
representation of the sampled information. I therefore want to use the last section 
of this chapter to briefly explore a completely different approach that is unrelated 
to any of the models discussed so far. This idea was prompted by comments from 
a participant who described looking for patterns or specific sub-sequences of 
outcomes within the experienced sequence to increase the performance within the 
tasks. At first this looks like an unusual way of formulating the problem. 
However, similar observations have also been made in the context of probability 
learning experiments which led to the development of mathematical models to 
formalise the usage of runs and patterns in these tasks (e. g., Edwards, 1956; 
Goodnow, 1955; Nicks, 1959). As pointed out by Jones and Myers (1966), the 
usage of runs and patterns as strategies can actually give participants an advantage 
in contexts where the underlying sampling process is assumed not to be random. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that divergent beliefs regarding the randomness of 
experimental procedures may persist, despite being instructed otherwise 
(Braveman & Fischer, 1968; McCracken, Osterhout, & Voss, 1962). 
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The underlying rational of these models is based on one of the oldest 
known judgement biases which can be traced as far back as to the work of 
Laplace (1796/195 1): the gambler's fallacy. It is also referred to as negative 
recency and describes the tendency of predicting the non-reinforced option based 
on the belief that a run without successes will be balanced out by following future 
successes. As I have already used the concept of recency in the context of the 
experiential chapters, it is important to distinguish the two. While the recency 
definition used earlier was based on the idea that particular parts of the sequence 
receive more weight, either as a strategy or due to cognitive limitations and 
memory effects, negative recency is defined with regard to reinforcement of the 
last outcome. Negative recency does therefore not imply that some information 
was not retrieved or ignored, the opposite, it derives alternative predictions based 
on all previously experiences sequences, giving each outcome a similar weight. 
Negative recency would therefore not have been detected by a recency tests in the 
form of the sequence-split analyses presented earlier. 
This concept can be applied to the appearance of runs within the 
sequences under DfXP as it provides a number of appealing properties that could 
explain some of the observed choice phenomena. For example, the tendency to 
choose options with rare but high payoffs more often under DfXP could be 
explained by negative recency as participants might anticipate a long run of the 
alternative non-rare outcome to be balanced out again. In addition, as sequential 
properties like the experienced numbers of runs and run lengths differ 
considerably between subjects due to the sampling process, this approach allows 
the modelling of variations of choice behaviour across participants. I will 
therefore briefly outline a particularly suitable run-based model before, given 
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restrictions of time and space, presenting one of many possible applications of the 
model within the matched sampling paradigm. 
6.5.1 The application of a run-based model 
The approach I have selected to test in the context of DfXP is based on a model 
by Restle (1961), which was originally proposed to account for negative recency 
effects observed in the probability learning experiments and which seems to be 
derived from earlier ideas by Goodnow, Rubinstein and Lubin (1960). It provides 
a clearly formalised mechanism which facilitates the transfer to a different 
domain. In Restle's (1961) original theory of patterns in guessing the anticipation 
of a binary outcome a or b is determined by matching the currently experienced 
sequence of events (for example abbbb) with sequences experienced earlier from 
memory. The greater the number of previous encounters with sequences of run 
lengths greater than the current length (k), the greater the probability of predicting 
the same outcome again (e. g., b). Conversely, if run lengths higher than k have not 
been encountered before, a shift in the response pattern (e. g., a) will follow. The 
expectancy of outcome b after trial t+1 does therefore not primarily depend on the 
actual probability of b but is instead determined by the probability of the schemata 
with run length k+1. It is obvious that the probability of an outcome and the 
distribution of the expected run lengths are not completely independent. However, 
there are conditions under which both make different predictions. 
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Restle's (1961) generalisation of this model has the following form: 
twj 
P(B I k) = j=k+I 00 
i=k (6.6) 
where the probability of response B after k runs of b is equal to the ratio of the 
weighted sums of schemata of run length >k and schemata with run length k. The 
weights W are added to model the saliency of different run lengths in memory and 
are set to k which implies that longer runs are assumed to be more salient than 
shorter runs. 
6.5.2 Test of a run-based model 
In order to apply such a model in the context of DfXP, it has to be reformulated 
and adapted to the different structure of the task. First, predictions are only made 
for the trial that would follow after the learning phase (t = 40+1) and which 
represents the last draw from the option to determine the outcome that is actually 
added to the final score. Second, instead of two outcomes a and b that appear with 
probability p and 1p we have actually two such pairs, one within each choice 
option. Consequently, it has to be determined separately for each option which of 
the two outcomes is more likely to appear in the last trial. Furthermore, a choice 
rule has to be introduced to model the actual decision between the two pairs of 
prospects. Following Restle's approach the model was divided into the following 
steps: 
1. Extract the last encountered schemata from the sampled sequence 
separately for both choice options (A and B). 
2. Determine the run length of these schemata (kA and kB) and the event 
included in the run (xA and XB). 
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3. Calculation of the probabilities P(xA kA) and P(xB I kB) according to 
formula 6.6. 
4. Determine the most likely outcome for the next trial for each option: If 
P(xA I kA) >. 5 then xA is predicted to appear in the final trial. Otherwise the 
alternative event yA is predicted to be the outcome of the final trial. 
5. Choice rule: The option with the highest predicted outcome is chosen. 
The addition of steps 4 and 5 makes the model deterministic and allow the 
calculation of rates of correct predictions similar to the previous model tests. 
Evaluations of this model were conducted on the basis of the data from all the 
Matched-Sampling Conditions, including experiments with one and all six 
decision problems and experiments with predetermined sampling order. For the 
cases in which participants had more than one choice problem the frequencies of 
the different run length were assumed not to be affected by the run lengths 
experienced in previous choice problems. As all the components of the model 
emerge from the actual properties of the individual sequences, it was not 
necessary to estimate any parameters. 
The mean rates of correct predictions obtained from this analysis, 
however, did not exceed chance level (51 %). The predictive power of the model 
across the different data sets has been summarised in Table 6.11. 
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TABLE 6.11 
Rates of correct predictions based on the run-based model for the Matched Sampling data 
Free sampling order 40_40 Order 11 5_5 
Exp. Exp. Exp. Exp. Exp. Exp. Exp. Exp. 
23475777 
Rate of correct 0.55 0.52 0.47 0.51 0.43 0.51 0.51 0.54 
predictions 
A version of the model without any salience weighting was also tested but did not 
offer a significant improvement of the rate of correct predictions. Although the 
model does not provide the same level of predictive power as the other 
approaches it has shown that there are alternative properties of the sequence that 
can be explored and utilised for the modelling of the cognitive processes driving 
decisions from experience. 
6.6 Discussion 
The first part of this chapter has provided model fits for PT which offered further 
insights regarding the shapes of the transformations of the model that would be 
able to account for DfXP. Furthermore, from these shapes it was possible to infer 
the apparent underweighting of small probabilities which brings together the 
different experimental findings and emphasises once more that PT cannot be 
generalised across DfXP without assuming different parameters for DfD and 
DfXP. Moreover, the estimations for the two-stage model have confirmed the 
results of the Matched-Sampling Conditions suggesting that such an adaptation of 
the parameter values cannot be avoided by resorting to subjective probability 
estimates. 
Despite the rather low benchmark, set by the predictive power of the PT- 
based approaches, the model tests in the second part of the chapter have shown 
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that it is difficult to outperform them. Nevertheless, the application of the value- 
updating model has revealed that it is possible to obtain identical fit under a model 
that does not require any assumptions regarding the weighting of probabilities. 
The summary of the maximum rate of correct predictions for the tested models in 
Figure 6.10 illustrates also that the application of simple choice heuristics in the 
context if the Matched Sampling design was not as fruitful as suggested by the 
results of Hau et al (in press). 
The same has to be said for the run-based model. Although unsuccessful in 
predicting the observed preferences within DfXP the application of this model has 
shown that there are a range of alternative approaches that should be considered 
and tested, either by being integrated within existing models or separately. 
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Figure 6.10. Summary of the mean proportions of correct predictions for the tested 
models. The dotted line indicates chance performance. 
However, there are also obvious limitations of the presented parameter 
estimations and their comparisons. First, it has to be pointed out that the rather 
low levels of maximum fits might be due to an increased level of noise which may 
be partly circumvented by using bigger sets of problems. This would also allow 
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for an estimation of individual parameters, rather than fitting at an aggregated 
level with data that is pooled across participants, and would get rid of the variance 
due to individual differences 
Furthermore, it has to be assumed that the generally lower upper limits are 
also a result of the usage of the actual rate of correct predictions as a criterion 
instead of the agreement on the level of predicted choice proportions, as it is 
usually reported in descriptive choice tasks. However, this would also apply to the 
previous parameter estimations that have been conducted in this context (e. g., Fox 
& Hadar, 2006; Hau et al., in press). With regard to the evaluation of the 
performance of the models it is important to note, that there is an inevitable 
"upper limit" for every model that predicts modal choice without somehow taking 
into account individual differences. An estimation of this upper limit that might be 
expected for such models was calculated from the average proportion of people 
choosing the modal option in the choices reported by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), taken from the summary table provided by Stewart and Simpson (in 
press). The average is 77.4%, which means that even a model that correctly 
predicts every modal choice (i. e., higher subjective value for the preferred option) 
it would only score 77.4% correct across people's choices. Without being able to 
account for individual differences, one cannot get beyond this number. This 
applies to the PT models and the heuristics and suggests that the performance 
might not be as bad as indicated by the distance to the 100%-line. However, this 
does not apply to the value-updating model and the run-based model, which try to 
incorporate properties that are unique to the individual sequence. 
More generally, a side effect of the functional form of the PT model is that 
the same level of optimal fit can always be obtained under different parameter 
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combinations. This means that the shape of both functions can be traded off 
against each other which makes it very difficult to determine which shape to 
prefer over the other (see also Stott (2006) for a further discussion of this issue). 
This problem even holds for non-parametric approaches (for details see Gonzalez 
& Wu, 1999). Nonetheless, given the converging evidence from the choice 
proportions and the constraints of the decision biases it was possible to refine the 
results at least slightly further. 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that this was by no means intended to 
be a comprehensive test of all candidate models. There is a range of alternatives 
that have been suggested in the literature but which do not lend themselves to a 
direct application within the Matched Sampling paradigm, especially models that 
have been developed to account for feedback based decisions or bandit problems 
with inherent trade-offs between exploration and exploitation of an option (e. g., 
Denrell, 2007; Erev & Barron, 2005). An adoptable approach that should be 
considered in addition to the above mentioned models is the recently proposed 
primed-sampler model (Erev et al., 2008). This is an extension of the value- 
updating model which incorporates the idea that people evaluate choices by 
drawing an even smaller mental sample from the input they have received. 
However, this could conflict with the observation presented here, that participants 
are well aware of the overall frequencies within experienced samples. Another 
dynamic model that does not require a value- or weighting function is the 
decisions by sampling model (Stewart et al., 2006) which has also been shown to 
provide a good predictions under descriptive choice. However, with the extension 
of the range of models considered it becomes also important to find new 
experimental conditions that allow distinguishing the predictions of these models. 
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Potential implications and suggestions emerging from the presented work 
regarding the design of such tests will be discussed in the concluding chapter of 
this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Summary of empirical findings and their contributions 
The research presented in the thesis investigated whether the phenomenon of 
underweighting of small probabilities, as it has been observed in decisions from 
experience (e. g., Hertwig et al., 2004; Weber et al., 2004), can be explained by the 
accounts that have been put forward in the literature thus far. One of these 
explanations has been the reliance on small samples (Hertwig et al., 2004) which 
can result in systematic underrepresentation of the actual frequencies of rare 
events. Another explanation, recency weighting, is based on the assumption that 
more recent outcomes, which are also more likely to be the non-rare events, 
receive more weight than earlier outcomes (Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 
2004). Alternatively, Fox and Hadar (2006) proposed that the effect could also be 
a result of judgement error, the difference between the actually experienced 
probability and the estimated subjective probability. Yet, their experimental 
results did not confirm this claim. Instead, they found evidence suggesting that the 
phenomenon is a result of sampling error, the difference between the experienced 
probability and the actual objective probability. Furthermore, Fox and Hadar 
(2006) argue that the phenomenon can therefore simply be accounted for by 
applying prospect theory in the form of the two-stage model, predicting choices 
on the basis of subjective probabilities estimates rather than objective 
probabilities, thereby implying equivalence in terms of the underlying processes 
involved in both decisions from experience and decisions from description. 
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However, the crucial experimental test of this hypothesis within a design that 
allows controlling for sampling error is yet to be delivered. 
The first strand of this research was intended to investigate these 
experimental conditions with varying degrees of inherent sampling error. The 
results obtained, however, cast serious doubt upon the claimed equivalence of the 
two different choice formats and the cognitive processes involved. Instead, the 
apparent underweighting of small probabilities appeared to be a robust 
phenomenon of experiential choice tasks even under the absence of sampling 
error. Consequently, it was the endeavour of the second part of this research to 
explore alternative explanations for this phenomenon. This was done through both 
additional experimental work and, more theoretically, through the application of 
various candidate models. The empirical findings from the individual chapters can 
be summarised as follows. 
Chapters 2 provided a first experiment which included both a replication 
of the initial experiment by Hertwig et al. (2004) and an extension of the design in 
the form of a Comprehensive-Sampling Condition. This meant that it was possible 
to test whether the effect is limited to conditions under which people only sample 
a few items resulting in underrepresentation of the probabilities of the rare events. 
Although sampling error was significantly reduced under Comprehensive- 
Sampling, the apparent underweighting of small probabilities typical for DfXP 
was replicated under both conditions. In addition, there was no evidence for 
recency weighting under any of the conditions. This confirmed the robustness of 
the apparent underweighting of small probabilities and raised questions regarding 
the validity of the sampling error explanation put forward by Fox and Hadar 
(2006). However, the design did not allow eliminating sampling error. 
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In Chapter 3,1 therefore introduced the Matched-Sampling design as a 
new experimental paradigm that permitted the investigation of decisions from 
experience without the distortion of sampling error. The first experiment, 
employing this design together with a Descriptive-Choice Condition and a Free- 
Sampling Condition, provided initial evidence that choice behaviour different to 
decisions from description can be observed even without the presence of sampling 
error. A comparison with the Free-Sampling Condition revealed that the effect 
under Matched-Sampling was attenuated but still significant. Sampling error has 
therefore been found to moderate the underweighting of small probabilities, but it 
is not the complete explanation of the phenomenon. Furthermore, frequency and 
probability estimations collected in the context of two additional Matched- 
Sampling experiments could show that there was no systematic underestimation 
of rare events. Rather, the estimates were found to be well-adjusted with a slight 
tendency to overestimate small probabilities in accordance with the results 
typically reported in the judgement literature. It can therefore be concluded that 
estimation error is not an explanation either. Further, with the equivalence of the 
estimates and the actual probabilities, the two-stage model makes the same 
predications as prospect theory and can therefore not improve its performance. 
Given this elimination of all existing explanations, Chapter 4 was 
dedicated to exploring potential alternatives. Following an observation of 
extensive switching between options within the previous experimental work, the 
chapter explored the impact of different sampling orders and the resulting 
partitioning of the experienced sequences. However, even when the two options 
could only be evaluated separately without switching, which is more equivalent to 
a descriptive choice task, the apparent underweighting was still observed. In 
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addition, the design in Experiment 6 and 7 also allowed for an initial investigation 
of the reversal of choice patterns between the DfD and DfX1' within participants. 
The analysis of the proportions of DfXP and Non-DfXP reversals though did not 
provide conclusive results. 
A re-analysis of the data in the context of classical decision biases was 
provided in Chapter 5. Instead of the usual common ratio effect observed under 
DfD, I found evidence for a reversed common ratio effect under Free-Sampling 
Conditions and an attenuated intermediate effect under Matched-Sampling 
Conditions, echoing the findings on the difference in terms of the probability 
weighting function within DfXP throughout the experimental work presented. A 
new discovery was the finding of a reversed reflection effect in the context of 
DfXP, indicating differences with regard to the value transformation. 
Furthermore, from this analysis a few constraints could be derived regarding the 
shape of both transformations that would allow prospect theory to account for the 
data. This is a value function that is concave for losses and convex for gains to 
incorporate the reversed reflection effect and a weighting function that is either 
slightly steeper between .2 and . 25 than 
between .8 and 1.0., or 
has equal slopes 
between both points, accommodating the apparent underweighting of small 
probabilities and the reversed or attenuated common ratio effect. 
Finally, Chapter 6 provided additional and more comprehensive model 
tests which could accommodate most of the findings in the previous chapters 
regarding the suitability of prospect theory. The overall fit was lower than usually 
observed under descriptive choice. Also, the inferences from the optimal 
parameters for both transformations under a valid prospect theory framework 
matched the constraints derived from the decision biases analysis and the apparent 
227 
Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusions 
underweighting observed for the differences in choice proportions between DfXP 
and DfD. The same results were also obtained for the two-stage model, again 
validating earlier observations. Crucially, as predicted from the combined 
findings, the optimal parameters under DfXP differed noticeably from parameters 
obtained for the available descriptive choice data. 
Apart from the analysis of PT, it could also be shown that a simple 
reinforcement model like the value-updating model by Hertwig et al. (2006), 
which does not make any assumptions about probability weighting, can also 
explain the data just as well as PT. Simple heuristics and an application of a run- 
based model, on the other hand did not seem to provide predictive power beyond 
chance level. 
7.2 Conclusions 
With the results summarised in the previous section, this thesis has provided 
wide-ranging evidence for the robustness of the differences between decisions 
made on the basis of simple lottery descriptions and decisions from experience, 
where information regarding the outcomes and probabilities of the choice 
alternatives are not explicitly provided but have to be inferred from an 
experienced sequence of outcomes. The different behaviour observed under 
decisions from experience seems to imply underweighting of small probabilities. 
As the current literature is dominated by a discussion around the sampling error 
hypothesis of Fox and Hadar, the introduction of the Matched Sampling paradigm 
and the resulting rejection of sampling error as a complete explanation is a 
significant contribution to the field. Indeed, this will shift the focus of future 
research. Furthermore, this design should be embraced as a replacement for the 
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Free-Sampling design and will hopefully inspire the development of additional 
extensions facilitating the identification of the relevant properties and the 
underlying processes. 
The absence of any form of recency weighting throughout the seven 
experiments presented here can be seen as strong evidence against any 
involvement of it in the phenomenon. However, there are of course other ways of 
measuring recency weighting. In the analyses reported here, I have been following 
the original approach of Hertwig et al. (2004) by predicting choices on the basis 
of the expected value of earlier and later parts of the sequences. Alternatively, one 
could use different models to generate the predictions, for example prospect 
theory or one of the choice heuristics described in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, the 
findings reported here seem to echo the results of other very recent studies by Hau 
et al. (in press) and Rakow, Demes and Newell (in press) who also report similar 
effects without the coexistence of recency effects. Finally, there was also 
converging evidence from the estimations for the value-updating model, which 
verify that close to optimal performance of the model in most of the data sets can 
be obtained without any form of recency weighting. The consistent observation of 
well-adjusted frequency and probability estimates is also an important finding 
which is in line with results by Fox and Hadar (2006). Again, this emphasises the 
convergence of the PT and the two-stage model under DfXP. 
In summary, the first four experiments of this thesis showed that all the 
explanations put forward in the literature thus far are not sufficient to account for 
the choice pattern under decisions from experience. It was therefore the challenge 
of the second part to identify alternative accounts. Although the investigation of 
the sampling order effects did not lead to an ultimate explanation of the effect, the 
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deduction of its design from the observation of the switching behaviour will 
hopefully direct attention towards the structural differences of the experiential 
tasks and facilitate a further investigation of the specific properties of the 
sequential accumulation of the incorporated information over time. 
In the context of the analysis of the decision biases in Chapter 5, another 
significant contribution was the examination of the reflection effect under DfXP. 
The observation of a reversed reflection effect under Matched Sampling suggests 
that the underlying differences are not necessarily restricted to a difference in 
probability weighting, as it is discussed in the current literature, but are based on 
variations in the transformations of both values and probabilities. This was also 
confirmed by the optimal parameters found for the PT and the two-stage model in 
Chapter 6 which offered the first comprehensive parameter estimation on 
experiential choice data that could actually match the observed deviations from 
the PT predictions with congruent parameter values. Furthermore, as the optimal 
parameters for the available descriptive choice data could confirm the properties 
usually observed for PT, this thesis has provided the first comprehensive 
evaluation of the two formats that could track the differences between them from 
raw choice proportions over the differences in decision biases to the level of 
contrasting sets of optimal parameters values. 
Taken together, the results indicate that the functional form of PT-based 
models can, to some extent, account for experiential choice data. However, in 
order to do so drastic adjustments of the parameters are required. As the 
implications of these changes are also diametrical to the proposed mechanisms 
under descriptive choice it seems necessary to extend these models. Without a 
plausible rationale for the shift in parameters when applied to experiential choice 
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tasks the PT model seems to maintain its descriptive quality but loses its 
explanatory quality. Therefore, the derivation of simple reinforcement models in 
the context of DfXP, which have been proven to account for the data as well as 
PT-based models, seem more intuitive. Further, the learning models seem to be 
flexible and extendable enough to accommodate the different properties of 
experiential tasks. As the data and designs presented here do not allow any further 
conclusions regarding their validity, it will be left to future research to provide 
additional model comparisons under conditions that demand distinguishable 
predictions from the different models. 
In terms of the experimental methods employed, including laboratory and 
Web-based experiments, it could be shown that the difference between DfD and 
DfXP, although attenuated, can be replicated across a wider range of 
demographics outside the laboratory. However, it appeared to be easier to 
replicate the experiential choice proportions than the classical choice patterns 
under descriptive choice tasks within the Web-based experiments. As the gamble 
descriptions have been studied extensively in the lab, it could be argued that this 
is most likely due to special characteristics of the chosen samples. This is in line 
with observations by Birnbaum (1999), who demonstrated in a series of decision 
making experiments on the Internet, involving lottery descriptions, that student 
samples were generally more biased than Internet samples. 
7.3 Limitations and Future directions 
Nevertheless, besides these notable contributions, it is also important to point out 
a few limitations of the research that should be addressed by future investigations. 
The first limitation relates to the range of choice problems that have been 
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employed so far. As the research presented here was seeking to replicate the effect 
under Matched Sampling resembling the original conditions as closely as 
possible, I decided to use the same choice problems used by Hertwig et al. (2004), 
Fox and Hadar (2006), and Barron and Erev (2003). Within future experiments, 
however, it would be advantageous to see results from a wider range of choice 
problems, including mixed gambles and a more comprehensive range of 
probabilities. This would allow a more systematic and fine grained investigation 
of the transformation of probabilities in experiential tasks. A first step in this 
direction seems to have been made in the most recent studies (Erev et al., 2008; 
Hau et al., in press; Rakow et al., in press). It would also be important to test how 
far these results can be generalised to decisions involving more than two 
outcomes. 
An area that could only be touched briefly was the investigation of 
alternative representations of the task. Although the exploration of sub-sequences 
(Chapter 4) and the analysis of runs (Chapter 6) were not especially fruitful, it 
could be shown that the explored sequences do provide a rich source of alternative 
properties that can be utilised in order to model choice behaviour in decisions 
from experience. This includes observations of the information search and the use 
of individual stopping rules, which might also help to explain some of the 
differences found between Free Sampling, marked by a self-determined end of the 
exploration, and Matched Sampling. 
However, findings by Rakow, Demes and Newell (in press) seem to 
suggest that neither sequential information nor the actual experience itself can 
explain the phenomenon. They observed the same choice behaviour of 
underweighting of small probabilities under conditions in which participants were 
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merely provided with the raw frequencies from another participant's observations 
(e. g., (1) 4 points on 7 out of 10 occasions, 0 points on 3 out of 10 occasions, 
versus (2) 3 points on 5 out of 5). This, in turn, contradicts the findings of 
Simonson, Karlson, Loewenstein and Ariely (2008) who showed, in the context of 
the repeated play of games like the Weak-link and the Prisoner's Dilemma, that 
experienced information has more impact on actual behaviour than information, 
identical in content, format and relevance that was merely observed. It also goes 
against the explanation put forward by Erev et al. (2008) claiming that rare events 
are only underweighted when they are neglected and not made explicit. The 
presentation of the frequencies makes them explicit but it does not reduce the 
underweighting. 
It is also interesting to note that the results presented here seem to contradict 
the "frequentist hypothesis" (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996), which contends that the 
presentation in a frequency format eliminates biases usually observed under the 
presentation of probabilities. Instead of unbiased transformations under DfXP, we 
actually find a reversal of the biases normally observed when providing explicit 
probabilities in descriptive choice tasks. It would therefore be interesting to 
examine whether both biases can be compensated when combining the two 
formats. The results from Experiment 4, in which participants had to give 
probability judgements before choosing their preferred option, seem to suggest 
that this does not necessarily eliminate underweighting. It would be helpful to 
explore this more systematically, including alternative ways of combining the 
formats. 
An issue that has not yet been considered in the literature are the prior 
assumptions that participants might have regarding the sampling processes behind 
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the two buttons. These could be assumptions that they bring into the experiments 
or assumptions that are triggered by the device metaphor used within the 
experiment. Some of the participants' comments after the completion of the tasks 
seem to indicate that despite the instructions, participants believed in the presence 
of patterns or other forms of dependencies between buttons. Computer tasks like 
the button design of the DfXP paradigm could be the reason for such alternative 
assumptions. In order to clarify whether this has any impact on the observed 
choice behaviour, it would be vital to examine the phenomena using tasks that 
trigger more natural representations of the stochastic properties of the sampling 
process. This could be either draws from shuffled decks of cards or draws from an 
urn with a known proportion of differently coloured balls. 
Finally, an interesting series of findings that could also have implications 
for decisions from experience has been reported in research on decisions within 
human movement planning tasks involving rewards and penalties. A typical 
design for such tasks (e. g., Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2003b) requires 
participants to repeatedly hit a small circular reward region which overlaps with 
an equally sized penalty region on a touch screen. Due to a time limit, movements 
cannot be executed with full accuracy resulting in residual motor variability 
around the selected target point. The selection of the point that maximises hitting 
the reward region and minimises hitting the penalty region under the constraints 
of individual motor uncertainty provides therefore conditions that are 
mathematically equivalent to choices among lotteries in decision making under 
risk (Maloney, Trommershäuser, & Landy, 2007). However, it could be shown 
that unlike in decision making under risk, the performance of participants within 
these motor planning tasks show a startling ability to maximise expected value 
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across a long series of trials (e. g., Trommershäuser, Gepshtein, Maloney, Landy, 
& Banks, 2005; Trommershäuser, Landy, & Maloney, 2006; Trommershäuser, 
Maloney, & Landy, 2003a; Trommershäuser et al., 2003b). As the task is repeated 
and the uncertainty implicit, it shares a lot of similarities with decisions from 
experience. Even more intriguing in the context of investigation of the differences 
between DfD and DfXP is an extension of the design introducing explicit 
stochastic rewards and penalties (similar to lottery descriptions) under which 
performance could be shown to suddenly drop below optimal (Maloney et al., 
2007). A further investigation of these problems using an extended range of 
probabilities and configurations, including non-mixed lotteries and rare events, 
would allow testing of whether there is also evidence for underweighting of small 
probabilities comparable with the result reported in DfXP and whether the 
differences found for implicitly experienced forms of uncertainty can be 
generalised across a wider range of modalities. 
7.4 Applications 
In everyday life we often lack explicit objective information regarding the risks 
that we are exposed to. Instead, people have to rely on personal experiences. 
Consequently, a better understanding of the cognitive processes dominating the 
behaviour in experiential contexts might also enhance the understanding of human 
choice in general. As suggested by the title of this thesis and the results reported 
throughout, the reliance on experience might come with the burden of a different 
bias implying underweighting of small probability events. What this means for an 
individual decision depends of course on the context. However, as rare events are 
often also events which have an proportionally high impact (Taleb, 2007), it is 
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important to investigate potential implications of decisions from experience in the 
context of everyday live, like the usage of safety devices or the consideration of 
health risks, to name but a few. 
Initial applications have been provided in different domains, including the 
perceived risks constituted by global warming (Weber, 2006), risk assessment of 
industrial accidents (Barkan, Zohar, & Erev, 1998), the usage of safety devices 
(Yechiam, Erev, & Barron, forthcoming), and the fear of terrorist attacks 
(Yechiam, Barron, & Erev, 2005). These examples indicate the far-ranging 
implications of this new strand of decision making research. We may reasonably 
hope that further applications will follow. 
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